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A fresh challenge to 'microphysicalism', the influential contemporary view in philosophy and science that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts.
'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. Hüttemann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. Hüttemann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature. What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.
Provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, yielding new accounts of lawhood, causation and reduction.
Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society.
"This is a popular science book exploring the limits of scientific explanation. In particular, it debates if all sciences will ultimately be reducible to physics. The journey starts with physics itself, where there is a gap between the micro (quantum) and the macro (classical) and moves into chemistry, biology and the social sciences. Written by a practising scientist, this volume offers a personal perspective on various topics and incorporates the latest research"--
" ... dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed.".
During the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Instead, philosophers offered conceptual truths. It is widely assumed that, since 1970, things have changed greatly. This book argues that's an illusion that prevails because of the failure to differentiate between "concretely substantial" and "concretely empty" ideas.
In this book the author what it means to be physical, mental, or abstract entity, and how they relate to the concept of reality. His answers are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances, and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their latter day exemplars.