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When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal government fell in February 2020, PH also lost control over the states of Johor, Malacca, Perak and Kedah. In Sabah, PH-aligned Warisan was replaced by the PN-aligned United Alliance of Sabah. PH maintained its hold on three states—Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. Selangor’s position is of unique interest, given the largest share of PH assemblypersons comprising members from the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR), the party which has faced significant elite splits in 2020. The present stability of PH’s survival in Selangor can be accounted for by the sheer majority it possesses within the legislative assembly, comprising forty-one out of fifty-six state seats. Unless a significant share of assemblypersons were to defect, the change in state government would be highly unlikely. PH built a strong base in Selangor during its time in power over more than a decade, securing performative legitimacy and rooting itself strongly within the community. PH has benefited from the highly urbanized and educated demographic profile of Selangor. However, the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed the landscape, which may in turn affect how constituents will now respond to goodies offered by the federal government. Although PH in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year’s political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH’s ability to maintain its strong margin. The political fragmentation that continues to unfold will see further party and coalitional realignment, which will invariably impact PH’s strength in Selangor.
The results of Malaysia's 14th General Elections of May 2018 were unexpected and transformative. Against conventional wisdom, the newly reconfigured opposition grouping Pakatan Harapan (PH) decisively defeated the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN), ending six decades of uninterrupted dominant one-party rule. Despite a long-running financial scandal dogging the ruling coalition, pollsters and commentators predicted a solid BN victory or, at least, a narrow parliamentary majority. Yet, on the day, deeply rooted political dynamics and influential actors came together, sweeping aside many prevailing assumptions and reconfiguring the country's political reality in the process. In order to understand the elections and their implications, this edited volume brings together contributions from ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute researchers and a group of selected collaborators to examine the elections from three angles: campaign dynamics; important trends among major interest groups; and local-level dynamics and developments in key states. This analytical work is complemented by personal narratives from a selection of GE-14 participants.
Beginning in 2005 as a small electoral reform initiative, the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, known as Bersih, became the most prominent social movement in Malaysia. Based on participant observation approach and first-hand interviews with key actors, this book examines how Bersih became a movement that aggregated the collective grievance of Malaysians and brought Malaysian sociopolitical activism to a new level. This book makes a major contribution to the scholarly work on social movement theories in the Southeast Asian context and to the growing literature on social movements and democratization.
Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts explores how courts engage in constitutional state-building in aspiring, yet deeply fragile, democracies in Asia. Yvonne Tew offers an in-depth look at contemporary Malaysia and Singapore, explaining how courts protect and construct constitutionalism even as they confront dominant political parties and negotiate democratic transitions. This richly illustrative account offers at once an engaging analysis of Southeast Asia's constitutional context, as well as a broader narrative that should resonate in many countries across Asia that are also grappling with similar challenges of colonial legacies, histories of authoritarian rule, and societies polarized by race, religion, and identity. The book explores the judicial strategies used for statecraft in Asian courts, including an analysis of the specific mechanisms that courts can use to entrench constitutional basic structures and to protect rights in a manner that is purposive and proportionate. Tew's account shows how courts in Asia's emerging democracies can chart a path forward to help safeguard a nation's constitutional core and to build an enduring constitutional framework.
The best country-by-country assessment of human rights. The human rights records of more than ninety countries and territories are put into perspective in Human Rights Watch's signature yearly report. Reflecting extensive investigative work undertaken by Human Rights Watch staff, in close partnership with domestic human rights activists, the annual World Report is an invaluable resource for journalists, diplomats, and citizens, and is a must-read for anyone interested in the fight to protect human rights in every corner of the globe.
