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In the U.S. Navy, “Wheel Books” were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments. In that same tradition, the new Naval Institute Wheel Books will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute’s vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings, selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects. Command is the pinnacle of leadership in a military organization. Navy regulations define both the authority and the responsibility of command as “absolute.” This Naval Institute Wheel Book provides practical guidance and advice that actual and would-be commanders can use to carry out that absolute authority. Included in this carefully selected collection is the experience of those who have commanded as well as the expectations of those who are commanded. Aspirants as well as practitioners will do well to exploit this selected survey of what Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz described as the “one purpose” for entering the Navy.
In the U.S. Navy, “Wheel Books” were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments. In that same tradition, the new Naval Institute Wheel Books will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute’s vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute’s flagship publication Proceedings, selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects. Naval tactics were described by Vice Adm. A.K. Cebrowski, a brilliant thinker on the subject of naval warfare, as “the sum of the art and science of the actual application of combat power.” Renowned naval tactician Capt. Wayne Hughes called the study of naval tactics as striving “to bring whatever order and understanding is possible out of the chaos of battle.” With those words of wisdom serving as the “commander’s intent,” this collection sheds a bright light on this sometimes dark and mysterious but unquestionably essential realm, illuminating the principles and concepts of tactics that serve the warrior at the most critical moments.
This major revision updates Wayne Hughes's 1986 landmark study that is credited with providing decision makers a sound foundation for battle planning and tactical thinking. The book integrates the historical evolution of tactics, analysis, and fleet operations, and today it can serve as a primer for anyone who wants to learn how navies fight and win. This second edition includes much new material on combat in the missile age and reflects the reconfiguration of many tactics for littoral operations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hughes recreates famous battles to show how tactics have changed through the ages and the ways in which they have remained unchanged. He covers tactical interaction between land and sea, the sensory revolution of WWII, secret weapons and maritime surprise, the role in battle of leadership and morale, and the importance of surface warships in today's U.S. fleet. He suggests that naval tactics, unlike ground combat, are dominated by the offense and concludes that the great tactical maxim must be attack effectively first. A new chapter traces the evolution of missile tactics at sea and includes details of attacks on ships. Many changes emphasize joint operations and coastal combat. The already extensive appraisal of command and control and information warfare is further expanded to cover modern naval operations and the character of modern salvo warfare. In the tradition of Mahan and Clauswitz, this classic text incorporates literature, politics, and a knowledge of human nature. Indispensable reading for all those interested in naval tactics, it is also a valuable reference for wargamers
Throughout the history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, leading officers and strategists have advocated for formal colleges and schools for naval officers but have also made the case that true naval professionalism requires a career-long dedication to learning and to self-improvement. This was the impetus behind the very founding of the U.S. Naval Institute by officers who believed that the Navy's lack of support for their education meant they needed to create their own organization for self-study and cooperative learning. Naval luminaries like admirals William Sims and Ernest King continued to campaign for self-study and the personal pursuit of professional knowledge during the twentieth century, distributing lists of suggested books for officers to read and promoting their ideas widely through speeches and published works. While recommending that officers read broadly in pursuit of individual knowledge is an important part of creating a truly educated and professional Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, it is also important for leaders in the sea services to offer mentorship and create opportunities for discourse that encourages group learning. Developing the Naval Mind serves as a how-to manual and syllabus for leaders to create and lead wardroom, ready room, and work center discussion groups across the fleet to create a more educated and professionally engaged Navy and Marine Corps.
All naval professionals—without exception—encounter, directly participate, or play a supporting role in naval cooperation. It is a key element in the U.S. defense strategy because military and naval operations today are usually conducted by international coalitions and fighting alongside foreign navies is an expected aspect of current and future naval warfare. Activities in support of mutual defense include bilateral and multilateral exercises, international programs such as cooperative acquisition and foreign military sales, combined training, and efforts towards increased interoperability. This volume is intended to provide a basic familiarization to all aspects of the subject and detailed understanding of relevant recent issues. Since there is no formal training offered on the subject for naval professionals—with the exception of certain specialized personnel—the book is designed to bridge the existing gap in knowledge about naval cooperation.
