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VAT missing trader fraud is a large-scale criminal attack on the EU VAT system, which costs the UK exchequer approximately £1 billion a year. Although the Department has been trying to tackle this fraud for six years, they still have not stemmed the flow of tax losses. Recently they obtained authority to introduce the special measure of "reverse charge" for mobile phones and computer chips but this can only be a provisional solution. The problem can only be tackled at EU level and ultimately the European Union will have to agree a new legislative framework for administering VAT.
The Department for Transport has approved expenditure of over £11 billion between 1998 and 2021 for the development of new and existing trunk roads and motorways by the Highways Agency, and just under £1.7 billion on major road schemes proposed and developed by local authorities in five year Local Transport Plans. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 321, session 2006-07; ISBN 9780102944600) published in March 2007, the Committee's report examines the steps taken by the Department for Transport and the Highways Agency to improve value for money and oversight of the roads programme and contracting methods and project management capability. By September 2006, the Agency's 36 completed schemes in the Targeted Programme of Improvement cost 40 per cent more than estimated initially, and for schemes still to be completed, latest forecasts indicate that final costs could be 27 per cent more than original estimates. The main causes for costs exceeding estimates are increases in construction costs, higher than forecast land prices and compensation to landowners, inflation and changes in the scope of the project. The report finds that the DfT has not been rigorous enough in its oversight of the Agency's delivery of major road schemes, allowing it too much latitude on delivery and cost plans, and has failed to monitor in-year expenditure against progress and delivery milestones. The Agency is overly reliant on consultants for project management expertise and needs to develop its in-house capability.
Committee of Public Accounts treasury minutes are on the following reports: HCP 113, 06/07, 27th report (ISBN 9780215034311); HCP 179, 06/07, 28th report (ISBN 9780215034373); HCP 142, 06/07, 29th report (ISBN 9780215034304); HCP 189, 06/07, 30th report (ISBN 9780215034489); HCP 309, 06/07, 31st report (ISBN 9780215034496); HCP 91, 06/07, 32nd report (ISBN 9780215034571); HCP 275, 06/07 33rd report (ISBN 9780215034786); HCP 43, 06/07, 34th report (ISBN 9780215034830); HCP 729, 06/07, 36th report (ISBN 9780215034823); HCP 812, 06/07, 37th report (ISBN 9780215034878); HCP 261, 06/07, 38th report (ISBN 9780215034991); HCP 377, 06/07, 39th report (ISBN 9780215034922); HCP 368, 06/07, 40th report (ISBN 9780215035066); HCP 892, 06/07, 43rd report (ISBN 9780215035172); HCP 246, 06/07, 44th report (ISBN 9780215035271); HCP 250, 06/07, 45th report (ISBN 9780215035387)
The Inland Revenue collects over £200 billion a year in tax and National Insurance contributions from 30 million taxpayers, ranging from individuals to multinational corporations. The total amount of debt from unpaid taxes stood at £12 billion at the end of March 2004, of which £3 billion was more than a year old. Following on from a NAO report (HCP 363, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102927596) published in March 2004, the Committee has examined the progress made by the Inland Revenue to speed up debt recovery, whether more can be done to encourage prompt payment and the application of good practice in debt management. Findings include that the Department should impose a surcharge on persistent late payers; use other government departmental records to find taxpayers it cannot trace; seek additional powers for enforcing debts similar to those of other tax authorities; and include debt management data in its performance measures.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has an extensive and complex estate of some 24,000 hectares, and after the Forestry Commission, is the second largest landowner in the UK. The estate is valued at over £18 billion and costs some £3.3 billion to operate. The estate is seen as essential to the delivery of military capability and the welfare and morale of Service personnel. This report, from the Committee of Public Accounts, has taken evidence from the MoD on the standard of living accommodation, the Department's ability to prioritise estate projects effectively, and its response to staff shortages. It follows on from an NAO report (HCP 154, session 2006-7), Managing the Defence Estate: Quality and Sustainability (ISBN 9780102944679). It sets out 9 recommendations, including: more than half of single living accommodation and over 40% of family accommodation does not meet the Department's definition of high-quality accommodation and is therefore substandard; that poor accommodation has a negative impact on retention rates; there is no information on when poor accommodation is to be upgraded, with some military personnel and their families having to continue to live in substandard housing for the next 20 years; there are gaps in the Department's understanding of estate costs; the Department employs only 56% of safety works staff and 57% of quantity surveyors that it needs; that implementing energy saving measures at its' defence sites would bring environmental benefits and savings of more than £2 million annually.