Johor is a key battleground in Malaysia’s 14th General Elections. The state is economically vital to the country: it is the birthplace of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO); and it has a large number of parliamentary seats. Johor-specific dynamics that have worked to the advantage of the ruling coalition include: UMNO’s unique links with the state; the tight control over religion; and the phenomenal scale and success of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) scheme. Despite these advantages, support for the ruling coalition has been slipping across the state. Furthermore, the emergence of new parties such as Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) will challenge Barisan Nasional’s control over Johor’s rural and Malay heartland. The redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies now underway is however likely to benefit BN, and recent survey data indicate that Johoreans are yet to be attracted to the reconfigured opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan. Thus, while BN may suffer a drop in support, it is likely to retain power in Johor.
The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is no stranger to coalition politics. It has a long history of working with others, both in government and in opposition. Up until 2018, it used the framework of tahaluf siyasi as the guide to forming coalitions. Under the pretext of tahaluf siyasi or political coalition, PAS joined the Barisan Nasional (BN) government in 1974. It was also a key player in the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), Barisan Alternatif (BA) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coalitions. But in the lead up to GE14, PAS decided to form the Gagasan Sejahtera coalition with much smaller parties—Berjasa and Ikatan. It dominated this coalition and the two partners were largely insignificant. After GE14, PAS decided to partner with UMNO in Muafakat Nasional, under the pretext of a new strategy called ta’awun siyasi or political cooperation. This is a looser partnership arrangement, in which the partners are not strictly bound to each other. The formation of Muafakat Nasional is a historic development, as it brings together the two biggest and oldest Malay political parties for the time in an exclusive manner. Bersatu joined the pact in 2020, making Muafakat Nasional the biggest Malay political force in Malaysia today. PAS sees its role as a unifier of the Muslim ummah, holding and keeping the peace between UMNO and Bersatu. For PAS, creating Malay Muslim unity is not just an effective political strategy but also a religious obligation.
Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure. Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party’s establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang. The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election. Dr Boo Cheng Hau inherited the decentralized state leadership structure when he became the DAP Johor chairman in 2005. Under Dr Boo’s leadership the party prioritized welfare provision and constituency services in several state constituencies, particularly Skudai (in Gelang Patah) and Bentayan (in Bakri). The grassroots machinery was also strengthened while mechanisms were established to resolve intra-party conflicts in the lead-up to general elections. In the 2008 General Election, these efforts paid off and DAP Johor achieved its (till then) best results by capturing four state constituencies--including Skudai and Bentayan--in addition to the Bakri parliamentary seat. In the aftermath of GE2008, where DAP made unprecedented gains in Penang, Selangor and Perak, the national DAP leadership began to shift their attention towards Johor as the latter was perceived as the next frontline state. The party continued its upward swing and made unprecedented gains in the 2013 General Election. As DAP maintained its momentum, coupled with the success of other Pakatan Harapan (PH) component parties in Johor during the 2018 General Election, the DAP under the PH coalition displaced BN as the Johor state government.
How do discontented masses and opposition elites work together to engineer a change in electoral authoritarian regimes? Social movements and elections are often seen as operating in different terrains – outside and inside institutions, respectively. In this Element, I develop a theory to describe how a broad-based social movement that champions a grievance shared by a wide segment of the population can build alliances across society and opposition elites that, despite the rules of the game rigged against them, vote the incumbents out of power. The broad-based nature of the movement also contributes to the cohesion of the opposition alliance, and elite defection, which are often crucial for regime change. This Element examines the 2018 Malaysian election and a range of cases from other authoritarian regimes across Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa to illustrate these arguments.
What explains the treatment of ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia? This Element conceptually disaggregates ethnicity into multiple constituent markers – specifically language, religion, and phenotype. By focusing on the interaction between these three ethnic markers, Liu and Ricks explore how overlap between these markers can affect whether a minority integrates within a broader ethnic identity; successfully extracts accommodation as unique group; or engages in a contentious and potentially violent relationship with the hegemon. The argument is tested through six case studies: (1) ethnic Lao in Thailand: integration; (2) ethnic Chinese in Thailand: integration; (3) ethnic Chinese in Malaysia: accommodation; (4) ethnic Malays in Singapore: accommodation; (5) ethnic Malays in Thailand: contention; and (6) ethnic Chinese in Indonesia: contention.