Download Free Vertical Integration Facing Separation Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Vertical Integration Facing Separation and write the review.

This three-volume handbook includes state-of-the-art surveys in different areas of neoclassical production economics. Volumes 1 and 2 cover theoretical and methodological issues only. Volume 3 includes surveys of empirical applications in different areas like manufacturing, agriculture, banking, energy and environment, and so forth.
This timely book addresses the important issue of the negative effects of anticompetitive regulation on industry and the massive economic harm it causes. The distinguished contributors, including economic and legal scholars, advocate the need for a review of all anticompetitive laws and address several industry and country case studies with the ultimate aim of providing recommendations to eliminate the impact of anticompetitive regulation. The first part of the book considers regulations affecting private business and professions, part two covers public utility and public services regulation, whilst part three discusses the role of institutions and competition authorities in relation to anticompetitive practices. The authors draft guidelines, based on economic evidence and legal arguments, which they believe would provide a starting point for the European Union to address the problem. They go on to propose possible implementation strategies for these guidelines from both an institutional and legal perspective. The book also includes a historical perspective on the evolution of anticompetitive regulation complemented by an overview of the actions currently being implemented to address and reverse the problem in other jurisdictions.
This report considers the challenges that arise in remedying ‘intermediation bias’ by vertically integrated digital platforms which match the needs of different groups of users so they can transact with each other. Platforms perform this intermediation function by displaying and ranking those services or products which are most relevant to the users’ needs and, in doing so, compete for consumers’ attention. What is intermediation bias? Platforms compete for users’ attention to varying degrees depending on the ease with which users can switch between platforms and their inclination to do so, entry barriers for other platforms, and many other factors. Generally, platforms have an incentive to offer consumers the most relevant matches, because the platforms can then capture part of the value that has been created for both the consumer and the businesses that are being intermediated. However, sometimes platforms may also have incentives to deviate from offering the most relevant matches first and bias the intermediation towards matches that are more profitable to themselves. This concern is especially pronounced in the context of vertically integrated platforms which undertake both the intermediation function and supply services or products in the downstream market and who therefore have the ability to direct users’ attention towards their affiliated services and products, even if rival services or products are more relevant to users’ needs. Such ‘biased intermediation’ may harm consumers, both by providing them with poorer matches on the platform and by distorting competition in the relevant downstream market and, potentially, in the platform market itself. Competition authorities have prosecuted a number of significant cases involving intermediation bias – including the recent Google Shopping case – and it seems likely that further cases will be pursued in the future. It can be very difficult to detect bias in the first place, or to determine the source of any bias that has been detected. Digital platforms use very complex algorithms to perform their intermediation functions and make frequent changes to them. Distinguishing between legitimate changes which improve the quality of matches and those which unfairly bias them can be very difficult since the impact of any individual adjustment can be subtle and the effects can be cumulative. This task may be even more difficult ex post, as competitive conditions may have changed in the meantime. This report does not imply that all vertically integrated platforms engage in biased intermediation, nor does it elaborate on how to detect intermediation bias and theories of harm. Rather, it presupposes that a competent authority, whether a competition authority or a regulatory authority with the power to impose ex-post remedies, has identified intermediation bias and it is necessary to remedy it. The aim of this report is to discuss the approach to remedies in this context. Challenges when remedying intermediation bias The challenge of remedying intermediation bias arises in part because a user’s attention is rivalrous and the selection and ranking of matches must involve giving prominence to some results and demoting or excluding others. Non-discrimination rules of the kind applied in the regulation of vertically integrated firms in network industries would compromise the core sorting function which the platform performs. Other remedies used in network industries, such as those requiring regulated access to upstream inputs, are also inappropriate when rivals in digital markets require equal access to users’ attention rather than to specific factors of production. Effective remedies against intermediation bias must either ensure that the platform no longer has an incentive to engage in biased intermediation by separating ownership of the platform from the entity engaged in the downstream activities, or must ensure that the platform no longer has the ability to produce matches which would harm users of the platform. The need for experimentation We recognise that competition authorities may be reluctant to undertake their own remedy design and may prefer to rely upon proposals submitted by platforms, criticisms by