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Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for develop­ing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units - combat, support, and headquarters - that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army's ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army's program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
An empirically rich account of how the West's main war-fighting armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.
This is the story of how the United States Army responded to the challenges of the end of the Cold War by transforming itself into the most capable ground force in the world today. It argues that from 1989 through 2005 the U.S. Army attempted, and largely achieved, a centrally directed and institutionally driven transformation relevant to ground warfare that exploited Information Age technology, adapted to post?Cold War strategic circumstances, and integrated into parallel Department of Defense efforts. The process not only modernized equipment, it also substantially altered doctrine, organization, training, administrative and logistical practices, and the service culture. Kevlar Legions further contends that the digitized expeditionary Army has withstood the test of combat, performing superbly with respect to deployment and high-end conventional combat and capably with respect to low-intensity conflict and the counterinsurgency challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Contents: Intro.: The Post WWII Army; Overview; Chap. 1: The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army and the Conceptual Challenge of the Nuclear Age; The Army and the ¿New Look¿; The Dual-Capability Conundrum; Kennedy Admin.; Chap. 2: Reorienting the Army ¿ After Vietnam: Nixon Admin. and Defense; The STEADFAST Reorg.; Doctrinal Ferment; Meeting the Army¿s Educational Needs; Towards Army 86; Operational Art and AirLand Battle; Chap. 3: A Strange New World -¿ Army after the Cold War: Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; Army of the 1990s; Doctrinal Revision; The New Louisiana Maneuvers; The Debate Intensifies; Force XXI Campaign; Doctrine as an Engine of Change?; From Quadrennial Review to Quadrennial Review.
Introduction to Global Military History provides a lucid and comprehensive account of military developments around the modern world from the eighteenth century up to the present day. Beginning with the background to the American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary wars and ending with the recent conflicts of the twenty-first century, this third edition combines fully up-to-date global coverage with close analysis not only of the military aspects of war but also its social, cultural, political and economic dimensions and repercussions. The new edition includes a fully revised chapter on conflicts during the eighteenth century, updated coverage of events post-1990 and increased coverage of non-Western conflicts to provide a truly international account of the varied and changing nature of modern military history. Covering lesser-known conflicts as well as the familiar wars of history and illustrated throughout with maps, primary source extracts and case studies, it is essential reading for all students of modern military history and international relations.
In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.
This book examines the implications of disruptive technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) on military innovation and the use of force. It provides an in-depth understanding of how both large and small militaries are seeking to leverage 4IR emerging technologies and the effects such technologies may have on future conflicts. The 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), the confluence of disruptive changes brought by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, nanotechnologies, and autonomous systems, has a profound impact on the direction and character of military innovation and use of force. The core themes in this edited volume reflect on the position of emerging technologies in the context of previous Revolutions in Military Affairs; compare how large resource-rich states (US, China, Russia) and small resource-limited states (Israel, Sweden, Norway) are adopting and integrating novel technologies and explore the difference between various innovation and adaptation models. The book also examines the operational implications of emerging technologies in potential flashpoints such as the South China Sea and the Baltic Sea. Written by a group of international scholars, this book uncovers the varying 4IR defence innovation trajectories, enablers, and constraints in pursuing military-technological advantages that will shape the character of future conflicts. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.