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On December 4, 1992 President Bush gave the order 'to move a substantial American force into Somalia.' Although Army forces contributed substantially to the Joint Task Force, the Army did not dominate the deployments to the degree it did during Operation Desert Storm. Still, by the end of January more than 10,000 Army personnel were on the ground in Somalia, helping tp provide security for relief operations and working to rebuild many of the basic elements of civil society. This report reviews the Army deployment operation. By almost any measure, the transportation of the Army to Somalia can be judged a successful operation. During the first 30 days, 82 percent of the peak U.S. personnel strength and more than half the Army equipment had been delivered. Nonetheless, many participants speak of difficulties and glitches in planning, coordinating and managing the deployments. In spite of these frictions, the nature of the humanitarian mission and the relatively small scale of the deployments (about five percent of Operation Desert Shield/Storm) allowed the deployments to go off without debilitating problems.
This study examines the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.
This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster. The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to Oct. 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations. This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention.
Information on concerns of Vietnam War veterans about the consequences of ecposure to Agent Orange.
The American mission in Somalia presented the U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. The author has taken the essential first step by identifying and articulating the hard lessons of Somalia with candor and objectivity.
In this book US Army Transportation Corps Historian, Richard E. Killblane, utitlizes the expertise of professionals with lived experience of synchronizing military transportation from end to end to uniquely explore how military transportation logistics have evolved during the last half of the 20th Century and beyond towards greater efficiency.
Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope were planned and implemented with the aim of bringing order to chaos. Unfortunately, what should have been a victory for the United Nations deteriorated into a humiliating defeat of massive proportions. This is a brilliantly researched and moving expose of this bloody mission.