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This dissertation explores questions in labor economics with a particular focus on economic inequality. As one might expect, race, gender, and location are recurring themes. The dissertation makes headway on long-standing questions in economics, in large part, through the collection of administrative datasets, and complementary field experiments. In the first chapter, I present evidence that employers pay a premium to equalize pay between workers if those workers can share information about their compensation. To establish a causal relationship between pay transparency and wage compression, I work with the operator of an online labor market who granted me access to detailed records of the tasks that employers advertise and the prices at which workers are willing to do them. These data capture the entire wage determination process, making it possible to observe the drivers of wage compression and the gender wage gap. Three facts emerge. First, for a particular multi-worker setting, pay between any two workers differs on average by over fifty percent when workers propose a price for their services. Second, when workers are in the same location, employers deliberately raise the pay of lower bidders, reducing dispersion, irrespective of differences in assessed productivity or reservation values. Finally, employers who compress pay when workers work in the same place will allow disparities when workers are physically separated. Overall, we find that even in this short-term spot market for labor, consideration of relative pay are quantitatively important for both wages and labor supply. We combine these online platform data with a field experiment to show that, with few institutional constraints, paying a premium to compress pay may be efficient when workers can communicate pay. Our field experiment shows that when pay is unequal, workers strategically use information about co-worker pay to negotiate higher wages that can double the time it takes to complete a job. Worker morale response to lower relative pay can lead quality of output to fall by a full standard deviation. An employer can make trade-offs between these costs by adjusting the terms of negotiation or compressing pay. A profit maximizing employer may optimally equalize wages ex-ante in equilibrium. An important extension to this empirical result is the effect of gender on the ramifications of pay transparency. While a male worker who communicates with co-workers is, on average, able to close the wage gap between the highest paid work and himself by 85 percent, a female worker in the same position closes the gap by 12 percent. This result may give pause to advocates of pay transparency policies if their goal is more equal pay for men and women. The second and third chapter examine the relationship between place and productivity. In the second chapter, I study the impact on aggregate productivity of policies that affect a firm's choice of where to locate. In particular, I study the relationship between state corporate taxes and the investment of firms in R& D, as captured by new patents. While tax advantaged-areas make investment cheaper for firms, they often require firms to locate where their productivity will be lower. In this chapter, I create a unique patent-establishment panel dataset by linking the residence of scientists on each patent application granted, over a thirty-year window, with the address of U.S. establishments. With this dataset, I show that innovation productivity is lower in low tax places, suggesting that place-based productivity is a more important determinant of innovative activity than traditional explanations which focus on the cost of investment. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we analyze establishment mobility and show that lower taxes attract establishments. In particular, a one percent lower corporate tax rate increases the share of establishments in a local area by roughly 3.4%. Second, we exploit establishment migration to separate variation in innovation productivity due to establishment-specific and place-specific characteristics. We show that moving to a place that is 5% more productive increases a given firm's patent activity by 1 %. We follow this literature in evaluating the validity of this variation using pre-move behavior and control functions in the spirit of Dahl (2002). We then relate these place effects to corporate taxes and document that low tax places tend to have lower innovation productivity. The third chapter provides evidence that the voluntary choice of African-Americans to move from Northern regions in the U.S. to Southern regions is responsible in part for lower occupational standing and real income. I find that these migration patterns are also part of a trend that accelerated during the early 21st century among Northern born African-Americans. We combine evidence from four nationally-representative surveys, the U.S. Census, American Community Survey, Current Population Survey, and the Survey of Income Program and Participation, to statistically assess the forces behind a reverse migration from North to South and associated economic trade-offs. Using variation in the precise timing of individual moves and a model of the wage process, I provide evidence that, on average, African-American are moving to places where their earnings are lower after adjusting for regional price differences, and much lower relative to non-Hispanic white migrants. As suggestive evidence about the reason for these moves, we find that the magnitude of the economic trade-off between origin and destination is proportional to the severity and duration of riots which occurred in Northern cities at the time of the earlier Great Migration. We conclude from this that attractive amenities of the South may play a minor role in driving a reverse migration relative to the failure of some Northern cities to integrate during the 20th century. In chapters 1 and 2, I work closely with co-authors Bobak Pakzad Hurson, currently a classmate of mine, and Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato, who was a post-doc at Stanford at the inception of our collaboration, and who has since take a faculty position at Duke University.