rivals, or benchmarks or quotas which specify outcomes in the downstream market rather than directly addressing bias in the intermediation process itself. This seems unsatisfactory. Instead, we would urge public authorities – whether a competition authority or some other body such as a specialist ‘digital agency’ or another existing regulatory body – to demand access to the same experimental data which the platform itself used when proposing any particular remedy. This means the authority would have the same access to internal data and documents of a firm as it is able to obtain when seeking to establish an abuse. In addition, the authority should be able to direct the platform to run other experiments in order to assess their effect on outcomes. They might even involve their own staff in the experiments being undertaken by the platform (as some financial service regulators now do before authorising new financial products). At the same time, a platform might submit experimental data before making changes to its factor-based mechanisms and obtain a ‘safe harbour’ ruling from the authority in return. We think the sharing of experimental data in this way could significantly improve the quality and effectiveness of remedies for intermediation bias, whilst also providing greater certainty and objectivity for dominant vertically integrated platforms that perform intermediation functions. Such data is commercially sensitive and confidentiality would need to be assured. Experiments of this kind are better suited to assessing the impact of incremental changes than fundamental ones and may not be able to determine whether a particular set of changes would restore downstream market conditions to those which prevailed prior to the abuse, as opposed to those which now prevail. The experiments may impose some additional costs on platforms and should be undertaken only for the specific purpose of remedy appraisal. Such a new approach may require new institutional arrangements and changes to the existing legal framework in order to implement them, and might involve both competition authorities and existing or new regulatory bodies working together in a way that they have not generally done to date. The boundaries between ex ante and ex post functions may be less obvious in the future: designing effective remedies for intermediation bias may require both ex ante assessments before they are introduced and ex post appraisals after implementation. It is likely to be a more iterative and a more collaborative process, informed by the scientific results of experiments, than anything we have seen undertaken by competition authorities to date.
An introduction to the practical and theoretical issues that are central to the study of regulation, which a particular focus on contested areas and how they are dealt with.
Presents the latest findings on past changes in structure, the factors that lead to structural change, its effect on societal welfare and what will happen to the structure of agriculture in the years ahead. The book provides insights on issues such as the family farm, the industrialization of agriculture and the impact of agricultural technology on the environment.
The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.
This paper, prepared by the OECD and the Development Research Center under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (DRC), discusses principles for reforming the Chinese railway, based on experience of rail reform in OECD countries.
The process of selling assests and enterprises to the private sector raises questions about natural monopolies, the efficiency and equity of state-owned versus privately owned enterprises, and industrial policy. This comprehensive analysis of the British privatization program explores these questions both theoretically and empirically.
The World Development Report, now in its 24th edition, is the standard reference work for international economic data. It contains an appendix of social and economic statistics for more than 200 countries. World Development Report 2001--Institutions for Markets--focuses on the performance of transition countries in their progress toward market economies. This edition is centered around the issues related to market reform and how reforms can improve and sustain living standards. It answers such questions as: How can institutions better support markets? and What are the institutions which make markets effective in delivering inclusive growth?
Derived from the renowned multi-volume International Encyclopaedia of Laws, this book provides a systematic approach to legislation and legal practice concerning energy resources and production in International Energy Law. The book describes the administrative organization, regulatory framework, and relevant case law pertaining to the development, application, and use of such forms of energy as electricity, gas, petroleum, and coal, with attention as needed to the pervasive legal effects of competition law, environmental law, and tax law. A general introduction covers the geography of energy resources, sources and basic principles of energy law, and the relevant governmental institutions. Then follows a detailed description of specific legislation and regulation affecting such factors as documentation, undertakings, facilities, storage, pricing, procurement and sales, transportation, transmission, distribution, and supply of each form of energy. Case law, intergovernmental cooperation agreements, and interactions with environmental, tax, and competition law are explained. Its succinct yet scholarly nature, as well as the practical quality of the information it provides, make this book a valuable resource for energy sector policymakers and energy firm counsel handling cases affecting International Energy Law. It will also be welcomed by researchers and academics for its contribution to the study of a complex field that today stands at the foreground of comparative law.