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Since the early seventies, following the pioneering work by Leo Hurwicz, economists have been studying the relationship between socially optimal goals and private self-interest. The task was to reconcile the Utopian and Hobbesian traditions, using game theory to find ways to organise the society that are both socially optimal and incentive compatible. This book provides a succinct and up-to-date account of this vast literature and will be welcomed by students, lecturers and anyone wishing to update their knowledge of the field.
The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. *Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues *Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--
Optimization and Operations Research is a component of Encyclopedia of Mathematical Sciences in the global Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), which is an integrated compendium of twenty one Encyclopedias. The Theme on Optimization and Operations Research is organized into six different topics which represent the main scientific areas of the theme: 1. Fundamentals of Operations Research; 2. Advanced Deterministic Operations Research; 3. Optimization in Infinite Dimensions; 4. Game Theory; 5. Stochastic Operations Research; 6. Decision Analysis, which are then expanded into multiple subtopics, each as a chapter. These four volumes are aimed at the following five major target audiences: University and College students Educators, Professional Practitioners, Research Personnel and Policy Analysts, Managers, and Decision Makers and NGOs.
In 1968, Sveriges Riksbank (Sweden's central bank) established the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, founder of the Nobel Prize. The Prize in Economic Sciences is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, according to the same principles as for the Nobel Prizes that have been awarded since 1901. This volume is a collection of the Nobel lectures delivered by the prizewinners, together with their biographies and the presentation speeches, for the period 2006-2010.List of prizewinners and their award citations:(2006) Edmund S Phelps — for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy;(2007) Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S Maskin and Roger B Myerson — for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory;(2008) Paul Krugman — for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity;(2009) Elinor Ostrom — for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons, and Oliver E Williamson — for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm;(2010) Peter A Diamond, Dale T Mortensen and Christopher A Pissarides — for their analysis of markets with search frictions.
Choice is a key concept of our time. It is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism. Thus, choice can be understood as an atomic structure that grounds core societal processes. In recent years, however, the debate over the right way to theorize choice - for example, as a rational or a behavioral type of decision making - has intensified. This collection provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. It shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, in particular in the regulation of the digital economy or in choosing between market, firm, or network. In its first part, the volume provides an accessible overview of the current debates about rational versus behavioral approaches to theories of choice. The remainder of the book structures the vast landscape of theories of choice along with three main types: individual, collective, and organizational decision making. As theories of choice proliferate and become ever more sophisticated, however, the process of choosing an adequate theory of choice becomes increasingly intricate. This volume addresses this selection problem for the various legal arenas in which individual, organizational, and collective decisions matter. By drawing on economic, technological, political, and legal points of view, the volume shows which theories of choice are at the disposal of the legally relevant decision-maker, and how they can be operationalized for the solution of concrete legal problems. The editors acknowledge the kind support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for an exploratory conference on the subject of the book.
Fundamental Economics in two volumes is a component of Encyclopedia of Social Sciences and Humanities in the global Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), which is an integrated compendium of twenty one Encyclopedias. The Theme discusses on Fundamental Economics, Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Microeconomics, Strategic Behavior, The Economics of Bargaining, Economic Exernalities, Public Goods, Macroeconomics, Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Development Economics and many other related topics. These two volumes are aimed at the following five major target audiences: University and College Students Educators, Professional Practitioners, Research Personnel and Policy Analysts, Managers, and Decision Makers, NGOs and GOs.
Yew-Kwang Ng looks to make welfare economics more complete by discussing the recent inframarginal analysis of division of labour and by pushing welfare economics from the level of preference to that of happiness, making a reformulation of the foundation of public policy necessary. A theory of the third best is provided, with extension to the equality/efficiency issue. The remarkable conclusion of treating a dollar as a dollar provides a powerful simplification of public policy formulation in general and in cost-benefit analysis in particular.
This unified volume is a collection of invited articles on topics presented at the Symposium on Systems, Control, and Networks, held in Berkeley June 5–7, 2005, in honor of Pravin Varaiya on his 65th birthday. Varaiya is an eminent faculty member of the University of California at Berkeley, widely known for his seminal contributions in areas as diverse as stochastic systems, nonlinear and hybrid systems, distributed systems, communication networks, transportation systems, power networks, economics, optimization, and systems education. The book will serve as an excellent resource for practicing and research engineers, applied mathematicians, and graduate students working in such areas as communication networks, sensor networks, transportation systems, control theory, hybrid systems, and applications.
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.