This thesis examines the themes of sorting, inequality and the impact of technological change on the labor market. In particular, it addresses the questions of how workers sort within and between firms and how this influences labor market inequality, both in the workforce as a while, as well as between demographic and skill groups. It also considers how changes in technology affects the labor market conditions faced by workers and firms. These questions are tackled over three chapters. The first chapter, entitled `Multidimensional heterogeneity and matching in a frictional labor market - an application to polarization' deals with the sorting of workers to firms along multidimensional characteristics and quantifies the impact of technological change on the evolution of sorting patterns, wages and employment outcomes of different skill and demographic groups. I construct a model of directed search with two-sided multidimensional heterogeneity and estimate the model on US data. I find that production complementarities between cognitive and interpersonal skills and tasks have increased, relative to hat between manual skills and manual tasks. This change in production technology accounts for a large part of wage and job polarization in the US. Also, despite being gender-blind, the model can explain a substantial fraction of the narrowing of gender wage and job rank gaps from the 1980s to the present day. The second chapter, entitled `Intra-firm hierarchies and gender gaps' and coauthored with Nicolo Dalvit and Aseem Patel, studies the sorting of women into layers of hierarchy within firms, using administrative French data, and examines the incidence of gender wage and employment gaps across hierarchies over time. Further, by exploiting a policy on corporate board quotas in France, it assesses the impact of an increase in female leadership on gender wage and employment outcomes within firms. We find that hierarchies matter in gender wage and employment gaps. Gender wage and employment gaps increase with each layer of firm hierarchy, even if these gaps narrow more over time in the upper layers. In addition, improvements in top female leadership has differing impacts across hierarchies. While a greater share of female corporate board members narrows the gender wage gap in top layers of hierarchy, it has no such impact on lower layers. Instead, it increases the share of women in lower layers working part-time, at the expense of full-time employment. The opposite is true for women in upper layers. The third chapter, `Occupational Shortage and Labor Market Adjustments: a Theory of Islands', coauthored with Riccardo Zago, addresses the incidence of occupational shortage, and assesses whether it leads to wage and employment adjustments. Using a unique dataset on reported vacancies that firms find difficult to fill, we document the incidence of shortage across regions, industries and occupation groups. We find that shortage only leads to wage and employment adjustments in non-routine occupations, but not in routine occupations. We show how the secular decline of the routine occupations, caused by technological change, can account for the persistence in shortage in the routine sector and its inability to adjust.
Search theory has proven to be a very useful tool to analyze and understand the impact of labor market policies and institutional arrangements on labor market outcomes. Structural econometrics, on the other hand, seeks to recover the primitives of economic theory and to estimate decision rules. These essays use the conjunction of both to analyze various labor market issues. The first chapter estimates a search and matching model to analyze the relationship between duality in the labor market and labor market protection in Chile. Results indicate that both types of contracts, permanent and temporary, survive in equilibrium and that there is a strong substitution effect between contracts. Also, stringent labor protection generates important trade offs between flexibility and productivity. The second chapter provides lifetime measures of inequality for Chile and analyzes its main sources. Results indicate that inequality is not only high in a cross-section perspective, but also in a lifetime perspective and that low mobility is the main source of lifetime inequality. Finally, the third chapter uses a descriptive approach and a structural estimation of a search model to identify the sources of gender differentials in the United States. Results show that prejudice may still have a role in explaining the evidence on gender differentials and it is responsible for the reversal of the returns to schooling ranking in recent years.
This thesis consists of three chapters on aspects of labor market inequality. In chapter 1, I estimate the dynamic effects of federal affirmative action regulation, exploiting variation in the timing of regulation and deregulation across work establishments. I find that affirmative action sharply increases the black share of employees, with the share continuing to increase over time: five years after an establishment is first regulated, its black share of employees increased by an average of 0.8 percentage points. Strikingly, the black share continues to grow even after an establishment is deregulated. Building on the canonical Phelps (1972) model of statistical discrimination, I argue that this persistence is in part driven by affirmative action inducing employers to increase the precision with which they screen potential employees. I then provide supporting evidence. In chapter 2, I study the spatial mismatch hypothesis, which proposes that job suburbanization isolates blacks from work opportunities and depresses black employment. Using synthetic panel methods and variation across metropolitan areas from 1970 to 2000, I find that for every 10% decline in the fraction of metropolitan area jobs located in the central city, black employment (earnings) declined by 1.4-2.1% (1.1-2.3%) relative to white employment (earnings). This relationship is driven primarily by job suburbanization that occurred during the 1970's. To address the potential endogeneity of suburbanization, I exploit exogenous variation in highway construction and find that highways cause job suburbanization and declines in black relative employment in a manner consistent with spatial mismatch. In chapter 3, joint work with Isaiah Andrews, we analyze the effect of heterogeneity on the widely used analyses of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) for optimal social insurance. The basic Baily-Chetty formula is robust to heterogeneity along many dimensions but requires that risk aversion be homogeneous. We extend the Baily-Chetty framework to allow for arbitrary heterogeneity across agents, particularly in risk preferences. We find that heterogeneity in risk aversion affects welfare analysis through the covariance of risk aversion and consumption drops, which measures the extent to which larger risks are borne by more risk tolerant workers. Calibrations suggest that this covariance effect may be large.
