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Contents: Opportunities and Prospects for Cooperation on Central and West Asian Security Issues; Forging a Global Concert of Democratic States for the Post-Cold War Era; India's Role in the New Global Order: An American Perspective; Opportunities and Prospects for Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Asian Security Issues: China and South East Asia; Proliferation on the Subcontinent: Possibilities for U.S.-Indian Cooperation; The Emerging Global Environment: An Indian View of the American Role; Whither China: Beijing's Domestic, Foreign, and National Security Policies in the 1990s; Opportunities and Prospects for Cooperation on Asian Security Issues-Central and West Asia; Opportunities and Prospects for Indo-U.S. Cooperation in Defense Technologies; India in the Emerging Global Environment; Opportunities for Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; and Indo-U.S. Security Cooperation: USCINPAC's First Steps U.S. and India in the Bipolar Contract.
The Cold War period witnessed competition from political, economic, ideological, diplomatic, military and social dimensions between the United States of America (USA), and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the superpower rivalries, India and Africa were adversely affected in many ways. The situation did not change for the better in the post-Cold War period, which has witnessed the domination of the world by the US and its allies, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialised countries. This domination has been characterised by the process of Americanization of the worlds, otherwise termed globalisation, in virtually all spheres of life. USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold War demonstrates that both the United States and The Soviet Union used African States, India and other Third World countries for their own geopolitical considerations; that the foreign policy and foreign relations of the US were meant to subject Africa and India to the dictates of US imperialism. The book assesses the impact of the Cold War and the post-Cold War order on Africa, India and the entire world and argues that the Non Aligned Movement is still relevant to the Third World countries despite the demise of the Cold War. The book analyses issues from the African point of view as opposed to hitherto Western view points but provides a balanced appreciation of the complex forces that shape foreign policies and foreign relations globally. It is a valuable contribution to modern diplomatic history and targets university students, researchers, foreign affairs ministries, and practising diplomats.
Focusing on the two tumultuous decades framed by Indian independence in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, The Cold War on the Periphery explores the evolution of American policy toward the subcontinent. McMahon analyzes the motivations behind America's pursuit of Pakistan and India as strategic Cold War prizes. He also examines the profound consequences—for U.S. regional and global foreign policy and for South Asian stability—of America's complex political, military, and economic commitments on the subcontinent. McMahon argues that the Pakistani-American alliance, consummated in 1954, was a monumental strategic blunder. Secured primarily to bolster the defense perimeter in the Middle East, the alliance increased Indo-Pakistani hostility, undermined regional stability, and led India to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union. Through his examination of the volatile region across four presidencies, McMahon reveals the American strategic vision to have been "surprinsgly ill defined, inconsistent, and even contradictory" because of its exaggerated anxiety about the Soviet threat and America's failure to incorporate the interests and concerns of developing nations into foreign policy. The Cold War on the Periphery addresses fundamental questions about the global reach of postwar American foreign policy. Why, McMahon asks, did areas possessing few of the essential prerequisites of economic-military power become objects of intense concern for the United States? How did the national security interests of the United States become so expansive that they extended far beyond the industrial core nations of Western Europe and East Asia to embrace nations on the Third World periphery? And what combination of economic, political, and ideological variables best explain the motives that led the United States to seek friends and allies in virtually every corner of the planet? McMahon's lucid analysis of Indo-Pakistani-Americna relations powerfully reveals how U.S. policy was driven, as he puts it, "by a series of amorphous—and largely illusory—military, strategic, and psychological fears" about American vulnerability that not only wasted American resources but also plunged South Asia into the vortex of the Cold War.
Special Sections: Russian Foreign Policy Towards the “Near Abroad” and Russia's Annexiation of Crimea II This special section deals with Russia’s post-Maidan foreign policy towards the so-called “near abroad,” or the former Soviet states. This is an important and timely topic, as Russia’s policy perspectives have changed dramatically since 2013/2014, as have those of its neighbors. The Kremlin today is paradoxically following an aggressive “realist” agenda that seeks to clearly delineate its sphere of influence in Europe and Eurasia while simultaneously attempting to promote “soft-power” and a historical-civilizational justification for its recent actions in Ukraine (and elsewhere). The result is an often perplexing amalgam of policy positions that are difficult to disentangle. The contributors to this special issue are all regional specialists based either in Europe or the United States.
Thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, this book reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall “The most engaging and carefully documented account of this period in East-West diplomacy currently available.”—Andrew Moravscik, Foreign Affairs Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange—but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union’s own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong.