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First published in 1980. This volume is an account of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 or the Sinai blunder.
First published in 1980. This volume is an account of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 or the Sinai blunder.
A narrative by the former commander of the United Nations Emergency Force.
In both the 1956 and 1967 wars, Abu Ageila was the main gateway to the Sinai for the Israel Defense Forces. Yet there were marked differences between Egyptian and Israeli war plans, preparations, operations, and results in the two battles for the area. In 1956, Israel carried the burden of a constricting alliance with Britain and France and faced other extensive military problems. The result was that Israel fought a difficult and costly battle for Abu Ageila. In contrast, in 1967, the Israel Defense Forces developed a brilliant operational plan and achieved effective unit command and control and attained a decisive victory.
After it became clear that the UN Security Council would not set up a peacekeeping force to fulfill the role envisaged for it in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty--supervising the implementation of the treaty and preventing any violation of its terms--the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was established in its place. This book provides a detailed description of the structure and function of the MFO in order to evaluate its chances for success. In addition, the author has included various documents regarding the MFO's legal basis and organization. The MFO is the first modern multinational peacekeeping force that is independent of any organization; in the future it may serve as a prototype for multinational peacekeeping forces in conflicts and areas in which the UN is unwilling or unable to become involved.
[Includes 5 figures and 21 maps] Situated between the Suez Canal and Israel and marked by the harsh environment of the central Sinai lies Abu Ageila, an unprepossessing area of low ridges and hills through which passes the best-surfaced road in the peninsula. Owing to its location on the central route, close to the Israeli-Egyptian border, Abu Ageila became the key to the Sinai in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967. The struggle for this barren land in two wars provides an epic story of battle and reveals the influence of experience on the preparation for and conduct of war. In both the 1956 and 1967 wars, Abu Ageila was the main gateway to the Sinai for the Israel Defense Forces. Yet, as Dr. George W. Gawrych demonstrates, there were marked differences between Egyptian and Israeli war plans, preparations, operations, and results in the two battles for the area. In 1956, Israel carried the burden of a constricting alliance with Britain and France and faced other extensive military problems. The result was that Israel fought a difficult and costly battle for Abu Ageila. In contrast, in 1967, the Israel Defense Forces developed a brilliant operational plan and achieved effective unit command and control and attained a decisive victory. Based on extensive research, including personal interviews with Israeli commanders and briefings by Egyptian military historians, Key to the Sinai is a crisp battle narrative of desert warfare and a systematic historical analysis of two armies confronting the changing terms of battle. Students of AirLand Battle doctrine will find reading this Research Survey a stimulus to meeting the challenges of modern warfare.
The June 1967 war was a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East. In six days, the Israelis defeated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies, seizing large portions of their territories. Two veteran scholars of the Middle East bring together some of the most knowledgeable experts in their fields to reassess the origins and the legacies of the war. Each chapter takes a different perspective from the vantage point of a different participant, those that actually took part in the war and also the world powers that played important roles behind the scenes. Their conclusions make for sober reading. At the heart of the story was the incompetence of the Egyptian leadership and the rivalry between various Arab players who were deeply suspicious of each other's motives. Israel, on the other side, gained a resounding victory for which, despite previous assessments to the contrary, there was no master plan.
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
Although political culture is not sole explanatory factor in development of US policy toward Israel, it has played a key role in serving to shape and define American approach to foreign affairs. This book explains American commitment to Israel within a framework of political culture.
India's foreign policy toward Israel is a subject of deep dispute. Throughout the twentieth century arguments have raged over the Palestinian problem and the future of bilateral relations. Yet no text comprehensively looks at the attitudes and policies of India toward Israel, especially their development in conjunction with history. P. R. Kumaraswamy is the first to account for India's Israel policy, revealing surprising inconsistencies in positions taken by the country's leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, and tracing the crackling tensions between its professed values and realpolitik. Kumaraswamy's findings debunk the belief that India possesses a homogenous policy toward the Middle East. In fact, since the early days of independence, many within India have supported and pursued relations with Israel. Using material derived from archives in both India and Israel, Kumaraswamy investigates the factors that have hindered relations between these two countries despite their numerous commonalities. He also considers how India destabilized relations, the actions that were necessary for normalization to occur, and the directions bilateral relations may take in the future. In his most provocative argument, Kumaraswamy underscores the disproportionate affect of anticolonial sentiments and the Muslim minority on shaping Indian policy.