This dissertation consists of three essays that address important questions within the fields of labor economics and public economics. I use advanced empirical methods and a combination of restricted access and public-use data to study the role of inequality in labor markets and wealth.In Chapter 1, I study whether the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) extensions are different for workers exposed to higher levels of local labor market concentration, a potential source of employer market power. UI extensions can improve the bargaining power of job seekers relative to employers by improving workers' outside options. I exploit measurement error in state unemployment rates that led to quasi-random assignment of UI durations in the U.S. during the Great Recession. Using matched employer-employee data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program, I find that UI extensions lengthen nonemployment durations by one week and cause economically meaningful but not statistically significant increases in earnings. The UI-earnings effect is significantly lower at higher levels of concentration, while there is no difference in the UI-duration effect. The lower UI-earnings effect is driven by differences at the extremes of the distribution of concentration. Workers exposed to higher concentration also are slightly more likely to change workplaces, local labor markets, and industries following an extension, but they are not induced to match into less-concentrated markets. My results imply that the benefits of more generous UI, in terms of match quality, are attenuated at higher levels of concentration, and so UI policy that accounts for local concentration is potentially warranted.In Chapter 2, joint with Anne M. Burton, we revisit how Ban the Box (BTB) policies affect the employment of minority men. BTB policies are intended to help ex-offenders find employment by delaying when employers can ask about criminal records. Existing evidence finds BTB causes discrimination against young, non-college-educated minority men. We show that effects for this group are not robust to a simple change in specification and the coding of BTB laws. Using a distinct treatment definition, we find no evidence of statistical discrimination: employment effects are near zero, precisely estimated, and not statistically significant.In Chapter 3, joint with N. Meltem Daysal and Michael F. Lovenheim, we study the effect of changes in parental wealth in childhood on the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Rising wealth inequality has spurred an increased interest in understanding how and why wealth is correlated across generations. Prior research has found an intergenerational correlation between 0.2 and 0.4 and has emphasized the role of family characteristics in driving this correlation. We contribute to this literature by examining the intergenerational transmission of wealth changes, which allows us to isolate the causal effect of wealth shocks from pre-determined parental preferences and household characteristics. Using Danish Register Data, we examine the effect of home price changes that occur between ages 0-5, 6-11, and 12-17 on overall wealth, housing wealth, and nonhousing wealth of adult children at ages 29-33. For the youngest age group, we find that 16.5% and 22.2% of each Krone of home price change is transmitted to overall wealth and housing wealth in adulthood, respectively. The corresponding transmission rates for the 6-11 age group are 30.8% and 18.5%, with a transmission to non-housing wealth of 12.3%. There is no transmission of home price changes that occur during the teenage years for any wealth outcome. Examining mechanisms, we find that home price increases in the first two age groups lead to modest increases in home ownership, educational attainment, and income. There also is an increase in partner wealth for the younger two groups. Income and education can explain less than a third of the intergenerational transmission we document. We argue that our results largely reflect changes to parental/household behaviors and preferences that are passed down to children and cause them to accumulate more housing wealth in young adulthood.
