Download Free War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub Committee Meetings January December 1944 Numbers 1 75 Volume Vi Cab81 92 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub Committee Meetings January December 1944 Numbers 1 75 Volume Vi Cab81 92 and write the review.

Uncovers and examines Britain's counter-subversive policies and security measures implemented in the post-war Middle East, Middle Eastern affairs make headlines. Not only are they politically volatile, but the cultural and religious contexts complicate Western involvement in the region. This book reveals secret British intelligence liaisons with Middle Eastern regimes during the early Cold War. It shows how Britain tried to influence regional intelligence and security services and shape their approach to countering communist subversion. Analysing newly declassified documents alongside extensive archival research and historiography, the book pieces together the intelligence culture build by the British Empire in the Middle East in the post-war era.
This book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. At the very heart of this highly secretive aspect of British defence policy were fundamental questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery, but featured prominently at the highest levels of the British government and defence planning. Importantly, and despite stringent secrecy, the book further uncovers how public scrutiny and protest movements played a substantial and successful part in influencing policy and attitudes towards nerve agent weapons.
Intelligence was a central element of the Cold War and the need for it was expected to diminish after the USSR's collapse, yet in recent years it has been in greater demand than ever. The atrocities of 11 September and the subsequent "war on terrorism" now call for an even more intensive effort. Important questions arise on how intelligence fits into the world of increased threats, globalization and expanded international action. This volume contains the recent work on this subject by Michael Herman, British intelligence professional for 35 years and Oxford University academic. It compares intelligence with other government information services, and discusses the British intelligence system and the case for its reform. It also addresses the ethical issues raised by intelligence's methods and results: "do they on balance make for a better world or a worse one?". Other chapters explore a wide range of intelligence topics past and present, including the transatlantic relationship, the alliance strategies of Norway and New Zealand, Mrs Thatcher's "de-unionization" of British Sigint, and personal memories of the British Cabinet Office in the 1970s. Michael Herman argues for intelligence professionalism as a contribution to international security and for its encouragement as a world standard. The modern challenge is for intelligence to support international cooperation in ways originally developed to advance national interests, while at the same time developing some restraint and international "rules of the game", in the use of intrusive and covert methods on its traditional targets. The effects of 11 September on this challenge are discussed in a thoughtful afterword.
War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.
This book focuses on the activities of the scientific staff of the British National Institute of Oceanography during the Cold War. Revealing how issues such as intelligence gathering, environmental surveillance, the identification of ‘enemy science’, along with administrative practice informed and influenced the Institute’s Cold War program. In turn, this program helped shape decisions taken by Government, military and the civil service towards science in post-war Britain. This was not simply a case of government ministers choosing to patronize particular scientists, but a relationship between politics and science that profoundly impacted on the future of ocean science in Britain.
A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.
This is a practical guide to the historical study of international politics. The focus is on the nuts and bolts of historical research--that is, on how to use original sources, analyze and interpret historical works, and actually write a work of history. Two appendixes provide sources sure to be indispensable for anyone doing research in this area. The book does not simply lay down precepts. It presents examples drawn from the author's more than forty years' experience as a working historian. One important chapter, dealing with America's road to war in 1941, shows in unprecedented detail how an interpretation of a major historical issue can be developed. The aim throughout is to throw open the doors of the workshop so that young scholars, both historians and political scientists, can see the sort of thought processes the historian goes through before he or she puts anything on paper. Filled with valuable examples, this is a book anyone serious about conducting historical research will want to have on the bookshelf.
This updated edition of The Secret State revises Hennessy's picture of the Soviet threat that was presented to ministers from the last days of the Second World War to the 1960s. He maps the size and shape of the Cold War state built in response to that perceived threat, and traces the arguments successive generations of ministers, the military and civil servants have used to justify the British nuclear capability. He also adds new material exploring the threats presented by the IRA and radical Islamic terrorists post 9/11. In what circumstances would the Prime Minister authorize the use of nuclear force and how would his orders be carried out? What would the Queen be told and when? In this captivating new account, Peter Hennessy provides the best answers we have yet had to these questions.
An analysis of Britain's diplomatic efforts to preserve the non-belligerency of Franco's Spain, during the period from late 1940 to the end of 1941. Making extensive use of recently available British and Spanish documentary records, Dr Smyth explains how Britain's uphill struggle to secure Spanish non-belligerency had been rewarded with success by December 1940. Ironically, British policy-makers were unaware of the earl), success of their efforts, so they remained alert throughout 1940-41 to the danger of sudden Spanish support for a German move across their territory to Gibraltar. The conclusion notes how continuing Spanish neutrality helped the British endure 'their finest hour' and the Franco regime to survive the destruction of its former Fascist patrons.