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Federal deposit insurance may be "the single most destabilizing influence in the financial system," says economist Charles W. Calomiris in a new study published by AEI. Market discipline provides a better bank safety net than government insurance, he concludes. The Postmodern Bank Safety Net: Lessons from Developed and Developing Economies shows how government deposit insurance subsidizes the risks taken by banks. Weak banks deliberately and sometimes with impunity take on greater risks than they can afford. Undue risk-taking would not be tolerated were private market discipline brought to bear on banks, Calomiris argues. Market discipline would place the regulatory burden on sophisticated market participants with their own money at stake-a bank would survive only if it had investors, and those investors would be willing to risk their money only if they were able to evaluate the bank's risk. Currently, banks that hide loan losses can avoid paying increased deposit insurance costs. At the same time, Calomiris says, government regulators lack strong incentive to determine the true risk characteristics of bank assets-government regulators do not have their own money at stake and they face political pressure to maintain the credit supply. The results can be calamitous. In the 1970s and 1980s the Farm Credit System was increasingly willing to lend against questionable collateral while private banks withdrew from the market as lending risk increased. The system failed, gripping U.S. farmers in a debt crisis. Similarly, the savings and loan failures and the oil-related bank collapses in Texas and Oklahoma of the 19080s can be attributed to the failure of the bank safety net. And Chile, Mexico, and Japan have suffered financial collapses because their governments protected banks from self-inflicted losses.
The literature surveys presented in this edited volume provide readers with up-to-date reviews on eleven contemporary topics in finance. Topics include unconventional monetary policy, implicit bank guarantees, and financial fraud - all linked to the exceptional event of the Global Financial Crisis Explores how recent studies on inflation risk premia and finance and productivity have benefitted from new empirical methods and the availability of relevant data Demonstrates how angel investing, venture capital, relationship lending and microfinance have benefitted from increased research as they have become more seasoned Investigates crowdfunding and crypto-currencies which have both arisen from recent technological developments
Over the last twenty-five years, there has been an acceleration in the move from government regulation towards privatization. Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region is the first thoroughgoing account of the relative success of the different approaches to privatization as undertaken in Korea, China, Australia, and Japan. In most contexts, privatization is expected to yield greater efficiency and cost effectiveness while avoiding the corruption and bloated budgets of government regulation or monopoly control. But broad-scale privatization, if ill designed, has also yielded its share of difficulties in East Asia. Privatization sometimes has created a vacuum in corporate governance for some of the region's most important industries and in some cases merely reinstated the monopoly-like configurations. The papers presented in this book discuss the experiences of privatization in several industries, including railroad and telecom, corporate governance problems, accounting issues, and challenges for the future in East Asian countries. The first section is theoretical in nature and proposes boundaries among government protection, market freedom, and shareholder expectations. The second part is constituted by country case studies, beginning with an analysis of both the Korean financial crisis that followed its 1997 law to privatize large, public sector corporations and the new ways Korean corporations finance themselves. Following is an evaluation of China's approach to privatization, with an in-depth look at the financial transitions of companies slated for initial public offering. Providing provocative examples of the methods of privatization in the Asia-Pacific region specifically, these papers will be of huge import to any economist or policymaker interested in transposing those successes for their own region.
Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.
Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.
Because two disparate clients demand loyalty from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, these government-sponsored entities must fulfill two ultimately irreconcilable roles.
This book is timely since the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements is in the process of making major changes in the capital rules for banks. It is important that capital adequacy regulation helps to achieve financial stability in the most efficient way. Capital adequacy rules have become a key tool to protect financial institutions. The research contained within the book covers some key issues at stake in the capital requirements for insurance and securities firms. The contributors are among the leading scholars in financial economics and law. Their contributions analyze the use of subordinated debt, internal models, and rating agencies in addition to examining the effect on capital of reinsurance, securitization, credit derivatives, and similar instruments.
"Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust once systemic risk is factored in. As systemic risk increases, the informational content of past fundamentals declines. These episodes also show how few systemic shocks can trigger a run irrespective of ex-ante fundamentals. Overall, the evidence suggests that in emerging economies, the notion of market discipline needs to account for systemic risk. This paper--a product of the Finance Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study market discipline"--World Bank web site.
Throughout the 1990s, major banking and currency crises occurred in many countries around the world. This book contains papers and comments from a conference held to identify and discuss the lessons to be learned from these crises, such as their causes and how to prevent their reoccurrence.