Chapter one determines the properties of the optimal tax function when there is rent-seeking in the labor market. Rent-seeking in the labor market refers to unproductive effort expended in order to increase compensation. With rent-seeking effort expended by high skill workers, low skill workers face reduced wages because firms, in a competitive market, face a zero profits condition. Firms are able to respond to rent-seeking by increasing the number of high skill workers hired, reducing their productivity and wages. The government's optimal tax function increases marginal and average taxes on high skill workers. While low skill workers face lower marginal and average tax rates. The government, therefore, wishes to redistribute income primarily through post-tax income rather than through manipulating the distribution of pre-tax income. Chapter two looks at the effect of both intensive and extensive margin labor supply on the optimal tax function. The model combines a static search labor market model with a classical labor supply model. By combining these two models, the optimal tax function will balance incentives for working more hours and incentives for searching for work. The tax function provides insight into how the government should balance redistribution and efficiency when workers can potentially be unemployed for long periods of time. The resulting tax function increases the marginal tax rate over the model. This increase is due to the government's ability to decrease the wages of workers which increases the general equilibrium probability of employment for workers. Chapter three investigates the effect of uneven internal migration by skill on the income inequality in local labor markets. Migrant moving within the US are more educated than workers who stay in their local labor market. We would expect to see income inequality to decrease in locations that experience more migration. However, we don't see this effect. Chapter one investigates this phenomenon using data from the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS records information on income, education, and migration patterns and is a yearly representative sample of the US population. To causally estimate the effect of differing rates of migration by skill, a shift-share instrument is constructed. This instrument creates a predicted amount of migration based on historical migration patterns. The instrument seems to work well and does not appear to correlated with labor demand shocks. The main results are that income inequality increases when there are more college educated workers moving than non-college educated workers.
In Chapter 1, I develop a random search model incorporating marriage decisions, fertility shocks, and human capital accumulation to examine the mechanisms underlying wage and employment differences between men and women over their life-cycles. The model assumes that men and women are mostly identical, with women bearing child-rearing responsibilities in a gender-heterogeneous labor market. When single, workers search for jobs and marriage partners individually; when married, they search for jobs jointly as a household. The household search and exogenous fertility shocks are the primary factors contributing to the life-cycle employment patterns observed in the NLSY97 data. Child-rearing responsibilities amount to approximately 39.83 hours per week, a significant portion of the 80 hours available to each worker, leading to a decline in women's employment rates and full-time working status. Initial gender wage gaps stem from gender-specific wage offer distributions, with human capital accumulation as the main factor widening these gaps over time. Counterfactual policy experiments indicate that a gender-neutral hiring process could eliminate wage gaps, while 10 hours of government-funded childcare services per week could eliminate employment differences. In Chapter 2, I investigate the impact of prejudiced sentiments on wage disparities between homosexual and heterosexual men. I develop a random search model that incorporates taste-based prejudice, bargaining, and migration. The findings reveal that prejudice significantly contributes to predicting empirical earnings and employment patterns. Despite homosexual workers exhibiting the same conditional mean productivity as their heterosexual counterparts, they earn less than 80% of their productivity value due to prejudice. This prejudice results in an average monetary loss of 4 dollars per hour for homosexual workers. Based on the estimates, a modest tax of 0.09 dollars per hour of work on heterosexual men is determined to be sufficient to compensate for this loss.
Abstract: My dissertation consists of three applied studies in the area of public finance and labor economics. In the first chapter, "The effect of financial aid and tax policies on educational choices", I build and estimate a structural dynamic life-cycle model of education choices, labor force participation, and saving decisions by young men in the United States. The model is estimated with the method of simulated moments using a longitudinal sample of white, black, and Hispanic young men from the 1997 panel of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The model incorporates unobservable abilities, tuition costs, and the main features of the U.S. federal income tax. In particular, it takes into account the structure of the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit. I use the estimated model to simulate the impact of a number of education policy changes. I find a sizeable effect on college enrollment from a general tuition reduction as well as a large increase in graduate school attendance from making the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit refundable. In the second chapter, "Aggregate wage dynamics and labor supply: an application to the U.S.", I estimate labor supply elasticities using the change in the return to skills over time as a source of exogenous variation in gross wages. The last few decades have seen a tremendous amount of change in the U.S. labor market: female labor force participation rates have risen, while the wage premium for college education and wage inequality have increased because of an higher demand for skilled labor. The number of hours worked is found to react weakly to changes in the offered wage. In the third chapter, "Labor supply effects of tax-based income-support mechanisms", I build and estimate a static discrete choice model of labor supply for single women in the United States. It incorporates the main features of the federal income tax. I estimate the model using cross-sectional data, and I use it to simulate hypothetical reforms to the tax and benefit system, which is found to have a large effect on the labor force participation decision of single individuals.