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Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen. Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels.To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book.This new edition has been updated and enlarged. In particular, two new chapters were added on statistical limit of games with many agents and on quantum games, reflecting possibly the two most stunning trends in the game theory of the 21st century.
Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen.Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels. It includes an advanced material not yet reflected in standard textbooks, providing links with the exciting modern developments in financial mathematics (rainbow option pricing), tropical mathematics, statistical physics (interacting particles) and discusses structural stability, multi-criteria differential games and turnpikes.To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book.
Game theory provides a mathematical setting for analyzing competition and cooperation in interactive situations. The theory has been famously applied in economics, but is relevant in many other sciences, such as political science, biology, and, more recently, computer science. This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background. The book is self-contained, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. The theory is illustrated through abundant examples, applications, and exercises. The style is distinctively concise, while offering motivations and interpretations of the theory to make the book accessible to a wide readership. The basic concepts and results of game theory are given a formal treatment, and the mathematical tools necessary to develop them are carefully presented. Cooperative games are explained in detail, with bargaining and TU-games being treated as part of a general framework. The authors stress the relation between game theory and operations research. The book is suitable for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course on game theory.
Game theory is the study of strategic behavior in situations in which the decision makers are aware of the interdependence of their actions. This innovative textbook introduces students to the most basic principles of game theory - move and countermove - with an emphasis on real-world business and economic applications. Students with a background in principles of economics and business mathematics can readily understand most of the material.Demonstration problems in each chapter are designed to enhance the student's understanding of the concepts presented in the text. Many chapters include non-technical applications designed to further the student's intuitive understanding of strategic behavior. Case studies help underscore the usefulness of game theory for analyzing real-world situations. Each chapter concludes with a review and questions and exercises. An online Instructor's Manual with test bank is available to professors who adopt the text.
Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Using fascinating examples from a range of disciplines, this textbook provides social science, philosophy and economics students with an engaging introduction to the tools they need to understand and predict strategic interactions. Beginning with an introduction to the most famous games, the book uses clear, jargon-free language and accessible maths as it guides the reader through whole games with full, worked-through examples. End-of-chapter exercises help to consolidate understanding along the way. With an applied approach that draws upon real-life case-studies, this book highlights the insights that game theory can offer each situation. It is an ideal textbook for students approaching game theory from various fields across the social sciences, and for curious general readers who are looking for a thorough introduction to this intriguing subject. Accompanying online resources for this title can be found at bloomsburyonlineresources.com/game-theory. These resources are designed to support teaching and learning when using this textbook and are available at no extra cost.
​There are several techniques to study noncooperative dynamic games, such as dynamic programming and the maximum principle (also called the Lagrange method). It turns out, however, that one way to characterize dynamic potential games requires to analyze inverse optimal control problems, and it is here where the Euler equation approach comes in because it is particularly well–suited to solve inverse problems. Despite the importance of dynamic potential games, there is no systematic study about them. This monograph is the first attempt to provide a systematic, self–contained presentation of stochastic dynamic potential games.
This book presents the first comprehensive and modern mathematical treatment of these mean field particle models, including refined convergence analysis on nonlinear Markov chain models. It also covers applications related to parameter estimation in hidden Markov chain models, stochastic optimization, nonlinear filtering and multiple target tracking, stochastic optimization, calibration and uncertainty propagations in numerical codes, rare event simulation, financial mathematics, and free energy and quasi-invariant measures arising in computational physics and population biology.
This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator for normal a form games applicable to oligopoly models, theory of international trade, public good models, the tragedy of commons, and War of attrition game among others. They also provide conditions to approximate the replicator dynamics on a space of measures by means of a finite-dimensional dynamical system and a sequence of measure-valued Markov processes.
Game theory, defined in the broadest sense, is a collection of mathematical models designed for the analysis of strategic aspects of situations of conflict and cooperation in a broad spectrum of fields including economics, politics, biology, engineering, and operations research. This book, besides covering the classical results of game theory, places special emphasis on methods of determining `solutions' of various game models. Generalizations reaching beyond the `convexity paradigm' and leading to nonconvex optimization problems are enhanced and discussed in more detail than in standard texts on this subject. The development is theoretical-mathematical interspersed with elucidating interpretations and examples. Audience: The material in the book is accessible to PhD and graduate students and will also be of interest to researchers. Solid knowledge of standard undergraduate mathematics is required to read the book.