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We propose a macroeconomic model with a nonlinear Phillips curve that has a flat slope when inflationary pressures are subdued and steepens when inflationary pressures are elevated. The nonlinear Phillips curve in our model arises due to a quasi-kinked demand schedule for goods produced by firms. Our model can jointly account for the modest decline in inflation during the Great Recession and the surge in inflation during the Post-Covid period. Because our model implies a stronger transmission of shocks when inflation is high, it generates conditional heteroskedasticity in inflation and inflation risk. Hence, our model can generate more sizeable inflation surges due to cost-push and demand shocks than a standard linearized model. Finally, our model implies that the central bank faces a more severe trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when inflation is high.
In the December 2022 Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), the median projection for four-quarter core PCE inflation in the fourth quarter of 2025 is 2.1 percent. This same SEP has unemployment rising by nine-tenths, to 4.6 percent, by the end of 2023. We assess the plausibility of this projection using a specific nonlinear model that embeds an empirically successful nonlinear Phillips curve specification into a structural model, identifying it via an underutilized data-dependent method. We model core PCE inflation using three components that align with those noted by Chair Powell in his December 14, 2022, press conference: housing, core goods, and core-services-less-housing. Our model projects that conditional on the SEP unemployment rate path and a rapid deceleration of core goods prices, core PCE inflation moderates to only 2.75 percent by the end of 2025: inflation will be higher for longer. A deep recession would be necessary to achieve the SEP's projected inflation path. A simple reduced-form welfare analysis, which abstracts from any danger of inflation expectations becoming unanchored, suggests that such a recession would not be optimal.
"To what extent is the recent spike in inflation driven by a change in its permanent component? We estimate a semi-structural model of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate in the United States over the period 1900-2021. The model predicts that between 2019 and 2021 the permanent component of inflation rose by 51 basis points. If instead we estimate the model using postwar data (1955--2021), the permanent component of inflation is predicted to have increased by 238 basis points. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the model estimated on the shorter sample assigns a larger increase in the permanent component of inflation because the period 1955-2021 does not contain sudden sparks in inflation like the one observed in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic but only gradual ones---the great inflation of the 70s took more than 10 years to build up. By contrast, the period 1900-1954 is plagued with sudden inflation hikes---including one around the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic---which the estimated model endogenously recalls and uses to interpret inflation around the COVID-19 episode. This result suggests that prewar data might be of use to understand recent inflation dynamics."--Abstract.
Inflation and unemployment rate were largely disconnected between 2000 and 2019 in advanced economies. We decompose core inflation into two parts based on the cyclical sensitivity of CPI components and document several salient facts: (i) both the cyclical and non-cyclical parts had surges across advaced economies in 2011, when unemployment rates had limited changes; (ii) the non-cyclical part had a downward trend between 2012 and 2019, which existed across countries, sectors, goods, and services; (iii) global indexes such as oil price, shipping costs, and a global supply chain pressure index do not explain the downward trend; and (iv) the cyclical part, after controlling for the impact of economic slack, also had a downward trend between 2012 and 2019. These patterns help disentangle competing explanations for the disconnect between inflation and unemployment rate. The approach has potential to help understand forces shaping price pressures during the pandemic and in the post-pandemic period ahead.
This paper aims to improve the understanding of U.S. inflation dynamics by separating out structural from cyclical effects using frequency domain techniques. Most empirical studies of inflation dynamics do not distinguish between secular and cyclical movements, and we show that such a distinction is critical. In particular, we study traditional Phillips curve (TPC) and new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) models of inflation, and conclude that the long-run secular decline in inflation cannot be explained in terms of changes in external trade and global factor markets. These variables tend to impact inflation primarily over the business cycle. We infer that the secular decline in inflation may well reflect improved monetary policy credibility and, thus, maintaining low inflation in the long run is closely linked to anchored inflation expectations.
Global inflation has surged to 7.5 percent in August 2022, from an average of 2.1 percent in the decade preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, threatening to become an entrenched phenomenon. This paper disentangles the confluence of contributing factors to the post-pandemic rise in consumer price inflation, using monthly data and a battery of econometric methodologies covering a panel of 30 European countries over the period 2002-2022. We find that while global factors continue to shape inflation dynamics throughout Europe, country-specific factors, including monetary and fiscal policy responses to the crisis, have also gained greater prominence in determining consumer price inflation during the pandemic period. Coupled with increasing persistence in inflation, these structural shifts call for significant and an extended period of monetary tightening and fiscal realignment.
This paper studies inflation dynamics during 25 historical episodes in advanced economies where output remained well below potential for an extended period. We find that such episodes generally brought about significant disinflation, underpinned by weak labor markets, slowing wage growth, and, in many cases, falling oil prices. Indeed, inflation declined by about the same fraction of the initial inflation rate across episodes. That said, disinflation has tended to taper off at very low positive inflation rates, arguably reflecting downward nominal rigidities and well-anchored inflation expectations. Temporary inflation increases during episodes were, in turn, systematically related to currency depreciation or higher oil prices. Overall, the historical patterns suggest little upside inflation risk in advanced economies facing the prospect of persistent large output gaps.
The post-pandemic rise in consumer prices across the world has renewed interest in inflation dynamics after decades of global disinflation. This paper provides a spatial investigation of inflation synchronicity at the city level in Lithuania using disaggregated monthly data during the period 2000–2021. The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that (i) the co-movement of city-level inflation rates—estimated using the instantaneous quasi-correlation approach—is significantly weaker than the extent of synchronization suggested by the simple correlation analysis; (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in the instantaneous quasi-correlation of inflation subcomponents between city pairs; and (iii) there are significant changes in the degree of city-level synchronization over time, reflecting important economic developments in history such as the global financial crisis, the adoption of euro, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
This paper examines inflation dynamics in the United States since 1960, with a particular focus on the Great Recession. A puzzle emerges when Phillips curves estimated over 1960-2007 are ussed to predice inflation over 2008-2010: inflation should have fallen by more than it did. We resolve this puzzle with two modifications of the Phillips curve, both suggested by theories of costly price adjustment: we measure core inflation with the median CPI inflation rate, and we allow the slope of the Phillips curve to change with the level and vairance of inflation. We then examine the hypothesis of anchored inflation expectations. We find that expectations have been fully "shock-anchored" since the 1980s, while "level anchoring" has been gradual and partial, but significant. It is not clear whether expectations are sufficiently anchored to prevent deflation over the next few years. Finally, we show that the Great Recession provides fresh evidence against the New Keynesian Phillips curve with rational expectations.