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This book presents a simple geometric model of voting as a tool to analyze parliamentary roll call data. Each legislator is represented by one point and each roll call is represented by two points that correspond to the policy consequences of voting Yea or Nay. On every roll call each legislator votes for the closer outcome point, at least probabilistically. These points form a spatial map that summarizes the roll calls. In this sense a spatial map is much like a road map because it visually depicts the political world of a legislature. The closeness of two legislators on the map shows how similar their voting records are, and the distribution of legislators shows what the dimensions are. These maps can be used to study a wide variety of topics including how political parties evolve over time, the existence of sophisticated voting and how an executive influences legislative outcomes.
Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers. Starting from a discussion of the underlying principles of democratic representation, the volume includes a description of a great variety of voting procedures. It lists and illustrates their susceptibility to the main voting paradoxes, assesses (under various models of voters' preferences) the probability of paradoxical outcomes, and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results to the choice of voting system.
Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions--for both voter choice and candidate strategy--in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multiparty electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.
DIVA marriage of behavioral and formal theory to explain the electoral strategies of political parties /div
With recent advances in computing power and the widespread availability of preference, perception and choice data, such as public opinion surveys and legislative voting, the empirical estimation of spatial models using scaling and ideal point estimation methods has never been more accessible.The second edition of Analyzing Spatial Models of Choice and Judgment demonstrates how to estimate and interpret spatial models with a variety of methods using the open-source programming language R. Requiring only basic knowledge of R, the book enables social science researchers to apply the methods to their own data. Also suitable for experienced methodologists, it presents the latest methods for modeling the distances between points. The authors explain the basic theory behind empirical spatial models, then illustrate the estimation technique behind implementing each method, exploring the advantages and limitations while providing visualizations to understand the results. This second edition updates and expands the methods and software discussed in the first edition, including new coverage of methods for ordinal data and anchoring vignettes in surveys, as well as an entire chapter dedicated to Bayesian methods. The second edition is made easier to use by the inclusion of an R package, which provides all data and functions used in the book. David A. Armstrong II is Canada Research Chair in Political Methodology and Associate Professor of Political Science at Western University. His research interests include measurement, Democracy and state repressive action. Ryan Bakker is Reader in Comparative Politics at the University of Essex. His research interests include applied Bayesian modeling, measurement, Western European politics, and EU politics. Royce Carroll is Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Essex. His research focuses on measurement of ideology and the comparative politics of legislatures and political parties. Christopher Hare is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of California, Davis. His research focuses on ideology and voting behavior in US politics, political polarization, and measurement. Keith T. Poole is Philip H. Alston Jr. Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. His research interests include methodology, US political-economic history, economic growth and entrepreneurship. Howard Rosenthal is Professor of Politics at NYU and Roger Williams Straus Professor of Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Princeton. Rosenthal’s research focuses on political economy, American politics and methodology.
Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other "rational" actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy.
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
A pioneering effort to integrate ideology with formal political theory
This volume brings together eight original essays designed to provide an overview of developments in spatial voting theory in the past ten years. The topics covered are: spatial competition with possible entry by new candidates; the "heresthetical" manipulation of vote outcomes; candidates with policy preferences; experimental testing of spatial models; probabilistic voting; voting on alternatives with predictive power; elections with more than two candidates under different election systems; and agenda-setting behavior in voting. Leading scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and other's work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to experimental testing.