Learning War examines the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal development from 1898–1945 and explains why the Navy in that era was so successful as an organization at fostering innovation. A revolutionary study of one of history’s greatest success stories, this book draws profoundly important conclusions that give new insight, not only into how the Navy succeeded in becoming the best naval force in the world, but also into how modern organizations can exploit today’s rapid technological and social changes in their pursuit of success. Trent Hone argues that the Navy created a sophisticated learning system in the early years of the twentieth century that led to repeated innovations in the development of surface warfare tactics and doctrine. The conditions that allowed these innovations to emerge are analyzed through a consideration of the Navy as a complex adaptive system. Learning War is the first major work to apply this complex learning approach to military history. This approach permits a richer understanding of the mechanisms that enable human organizations to evolve, innovate, and learn, and it offers new insights into the history of the United States Navy.
Drawing on extensive State Department files, declassified Navy policy papers, interviews with both former top officials and individuals who were involved in incidents, David F. Winkler examines the evolution of the U.S.-Soviet naval relationship during the Cold War, focusing in particular on the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA). In this volume, an updated edition of his classic Cold War at Sea, Winkler brings the story up to the present, detailing occasional U.S.-Russia naval force interactions, including the April 2016 Russian aircraft “buzzings” of the USS Donald Cook in the Baltic. He also details China’s efforts to militarize the South China Sea, claim sovereignty over waters within their exclusive economic zone, and the U.S. Navy’s continuing efforts to counter these challenges to freedom of navigation.
The Herndon Climb is an important and meaningful ritual in Naval Academy culture. Scaling the heavily greased, 21-foot tall Herndon Monument as a group at the very end of the year for "plebes," or freshmen, the Climb marks a major turning point in the lives of all Midshipmen, who are relieved of their low status at the moment they complete the task. The book is culled from interviews with more than fifty subjects, including participants in Climbs over the past six decades, with personal observations from the 2019 and 2018 events. Co-author James McNeal recalls the joyful pride of participating in the Climb as a plebe in 1983, and his experience helps bring vivid detail to the memories and reflections of his fellow Midshipmen. The book also includes a discussion of the career of William Lewis Herndon, whose heroic sacrifice at sea inspired the monument, and also traces the history and development of the modern Climb to its roots in the earliest plebe celebrations.
China’s reaction to the United States’ new maritime strategy will significantly impact its success, according to three Naval War College professors. Based on the premise that preventing wars is as important as winning wars, this new U.S. strategy, they explain, embodies a historic reassessment of the international system and how the United States can best pursue its interests in cooperation with other nations. The authors contend that despite recent turbulence in U.S.-China military relations, substantial shared interests could enable extensive U.S.-China maritime security cooperation, as they attempt to reach an understanding of “competitive coexistence.” But for professionals to structure cooperation, they warn, Washington and Beijing must create sufficient political and institutional space.
China’s maritime “gray zone” operations represent a new challenge for the U.S. Navy and the sea services of our allies, partners, and friends in maritime East Asia. There, Beijing is waging what some Chinese sources term a “war without gunsmoke.” Already winning in important areas, China could gain far more if left unchecked. One of China’s greatest advantages thus far has been foreign difficulty in understanding the situation, let alone determining an effective response. With contributions from some of the world’s leading subject matter experts, this volume aims to close that gap by explaining the forces and doctrines driving China’s paranaval expansion, operating in the “gray zone” between war and peace. The book covers China’s major maritime forces beyond core gray-hulled Navy units, with particular focus on China’s second and third sea forces: the “white-hulled” Coast Guard and “blue-hulled” Maritime Militia. Increasingly, these paranaval forces, and the “gray zone” in which they typically operate, are on the frontlines of China’s seaward expansion.