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"In the 84th Infantry Division, a unique experiment was attempted. As soon as the division was sent into combat, our own historical section was formed. It was encouraged to go direct to the source, to the men themselves, from the commanding general to any private, for the most complete, firsthand information on every action." -- from front flap of dust jacket.
"This study seeks to explore the roots of the successful innovation by examining the development of air ground doctrine, the early failures and efforts to revise it in the Mediterranean theater, and the stateside maneuvers that trained the bulk of the Army's higher-number infantry divisions originally from the National Guard and Reserves that carried much of the load in 1944 and 1945"--Provided by publisher.
The 84th Division in the Battle of Germany, November 1944 – May 1945, first published in 1946, is the account of the combat experiences of the noted “The Railsplitter Division” of the U.S. Army in the later days of World War II. Based on numerous interviews conducted immediately after each movement or encounter with the enemy, the book provides an in-depth look at the experiences of U.S. infantrymen as they moved into Germany in the face of often fierce resistance and muddy and freezing conditions. The Division fought at the Battle of the Bulge, was in the lead to cross the Roer and Rhine Rivers and the taking of the large city of Hannover, quickly followed by the successful crossing of the Elbe River. Along the way, the Division captured more than 70,000 German soldiers, liberated several concentration and internment camps, and met-up with Russian forces advancing from the east to form a critical part of the Allied victory. Included are 18 pages of maps and nearly 80 photographs and illustrations.
The German Wehrmacht was one of the most capable fighting forces the world has ever known, but in the end it was no match for the Allies. Some historians contend that the Allies achieved victory through brute force and material superiority. But, as Peter Mansoor argues, all of the material produced by U.S. industry was useless without trained soldiers to operate it, a coherent doctrine for its use, and leaders who could effectively command the formations into which it was organized. This book provides a comprehensive study of America's infantry combat performance in Europe during World War II, showing that the Army succeeded by developing combat effective divisions that could not only fight and win battles, but also sustain that effort over years of combat. While American industry admittedly enabled the U.S. to sustain its overseas armies, the effectiveness of those forces ultimately rested on their organizational capabilities and ability to adapt to combat in a variety of lethal environments and to learn from their mistakes. Mansoor analyzes the impact of personnel and logistical systems on the Army's strength, explaining how leaders used these systems to keep a small number of divisions at a high state of combat effectiveness. During the critical battles of 1944-45, American divisions were able to sustain this high level while their Wehrmacht counterparts disintegrated, demonstrating that the Army's endurance in extended combat was the most critical factor in its ultimate success. Mansoor also takes a close look at the personalities and capabilities of division commanders, infantry tactics and operations, logistics, and the benefits and weaknesses of stateside training. The American army won, asserts Mansoor, because unit for unit at the division level it was more effective than its adversaries. By showing how U.S. infantry developed more quickly and fought better than commonly believed, The GI Offensive in Europe contributes significantly to the history of the U.S. Army in the European theater and to our overall understanding of military effectiveness.
A fighter pilot who flew 75 combat missions in World War I, George C. Kenney was a charismatic leader who established himself as an innovative advocate of air power. As General MacArthur's air commander in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, Kenney played a pivotal role in the conduct of the war, but until now his performance has remained largely unexplored. Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of Kenney's numerous contributions to MacArthur's war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of airpower's ability to shape the outcome of military engagements and a commander who shared MacArthur's strategic vision. He tells how Kenney played a key role in campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines; adapted aircraft, pilots, doctrine, and technology to the demands of aerial warfare in the southwest Pacific; and pursued daring strategies that likely would have failed in the European theater. Kenney is shown to have been an operational and organizational innovator who was willing to scrap doctrine when the situation called for ingenuity, such as shifting to low-level attacks for more effective bombing raids. Griffith tells how Kenney established air superiority in every engagement, provided close air support for troops by bombing enemy supply lines, attacked and destroyed Japanese supply ships, and carried out rapid deployment by airlifting troops and supplies. Griffith draws on Kenney's diary and correspondence, the personal papers of other officers, and previously untapped sources to present a comprehensive portrayal of both the officer and the man. He illuminates Kenney's relationship with MacArthur, General "Hap" Arnold, and other field commanders, and closely examines factors in air warfare often neglected in other accounts, such as intelligence, training, and logistical support. MacArthur's Airman is a rich and insightful study that shows how air, ground, and marine efforts were integrated to achieve major strategic objectives. It firmly establishes the importance of MacArthur's campaign in New Guinea and reveals Kenney's instrumental role in turning the tide against the Japanese.
In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine.