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Epistemological theories of knowledge and justification draw a crucial distinction between one’s simply having good reasons for some belief and one’s actually basing one’s belief on good reasons. While the most natural kind of account of basing is causal in nature—a belief is based on a reason if and only if the belief is properly caused by the reason—there is hardly any widely accepted, counterexample-free account of the basing relation among contemporary epistemologists. Further inquiry into the nature of the basing relation is therefore of paramount importance for epistemology. Without an acceptable account of the basing relation, epistemological theories remain both crucially incomplete and vulnerable to errors that can arise when authors assume an implausible view of what it takes for beliefs to be held on the basis of reasons. Well-Founded Belief brings together 16 essays written by leading epistemologists to explore this important topic in greater detail. The chapters in this collection are divided into two broad categories: (i) the nature of the basing relation; and (ii) basing and its applications. The chapters in the first section are concerned, principally, with positively characterizing the epistemic basing relation and criticizing extant accounts of it, including extant accounts of the relationship between epistemic basing and propositional and doxastic justification. The latter chapters connect epistemic basing with other topics of interest in epistemology as well as ethics, including: epistemic disjunctivism, epistemic injustice, agency, epistemic conservativism, epistemic grounding, epistemic genealogy, practical reasoning, and practical knowledge.
New and thoroughly updated, Epistemology: An Anthology continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on 'The Structure of Knowledge and Justification', 'The Non-Epistemic in Epistemology', and 'The Nature of the Epistemic' Includes many of the most important contributions made in recent decades by several outstanding authors
On a traditional conception of the human mind, reasoning can be rational or irrational, but perception cannot. Perception is simply a source of new information, and cannot be assessed for rationality or justification. Susanna Siegel argues that this conception is wrong. Drawing on examples involving racism, emotion, self-defense law, and scientific theories, The Rationality of Perception makes the case that perception itself can be rational or irrational. The Rationality of Perception argues that reasoning and perception are often deeply intertwined. When unjustified beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudices influence what we perceive, we face a philosophical problem: is it reasonable to strengthen what one believes, fears, or suspects, on the basis of an experience that was generated, unbeknownst to the perceiver, by those very same beliefs, fears, or suspicions? Siegel argues that it is not reasonable even though it may seem that way to the perceiver. In these cases, a perceptual experience may itself be irrational, because it is brought about by irrational influences. Siegel systematically distinguishes a number of different kinds of influences on perception, and builds a theory of how such influences on perception determine what it's rational or irrational to believe. She uses the main conclusions to analyze perceptual manifestations of racism. This book makes vivid the far-reaching consequences of psychological and cultural influences on perception. Its method shows how analytic philosophy, social psychology, history and politics can be mutually illuminating.
First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
This volume explores evidentialism, a major theory of epistemic justification. It contains more than 20 papers that examine its nuances, its challenges, as well as its future directions. Written by leading and up-and-coming epistemologists, the papers cover a wide array of topics related to evidentialism. The contributors present both sides of the theory: some are advocates of evidentialism, while others are critics. This provides readers with a comprehensive, and cutting-edge, understanding of this epistemic theory. Overall, the book is organized into six parts: The Nature of Evidence, Understanding Evidentialism, Problems for Evidentialism, Evidentialism and Social Epistemology, New Directions for Evidentialism, and Explanationist Evidentialism. Readers will find insightful discussion on such issues as the ontology of evidence, phenomenal dogmatism, how experiences yield evidence, the new evil demon problem, probability, norms of credibility, intellectual virtues, wisdom, epistemic justification, and more. This title provides authoritative coverage of evidentialism, from the latest developments to the most recent philosophical criticisms. It will appeal to researchers and graduate students searching for more information on this prominent epistemological theory.
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
Culture and religion are overlapping phenomena: cultures are normally understood to subsume religions, and religions are very often central to cultures. The two are particularly closely associated when we focus on the kinds of difference that generate issues for public policy. The world has always been culturally and religiously diverse, but recent movements of population have intensified the internal diversity of societies. That increased diversity has presented societies with a number of pressing questions. How much should cultural differences matter? Can they and should they be treated impartially? Should they receive equal recognition and what sort of recognition might that be? Are cultural and religious differences at odds with human rights thinking or do universal human rights demand respect for those differences? When the demands of a religious faith clash with those of a society's rules, which should take precedence? Should the religious have to endure whatever burdens their beliefs bring their way, or should they be accommodated so that their religious faith does not become a source of social disadvantage? Should they have to put up with unwelcome treatments of their beliefs or should they be protected from the offensive and the disrespectful? These are some of the many issues examined in Culture, Religion and Rights.
Eugene Thomas Long Originally published in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 63, Nos 1–3. DOI: 10. 1007/s11153-007-9155-4 © Springer Science+Business Media B. V. 2007 This volume is presented as a tribute to the life and work of D. Z. Phillips. Six of the articles were originally presented at the annual conference on the philosophy of religion organized by Phillips and held at Claremont Graduate University, February 9–10, 2007. Unfortunately, Phillipsdidnotlivetoparticipateintheconferenceitself. HediedunexpectedlyJuly25,2006 in the library of his beloved University of Wales, Swansea. Previously published volumes of essays,basedonconferencesorganizedbyPhillipsinClaremont,includedachapterentitled, “Voices in Discussion,” in which Phillips provided his own reactions to the discussions wr- ten almost immediately after the conference. Sadly, this volume appears without the addition of his voice. Born in Morriston, near Swansea, Phillips was a Welsh speaker, a strong supporter of Welsh speaking schools and the author of many works in philosophy and literature in Welsh and English. Known widely as the leading representative of the movement in the philo- phy of religion called Wittgensteinianism, Phillips spent much of his effort challenging the tendency of philosophers to elevate one kind of discourse to the point where it becomes the norm by which other forms of discourse are to be judged.
Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemic justification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemic justification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemic justification. In this book McCain offers novel approaches to several elements of well-founded belief. Key among these are an original account of what it takes to have information as evidence, an account of epistemic support in terms of explanation, and a causal account of the basing relation (the relation that one's belief must bear to her evidence in order to be justified) that is far superior to previous accounts. The result is a fully developed Evidentialist account of well-founded belief.