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This book outlines the core concept of the theory of mixed oligopoly and presents recent results that have arisen in a mixed oligopolistic market. The wave of privatization since the 1980s has taken the development of the theory of mixed oligopoly in several directions. Although the main concern of the theory of mixed oligopoly focuses on the effect of regime change—especially privatization of a public firm—on social welfare, existing studies have not considered the difference in economic environments. With drastic changes in economic environments along with economic development in recent years, the domestic and foreign markets have become more and more integrated, firms have become concerned about corporate social responsibility, and governments or politicians have had various interests and preferences. Against that background, this book revisits the question of how privatization affects social welfare by incorporating regional and international interdependency and investigates how firms’ activities for corporate social responsibility, governments’ preferences, and political economic situations affect the market circumstance in a mixed oligopoly. The dynamic aspect of privatization is also investigated.
In this book a rigorous, systematic, mathematical analysis is presented for oligopoly with multi-product firms in static as well as dynamic frameworks in the light of recent developments in theories of games, oligopoly and industrial organization. The general results derived in this book on oligopoly with multi-product firms contain, as special cases, all previous results on oligopoly with single product as well as oligopoly with product differentiation and single product firms. A constructive nu- merical method is given for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may be extremely valuable to those who are interested in numerical analysis of the effects of various industrial policies. A sequential adjustment process is also formulated for finding the equilibrium. Dynamic adjustment processes have two versions, one with a discrete time scale and the other with a continuous time scale. The stability of the equilibrium is thoroughly investigated utilizing powerful mathematical results from the stability and linear algebra literature. The methodology developed for analyzing stability proves to be useful for dynamic analysis of economic models.
The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
This edited book presents recent developments and state-of-the-art review in various areas of mathematical programming and game theory. It is a peer-reviewed research monograph under the ISI Platinum Jubilee Series on Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research. This volume provides a panoramic view of theory and the applications of the methods of mathematical programming to problems in statistics, finance, games and electrical networks. It also provides an important as well as timely overview of research trends and focuses on the exciting areas like support vector machines, bilevel programming, interior point method for convex quadratic programming, cooperative games, non-cooperative games and stochastic games. Researchers, professionals and advanced graduates will find the book an essential resource for current work in mathematical programming, game theory and their applications. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (45 KB). Chapter 1: Mathematical Programming and its Applications in Finance (177 KB). Contents: Mathematical Programming and Its Applications in Finance (L C Thomas); Anti-Stalling Pivot Rule for Linear Programs with Totally Unimodular Coefficient Matrix (S N Kabadi & A P Punnen); A New Practically Efficient Interior Point Method for Convex Quadratic Programming (K G Murty); A General Framework for the Analysis of Sets of Constraints (R Caron & T Traynor), Tolerance-Based Algorithms for the Traveling Salesman Problem (D Ghosh et al.); On the Membership Problem of the Pedigree Polytope (T S Arthanari); Exact Algorithms for a One-Defective Vertex Colouring Problem (N Achuthan et al.); Complementarity Problem Involving a Vertical Block Matrix and Its Solution Using Neural Network Model (S K Neogy et al.); Fuzzy Twin Support Vector Machines for Pattern Classification (R Khemchandani et al.); An Overview of the Minimum Sum of Absolute Errors Regression (S C Narula & J F Wellington); Hedging Against the Market with No Short Selling (S A Clark & C Srinivasan); Mathematical Programming and Electrical Network Analysis II: Computational Linear Algebra Through Network Analysis (H Narayanan); Dynamic Optimal Control Policy in Price and Quality for High Technology Product (A K Bardhan & U Chanda); Forecasting for Supply Chain and Portfolio Management (K G Murty); Variational Analysis in Bilevel Programming (S Dempe et al.); Game Engineering (R J Aumann); Games of Connectivity (P Dubey & R Garg); A Robust Feedback Nash Equilibrium in a Climate Change Policy Game (M Hennlock); De Facto Delegation and Proposer Rules (H Imai & K Yonezaki); The Bargaining Set in Effectivity Function (D Razafimahatolotra); Dynamic Oligopoly as a Mixed Large Game OCo Toy Market (A Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel); On Some Classes of Balanced Games (R B Bapat); Market Equilibrium for Combinatorial Auctions and the Matching Core of Nonnegative TU Games (S Lahiri); Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow''s Social Choice Problem (K Saukkonen); On a Mixture Class of Stochastic Games with Ordered Field Property (S K Neogy). Readership: Researchers, professionals and advanced students in mathematical programming, game theory, management sciences and computational mathematics.
Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Industrial production and consumption patterns rely heavily on the intensive use of both renewable and non-renewable resources and the consequences for the environment can be serious. Following a long period of time where the profit incentives of firms have prevailed over preservation of the environment and the world’s natural resources, a new consensus has emerged concerning the need to regulate firm behaviour, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the economic system in the long run. This book offers an exhaustive overview of current economic debate about these topics, taking modern oligopoly theory as a benchmark. The first part of the book covers static models dealing with incentives for green research and development, Pigovian taxation, cartels, environmental quality and international trade, as well as the role of corporate social responsibility, public firms and consumer environmental awareness as endogenous regulatory instruments. Then, the author moves on to examine the role of time while drawing from optimal control and differential game theory. This opens the way to the discussion of fair discount rates to ensure the welfare of future generations, as well as the long run sustainability of production and consumption patterns.
Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.