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The politics surrounding exchange rate policies in the global economy The exchange rate is the most important price in any economy, since it affects all other prices. Exchange rates are set, either directly or indirectly, by government policy. Exchange rates are also central to the global economy, for they profoundly influence all international economic activity. Despite the critical role of exchange rate policy, there are few definitive explanations of why governments choose the currency policies they do. Filled with in-depth cases and examples, Currency Politics presents a comprehensive analysis of the politics surrounding exchange rates. Identifying the motivations for currency policy preferences on the part of industries seeking to influence politicians, Jeffry Frieden shows how each industry's characteristics—including its exposure to currency risk and the price effects of exchange rate movements—determine those preferences. Frieden evaluates the accuracy of his theoretical arguments in a variety of historical and geographical settings: he looks at the politics of the gold standard, particularly in the United States, and he examines the political economy of European monetary integration. He also analyzes the politics of Latin American currency policy over the past forty years, and focuses on the daunting currency crises that have frequently debilitated Latin American nations, including Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. With an ambitious mix of narrative and statistical investigation, Currency Politics clarifies the political and economic determinants of exchange rate policies.
Creating the European monetary union between diverse and unequal nation states is arguably one of the biggest social experiments in history. This book offers an explanation of how the euro experiment came about and was sustained despite a severe crisis, and provides a comparison with the monetary-financial history of the US. The euro experiment can be understood as risk-sharing through a currency that is issued by a supranational central bank. A single currency shares liquidity risks by creating larger markets for all financial assets. A single monetary policy responds to business cycles in the currency area as a whole rather than managing the path of one dominant economy. Mechanisms of risk-sharing become institutions of monetary solidarity if they are consciously maintained, but they will periodically face opposition in member states. This book argues that diversity of membership is not an economic obstacle to the success of the euro, as diversity increases the potential gains from risk sharing. But political cooperation is needed to realize this potential, and such cooperation is up against collective action problems which become more intractable as the parties become more diverse. Hence, risk-sharing usually comes about as a collective by-product of national incentives. This political-economic tension can explain why the gains from risk-sharing are not more fully exploited, both in the euro area and in the US dollar area. This approach to monetary integration is based on the theory of collective action when hierarchy is not available as a solution to inter-state cooperation. The theory originates with Keohane and Ostrom (1995) and it is applied in this book, taking into account the latest research on the inherent instability of financial market integration.
In this title, David Stasavage explores several alternative political economy explanations for the persistence of the Franc Zone and its macroeconomic management over the period 1945 to 2000. He addresses the issue of sustainability and asks why the Franc Zone has survived despite several major political and economic shocks that might have easily led to its dissolution. These include decolonisation, France's entry into the European Community and the growing marginalisation of Africa in world affairs. He also considers the issue of credibility and in particular the extent to which the Franc Zone arrangements commit member states to prudent macroeconomic policies.
Why have the states of Europe agreed to create an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a single European currency? What will decide the fate of this bold project? This book explains why monetary integration has deepened in Europe from the Bretton Woods era to the present day. McNamara argues that the development of a neoliberal economic policy consensus among European leaders in the years after the first oil crisis was crucial to stability in the European Monetary System and progress towards EMU. She identifies two factors, rising capital mobility and changing ideas about the government's proper role in monetary policymaking, as critical to the neoliberal consensus but warns that unresolved social tensions in this consensus may provoke a political backlash against EMU and its neoliberal reforms.McNamara's findings are relevant not only to European monetary integration, but to more general questions about the effects of international capital flows on states. Although this book delineates a range of constraints created by economic interdependence, McNamara rejects the notion that international market forces simply dictate government policy choice. She demonstrates that the process of neoliberal policy change is a historically dependent one, shaped by policymakers' shared beliefs and interpretations of their experiences in the global economy.
The establishment of Banking Union represents a major development in European economic governance and European integration history more generally. Banking Union is also significant because not all European Union (EU) member states have joined, which has increased the trend towards differentiated integration in the EU, posing a major challenge to the EU as a whole and to the opt-out countries. This book is informed by two main empirical questions. Why was Banking Union - presented by proponents as a crucial move to 'complete' Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) - proposed only in 2012, over twenty years after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? Why has a certain design for Banking Union been agreed and some elements of this design prioritized over others? A two-step explanation is articulated in this study. First, it explains why euro area member state governments moved to consider Banking Union by building on the concept of the 'financial trilemma', and examining the implications of the single currency for euro area member state banking systems. Second, it explains the design of Banking Union by examining the preferences of member state governments on the core components of Banking Union and developing a comparative political economy analysis focused on the configuration of national banking systems and varying national concern for the moral hazard facing banks and sovereigns created by euro level support mechanisms.
In this book, a historical analysis of the precedents of the euro is examined within the context of the current issues affecting the Eurozone and the long-term effects of the institutional changes implemented since 2010. The book begins by placing the Eurozone challenges in the historical context of previous monetary unions, drawing on the experience of the gold standard. It then specifically focuses on the problems arising from the running of permanent trade imbalances within the Eurozone. The authors explore the advantages and disadvantages of being a member of the Eurozone and attempt to measure the optimality of a currency area by the calculation of an index on internal macroeconomic asymmetries. They address the proposals recently made in favour of a fiscal union in the Euro zone; including the economic and political feasibility of fiscal transfers in the Eurozone. The final two papers discuss whether the monetary union is in fact more than just that, and whether it will lead inevitably to some form of political union if it is to survive. With chapters by leading experts from both Europe and the UK, this book will appeal to students in Economics, Finance, Politics, EU integration and European studies; as well as academics and professional economists doing research in EU integration, the Euro zone, monetary history and monetary and banking unions in Europe, the UK and elsewhere.
The idea for this volume came from the enigma that some Central and Eastern European (CEE) European Union (EU) member states have been keen to join the Eurozone while others have shown persistent reluctance. Moreover, the attitudes towards joining have seemingly not correlated with either the level of economic development or the time spent as part of the EU, nor with any other rational reason such as the level of integration into the EU real economy, or the level of trust in the EU on the part of the public. Therefore, at first sight, the answer to the question ‘why in, why out?’ remains rather unclear. The attractiveness of the currency union has nevertheless not disappeared for the CEE countries. Despite the Eurozone crisis of 2010–13, it was during that time that the Baltic states introduced the euro. Then, after a few years of inactivity, Croatia and Bulgaria successfully applied for membership of the exchange rate mechanism in July 2020, amid the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. At the same time, the three Visegrad countries still using their national currencies – Poland, Czechia and Hungary – no longer have a target date to join the monetary union. This volume aims to discuss these issues from horizontal aspects and through country studies, with contributions from expert authors from, or closely related to, the CEE region.
This is Volume XXI of twenty-three in a collection on the History of Economic Thought. Originally published in 1933, this volume offers selected papers and reviews on economic theory as the first volume of two.