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Uncovers and examines Britain's counter-subversive policies and security measures implemented in the post-war Middle East, Middle Eastern affairs make headlines. Not only are they politically volatile, but the cultural and religious contexts complicate Western involvement in the region. This book reveals secret British intelligence liaisons with Middle Eastern regimes during the early Cold War. It shows how Britain tried to influence regional intelligence and security services and shape their approach to countering communist subversion. Analysing newly declassified documents alongside extensive archival research and historiography, the book pieces together the intelligence culture build by the British Empire in the Middle East in the post-war era.
This important new study focusing on the ultranationalist regimes in Germany and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s examines in biographical format the roles played by individuals significantly involved in the drive for global hegemony. Employing a considerable range of new source materials and eyewitness testimony on the German side, it highlights the roles of the Nazi Party ‘enforcer’ and Gestapo representative in East Asia, Josef Albert Meisinger, and of the officer commanding German naval forces in the Pacific region, Admiral Paul Werner Wenneker, agent Richard Sorge as whose relations with the Japanese Navy in the 1930s were observed and recalled by Engineer-Commander George C. Ross, the UK assistant naval attaché in Japan. The reactions of the German aero-engineer, Willi Foerster, a client of the Soviet radio operator, Max Clausen, to both Meisinger and Wenneker in the 1940s are also documented. On the Japanese side, new evidence is employed which examines the influence of the right-wing business and political figure, Sasagawa Ryôichi, on domestic events during the era of ‘Tennô-fascism’ and its aftermath. Similarly, an analysis of the role of the head of wartime Japanese military intelligence in eastern Europe, General Onodera Makoto, based in Stockholm, indicates the extent of opposition within the Japanese army to factional groups wedded to Nazi ideology and strategy and the ongoing support in Japan for anti-Soviet and anti-communist policies in the post-war era.
War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.
The much-anticipated third volume of Churchill's fascinating papers.
This book focuses on the activities of the scientific staff of the British National Institute of Oceanography during the Cold War. Revealing how issues such as intelligence gathering, environmental surveillance, the identification of ‘enemy science’, along with administrative practice informed and influenced the Institute’s Cold War program. In turn, this program helped shape decisions taken by Government, military and the civil service towards science in post-war Britain. This was not simply a case of government ministers choosing to patronize particular scientists, but a relationship between politics and science that profoundly impacted on the future of ocean science in Britain.
An analysis of Britain's diplomatic efforts to preserve the non-belligerency of Franco's Spain, during the period from late 1940 to the end of 1941. Making extensive use of recently available British and Spanish documentary records, Dr Smyth explains how Britain's uphill struggle to secure Spanish non-belligerency had been rewarded with success by December 1940. Ironically, British policy-makers were unaware of the earl), success of their efforts, so they remained alert throughout 1940-41 to the danger of sudden Spanish support for a German move across their territory to Gibraltar. The conclusion notes how continuing Spanish neutrality helped the British endure 'their finest hour' and the Franco regime to survive the destruction of its former Fascist patrons.
This is a practical guide to the historical study of international politics. The focus is on the nuts and bolts of historical research--that is, on how to use original sources, analyze and interpret historical works, and actually write a work of history. Two appendixes provide sources sure to be indispensable for anyone doing research in this area. The book does not simply lay down precepts. It presents examples drawn from the author's more than forty years' experience as a working historian. One important chapter, dealing with America's road to war in 1941, shows in unprecedented detail how an interpretation of a major historical issue can be developed. The aim throughout is to throw open the doors of the workshop so that young scholars, both historians and political scientists, can see the sort of thought processes the historian goes through before he or she puts anything on paper. Filled with valuable examples, this is a book anyone serious about conducting historical research will want to have on the bookshelf.
A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.