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Top managers have a significant impact on organizations because they are responsible for the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies, have the visibility and influence to shape the opinions of internal and external stakeholders, and coin the culture of their organizations, affecting employees at every level of the organization. Research has focused on the drivers and consequences of top managers' actions, with a particular focus on executive compensation, but important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the literature on top executives by examining the antecedents of executive compensation, the influence of executive compensation on executive behavior, and the interplay of executive compensation and top executive personality. The first study introduces the role of compensation benchmarking for determining executive compensation to the management literature. It finds that benchmarking leads to compensation convergence. The second study examines the impact of executive compensation complexity on firm performance. The results show that compensation complexity is negatively related to accounting-based, market-based, and ESG-based metric of firm performance. The third study explores the implications of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the imitation behavior of firms. It finds that the introduction of RPE is positively related to the imitation of the strategic actions of peer firms. The fourth study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) goals in CEO contracts. Specifically, it examines how and when CSP incentives influence the CEO's attention to corporate social responsibility topics. The final essay examines the role of CEO personality; it finds that differences in CEO personality explain differences in the level of strategic conformity. Taken together, the essays in this dissertation make a significant contribution to the scholarly discourse on the influence of top managers on their companies. The empirical evidence presented expands the current understanding of how top executives affect strategic firm behaviors, and it provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.
The urgent and sustained interest in corporate governance is unprecedented, with the connections between corporate governance and economic performance being emphasized by the World Bank, the IMF and others in the global economic community. In this timely and definitive intellectual analysis of a key discipline, The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance offers a critical overview of the key themes, theoretical controversies, current research and emerging concepts that frame the field. Consisting of original substantive chapters by leading international scholars, and examining corporate governance from an inter-disciplinary basis, the text highlights how governance issues are critical to the formation, growth, financing, structural development, and strategic direction of companies and how corporate governance institutions in turn influence the innovation and development of industrial and economic systems globally. Comprehensive, authoritative and presented in a highly-accessible framework, this Handbook is a significant resource to those with an interest in understanding this important emerging field.
Promoting a comparative perspective, this comprehensive Research Handbook aids in the understanding of alternative finance and its values in a global setting. Readers are encouraged to view alternative finance through the lens of economic mechanisms rather than terminology.
Apartheid South Africa was often thought to run in the interests of the business elite. Yet 27 years after apartheid, those business interests remain largely entrenched. Why? Did the South African business community play a role in engineering this outcome – perhaps recognising the apartheid era was over, and jumping ship in time? Conversely, the mission of the ANC was widely perceived to be to shift wealth and power into the hands of the whole community. Yet despite ‘black empowerment’ measures, corporate ownership remains largely in white hands – and certainly in the hands of an elite few, even though no longer restricted to whites. This picture is replicated across the global south, where corporate ownership tends to be concentrated in the hands of an elite, rather than being more democratically spread. Why have alternative corporate forms not been pursued more vigorously, with ownership in the hands of customers, employees, and local communities? In the case of South Africa, where the majority of customers and employees are black, this could have delivered on the ANC’s mission to replace the apartheid era with a democratic one – in terms of wealth, incomes and power, as well as in terms of voting and civic rights. This edited volume explores all these questions and looks at ways to align corporate forms with economic and social goals. The chapters in this book were originally published as special issues of International Review of Applied Economics.
Family firms account for a large proportion of firms in most countries. In industrialised countries of North America and Western Europe, they generally account for a large share of small and medium sized enterprises. In emerging market economies such as India, they also account for the majority of the large firms. Their importance for factors such as employment creation notwithstanding, relative to the widely held Anglo-Saxon firms, which are ubiquitous in the economics, finance and management literatures, family firms have historically received much less attention from scholars of these disciplines. However, in part owing to increased focus on emerging markets, there is a growing literature on family firms. In How Family Firms Differ, the authors explore important aspects of family firms, drawing on the existing literature and their own research on these firms.
Exploring the technological advantage of nations, their performance and pattern of specialization and the affect of their financial and governance systems, this book discusses changes that need to be made so that they can cope with new challenges.
Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.