The Major Projects Report 2003 provides information on progress made by the Ministry of Defence in procuring major defence equipment against cost, time and technical performance targets. It covers 30 projects split, according to Smart Acquisition principles, between the 20 largest projects on which the main investment decision has been taken, and the 10 largest projects yet to reach that point. For the 20 largest projects, costs are forecast to have increased by £3.1 billion in the last year, and are now 6.1 per cent over their approved costs. Difficulties on four older projects (which predate the introduction of Smart Acquisition) account for the majority of cost and time overruns. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 195, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102926581) published in January 2004, the Committee's report examines four main issues: the impact of the large cost overruns and delays; departmental risk management; ways of developing a more constructive relationship between the Department and industry; and lessons that need to be learned to avoid such poor procurement performance being repeated in future.
We acknowledge that Universal Credit has stabilised and made progress since the previous Committee of Public Accounts first reported on the programme in 2013. However, there remains a long way to go. Implementation of Universal Credit so far has focussed mainly on the simplest cases and the Department for Work & Pensions has again delayed the programme. The completion date for the roll-out of its new digital service is six months later compared to when we looked at the programme only a year ago, and the Department now expects that Universal Credit will be fully operational in March 2021. The Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that there will be a further six-month delay beyond the Department's latest planned end-date. We remain disappointed by the persistent lack of clarity and evasive responses by the Department to our inquiries, particularly about the extent and impact of delays. The Department's response to the previous Committee's recommendations in the February 2015 report Universal Credit: progress update do not convince us that it is committed to improving transparency about the programme's progress.
The Assets Recovery Agency (the Agency) was set up in 2003 to recover assets from criminals using new and unique powers of civil recovery as well as criminal confiscation and taxation. It was also tasked with the training, accreditation and monitoring of financial investigators. The Agency is to be disbanded in 2008. It was set up with insufficient preparatory work. There was no business case setting out the expectations for the Agency, resulting in unachievable delivery aims. It is reliant on cases being referred to it by other authorities, but only 707 cases have been referred from 129 out of 696 potential referral partners. The Agency did not develop effective work processes: it failed to keep a comprehensive database of cases referred to it; it did not invest in a time-recording system to manage and monitor staff time and the cost of cases; and it failed to put in place processes to enable management to monitor the progression of cases effectively. Receivers' fees accounted for almost a quarter of the budget but fixed price contracts were not introduced until April 2006. The Agency's office is in central London, heavily reliant on temporary staff, and with high levels of staff turnover. The Agency had recovered assets amounting to only £23 million by December 2006 against expenditure of £65 million, and it has not met its target of becoming self-financing by 2005-06. Asset recovery has been slow because in most cases the full value of the assets was pursued through the courts rather than seeking settlement for a proportion of the assets. The Agency has not been adequately monitoring the accreditation of trained financial investigators. Of the 4,500 financial investigators trained at almost £700 per place, only 1,400 of those were active in the role by summer 2006.
The Department of Transport and its seven executive agencies average 10.4 days of sickness for each full-time employee (compared to a Civil Service average of 9.8 days). However the performance is varied. The central Department and four agencies have sickness levels at or below comparable organisations but the Driving Standards Agency and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency have absence rates of 13.1 and 14 day respectively. On the basis of a Comptroller and Auditor General's report the Committee have examined current sickness levels in the Department and actions being taken to meet their 2010 targets. They conclude that the Agencies need a better understanding of why some staff take so much sick leave. Although there appears to be a correlation with low paid repetitive administrative jobs there are also concerns about leadership within the Department. Measures have therefore been taken to strengthen management in areas involving repetitive work.
Biodegradable materials in landfill sites, such as food, vegetation and paper, generate methane and other emissions to the soil and water which can be harmful to health. The European Union introduced a Directive in 1999 which set maximum allowances for the tonnage of biodegradable municipal waste that each Member State could send to landfill from 2006 onwards. Waste collection and disposal is a key responsibility of the 388 local authorities in England, and the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has to work closely with them to enable the United Kingdom to comply with this Directive. Non-compliance could result in a fine of up to £180 million a year. The UK's historic reliance on landfill led to a four year extension to the timetable, but DEFRA took no effective action until 2003. Although 2005-06 saw a reduction of 2.3 million tonnes against the previous year, a further reduction of 4.9 million tonnes will be required to comply with the 2013 maximum allowance set by the EU. Much of the progress made has involved an increase in recycling, due to the public's enthusiasm, but manufacturers and retailers continue to use large amounts of packaging. Recycling alone will be insufficient to comply with the Directive, and new infrastructure - energy-from-waste plants which incinerate, anaerobically digest, or compost waste to generate electricity - will be necessary. But such plants are unpopular and typically take nine years to become operational, and there is a significant risk that many will not be ready in time.