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Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II provides a comprehensive study of the economic relations between the United States and Yugoslavia over the past four decades. The authors recount how Yugoslavia and the United States, despite great differences in size, wealth, and ideology, overcame early misunderstandings and confrontations to create a generally positive economic relationship based on mutual respect. The Yugoslav experience demonstrated, the authors maintain, that existence outside the bloc was possible, profitable, and nonthreatening to the Soviet Union. The authors describe American official and private support for Yugoslavia's decades-long efforts at economic reform that included the first foreign investment legislation in 1967 and the first introduction of convertible currency in 1990 for any communist country. Also examined are the origins of Yugoslavia's international debt crisis of the early 1980s and the American role in the highly complex multibillion-dollar international effort that helped Yugoslavia surmount that crisis. In the past, U.S. support for the Yugoslav economy was proffered in part, the authors claim, to counter perceived threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. This may have enabled Yugoslavia to avoid some of the hard but necessary economic policy choices; hence, future U.S. support, the book concludes, will likely be tied more closely to the economic and political soundness of Yugoslavia's own actions.
This book explores the emergence of Yugoslav globalism and how it was influenced by the early Cold War, the changes once Yugoslavia established itself as a nonaligned leader, and what the decline of Yugoslav globalism reveals about the waning Cold War and the history of internationalist diplomacy. Although Yugoslavia was correctly defined as a regional power, it is not true that Tito’s influence was confined to the Balkans alone. Even before the 1948 split with Stalin, political elites and intellectuals imagined socialist Yugoslavia as a model for international comity and development. Subsequently, due to dramatic changes in the climate of international diplomacy, Yugoslav globalist outreach found an audience and altered the course of early and fateful superpower stand-offs. In turn, such globalism was a significant part of Tito’s stewardship of nonalignment. This is a story that has never been fully told. Yugoslavia, Nonalignment and Cold War Globalism fills this gap in discussions of the emergence of globalist discourse in the post-1989 era. This volume is aimed at scholars and students of the Cold War and Tito’s era in Yugoslavia, as well as general readers of history interested in leadership and the role of regional powers in world politics.
When George C. Marshall became Secretary of State in January of 1947, he faced not only a staggering array of serious foreign policy questions but also a State Department rendered ineffective by neglect, maladministration, and low morale. Soon after his arrival Marshall asked George F. Kennan to head a new component in the department's structure--the Policy Planning Staff. Here Wilson Miscamble scrutinizes Kennan's subsequent influence over foreign policymaking during the crucial years from 1947 to 1950.
This book is aimed at presenting fresh views, interpretations, and reinterpretations of some already researched issues relating to the Yugoslav foreign policy and international relations up to year 1991. Yugoslavia positioned itself as a communist state that was not under the heel of the Soviet diplomacy and policy and as such was perceived by the West as an acceptable partner and useful tool in counteracting the Soviet influence.
A fascinating historical account of how and why the U.S. cultural penetration in Yugoslavia became a key feature for the attainment of Washington’s short, middle and long-term policy goals there.
This book examines John F. Kennedy's policy of engaging states that had chosen to remain nonaligned in the Cold War.
On April 12, 1945, Franklin Roosevelt died and Harry Truman took his place in the White House. Historians have been arguing ever since about the implications of this transition for American foreign policy in general and relations with the Soviet Union in particular. Was there essential continuity in policy or did Truman's arrival in the Oval Office prompt a sharp reversal away from the approach of his illustrious predecessor? This study explores this controversial issue and in the process casts important light on the outbreak of the Cold War. From Roosevelt to Truman investigates Truman's foreign policy background and examines the legacy that FDR bequeathed to him. After Potsdam and the American use of the atomic bomb, both of which occurred under Truman's presidency, the US floundered between collaboration and confrontation with the Soviets, which represents a turning point in the transformation of American foreign policy. This work reveals that the real departure in American policy came only after the Truman administration had exhausted the legitimate possibilities of the Rooseveltian approach of collaboration with the Soviet Union.
"Following WW II the response by Britain, France, and Holland to rejuvenated colonial nationalist movements was patently indequate. Their ineffective counter was further exacerbated by Soviet expansion and the corresponding need to redeploy resources to protect the mother countries. At the same time, newly independent former colonies had no wish to become captives to the developing Cold War. Indeed, it may be argued that the Truman Doctrine was designed to serve notice on the USSR that the "Third World" was not up for grabs. Thus, the postwar decades found the US and the USSR in often violent conflict over the allegiance of less-developed nations around the globe. Results of this American intervention in the Third World are traditionally viewed by diplomatic historians as ranging from minor damage to disaster. In contrast, Brands insists this conventional wisdom is far from the mark. He agrees that US officials often spoke, possibly even thought, in ideological terms but those same policy-makers tended to act in a nonideological and remarkably successful fashion. Using American policy towards Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India as case studies, Brands presents a very convincing thesis in this remarkably engaging (if controversial) extended essay."--Choice Reviews.