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This volume of original essays brings the practical world of trade policy and of government and business strategy together with the world of academic trade theory. It focuses in particular on the impact of changes in the international trade environment and on how new developments and theory can guide our trade policy.Contents: New Thinking about Trade Policy, Paul Krugman (Sloan School of Management, MIT). Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy, James A. Brander (University of British Columbia). Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique, Gene M. Grossman (Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University). Government Policy and the Dynamics of International Competition in High Technology, Michael Borrus, Laura d'Andrea Tyson, and John Zysman (all at the University of California, Berkeley). What Should Trade Policy Target? Barbara Spencer (University of British Columbia). Credit Policy and International Competition, Jonathan Eaton (University of Virginia). Industrial Policy: An Overview, Geoffrey Carliner (National Bureau of Economic Research). Japan's Industrial Strategy, Kozo Yamamura (University of Washington). U.S. Trade and Industrial Policy, William R. Cline (Institute for International Economics). Strategic Behavior and Trade Policy, Alvin K. Klevorick (Yale University) and William Branson (Princeton University). The New Political Economy of Trade Policy, J. David Richardson, (University of Wisconsin). Trade Policy: An Agenda for Research, Avinash K. Dixit (Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University).Paul Krugman is Professor of Economics at MIT. A former member of the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers, Krugman is also coauthor, with Elhanan Helpman, of Market Structure and Foreign Trade (MIT Press 1985).
Seminar paper from the year 2004 in the subject Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, grade: 1 (A), Rutgers The State University of New Jersey (Graduate School of Global Affairs), course: Introduction to IPE, language: English, abstract: Introduction One aspect of the study of International Political Economy (IPE) is the flow of goods, services and capital between the economies of different states. Is there a free flow of these things or is the flow somehow restricted and if so, why is this case? To answer these questions I will examine three periods in history and try to show the theoretical implications that can be seen in the respecti ve free or restricted flows of goods, services and capital. The first historical period I will examine is the period of great restrictions on trade and the flow of capital, namely the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, mostly associated with the term mercantilism. The second period is the time after the Second World War in Germany, where trade and financial policies were applied to stimulate domestic growth. The third period begins with the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s and continues to this day with an emphasis on fewer controls and restrictions on trade and the flow of capital. Of course, this periodization is not the only way of looking at historical events and there are, within these large time frames, discontinuities. However, I believe it is helpful to define the mentioned periods rather generously, because this helps to discover certain general aspects that can be associated with different theories of trade and finance.
This paper applies the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman (1994, 1997) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman politically-determined ex-port subsidy is identical to the Brander-Spencer rent-shifting export subsidy. The politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator. Joint lobbying is also considered and the results indicate that joint lobbying on export subsidy improves domestic welfare due to the elimination of the resource wasted in lobbying.
The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory, Evidence and Applications is a collection of sole-authored and co-authored papers by Devashish Mitra that have been published in various scholarly journals over the last two decades. It covers diverse topics in the political economy of trade policy, ranging from the role of modeling lobby formation in the context of trade policy determination to its applications to the question of unilateralism versus reciprocity and trade agreements. It also includes the theory and the empirics of the choice of policy instruments. Finally, the book presents the empirical investigation of the Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” model as well as the Mayer “Median-Voter” model of trade policy determination.
This book presents International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium commissioned papers. The papers systematically explore the conceptual and empirical dimensions of the new trade theory and try to determine the potential application to agricultural trade and trade policy analysis.
This collection of papers by former students and colleagues celebrates the profound impact that Jagdish Bhagwati has had on the field of international economics over the past three decades. Bhagwati, who is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia University, has made pathbreaking contributions to the theory of international trade and commercial policy, including immiserizing growth, domestic distortions, economic development, and political economy. His success and influence as a teacher and mentor is widely recognized among students at both MIT and Columbia, and as founder of the Journal of International Economics, he has encouraged research on many questions of theoretical and policy relevance. The political economy of trade policy, Bhagwati's most recent area of interest, is the theme of this collection which addresses salient topics including market distortions, income distribution, and the political process of policy-making. Sections and Contributors Market Distortions, T. N. Srinivasan. Paul A. Samuelson. Paul R. Krugman * Trade and Income Distribution, Douglas A. Irwin. Richard A. Brecher and Ehsan U. Choudri. Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson. Earl L. Grinols * Perspectives on Political Economy, Robert E. Baldwin. Peter Diamond * Models of Political Economy and Trade, Gene M. Grossman and Elhana Helpman. John Douglas Wilson. B. Peter Rosendorff. Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay
The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. The Handbook is focused on work by political scientists that draws extensively on work in economics, but is distinctive in its applications and attention to political features; that is, it takes politics seriously. The Handbook's framework is organized in part along the traditional lines of domestic society-domestic institutions - international interaction, but elaborates this basic framework to showcase the most important new developments in our understanding of the political economy of trade. Within the field of international political economy, international trade has long been and continues to be one of the most vibrant areas of study. Drawing on models of economic interests and integrating them with political models of institutions and society, political scientists have made great strides in understanding the sources of trade policy preferences and outcomes. The 27 chapters in the Handbook include contributions from prominent scholars around the globe, and from multiple theoretical and methodological traditions. The Handbook considers the development of concepts and policies about international trade; the influence of individuals, firms, and societies; the role of domestic and international institutions; and the interaction of trade and other issues, such as monetary policy, environmental challenges, and human rights. Showcasing both established theories and findings and cutting-edge new research, the Handbook is a valuable reference for scholars of political economy.
This book critically engages with a long tradition of scholarly work that conceives of the European Union as a peculiar international actor that pursues a value-based, normatively oriented and development-friendly agenda in its relations with international partners. The EU is a pivotal player in international trade relations, holding formidable power in trade but also exercising substantial power through trade. Trade policy therefore represents a strategic field for the EU to shape its image as a healthy economy and a global power. In this field, the EU has declared a twofold ambitious goal, namely that of fostering economic growth in Europe while, at the same time, promoting development and growth abroad, both in developed and developing countries. In other words, the EU aims to increase its competitiveness in world trade while acting as an ethical and normative power. Here, Poletti and Sicurelli explore the tension between these two roles.