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Why do we universally punish offenders? This book proposes that people possess a moral punish instinct: a hard-wired tendency to aggress against those who violate the norms of their group. This instinct is reflected in how punishment originates from moral emotions, stimulates cooperation, and shapes the social life of human beings.
Across time and cultures, ranging from ancient hunter-gatherers, to holy scriptures, to contemporary courts of law, it has been common for people to punish offenders. Furthermore, punishment is not restricted to criminal offenders but emerges in all spheres of social life. Why is punishment so ubiquitous? Punishment also occurs among nonhuman animals for which one can question their sense of morality. Apparently, there is something specific about punishment that warrants a more focused discussion. This work proposes that people possess a moral punishment instinct, that is, a hard-wired tendency to aggress against those who violate the norms of the group.
Punishment in International Society examines the penal philosophies and practices in international society, arguing for the added value of a punitive lens to international politics. Bringing together an international roster of scholars from the social sciences, law, and humanities, the contributions demonstrate that punitive practices have been more prevalent than commonly acknowledged as they have often been masked as (self-)defence, reparations, or coercive diplomacy. By approaching international punishment from various disciplines, this volume sheds new light on different dimensions of the punitive practices across the globe.
This issue of the American Journal of Islam and Society comprises four main research articles, each shedding light on the diverse ways in which the Islamic legal and theological tradition has shaped and intersected with premodern and modern societies. To start closer to home: Sam Houston’s contribution entitled “The “Metaphysical Monster” and Muslim Theology: William James, Sherman Jackson, and the Problem of Black Suffering” places American Muslim scholar Sherman A. Jackson’s important monograph Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering in conversation with the work of American pragmatist philosopher William James and suggests that Jackson’s account parallels James’s account of religion in that it speaks of the “practical effectiveness” of the “web of beliefs” constituting Islamic doctrines of God. Our next article explores the practical engagement of the official ulama as spokespersons of the Islamic legal and theological tradition in a different field: post-2011 Egypt. In his article entitled, “Ideals and Interests in Intellectuals’ Political Deliberations: The Arab Spring and the Divergent Paths of Egypt’s Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib and Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa,” Muhammad Amasha calls into question the commonplace generalizations about the ulama as being either pro-revolution or pro-regime by examining the politics of two prominent members of the pro-establishment ulama class. Syamsuddin Arif in his “Rethinking the Concept of Fiṭra: Natural Disposition, Reason and Conscience,” turns our attention to an understudied dimension of Islamic psychology: the role of innate human nature, or fiṭra, in the motivation behind human action. Drawing on recent Western as well as Islamicate scholarship, it attends to the biological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions of this Qur’anic concept, suggesting that it be treated not only as the natural tendency for humans to act or think in a particular way, but specifically as the religious, ethical, and rational instinct. Finally, Fateh Saeidi’s “The Early Sufi Tradition in Hamadān, Nahāwand, and Abhar: Stories of Devotion, Mystical Experiences, and Sufi Texts” explores the history of the development of early Sufism in Hamadān, Nahāwand, and Abhar through an analysis of three significant but understudied early Sufi texts: Karāmāt Sheikh abī ʻalī al-Qūmsānī by Ibn Zīrak al-Nahāwandī (d. 471/1078), Ādāb al-fuqarāʼ by Bābā Jaʻfar al-Abharī (d. 428/1036), and Rawḍat al-murīdīn by Ibn Yazdānyār
The return of emotions to debates about crime and criminal justice has been a striking development of recent decades across many jurisdictions. This has been registered in the return of shame to justice procedures, a heightened focus on victims and their emotional needs, fear of crime as a major preoccupation of citizens and politicians, and highly emotionalised public discourses on crime and justice. But how can we best make sense of these developments? Do we need to create "emotionally intelligent" justice systems, or are we messing recklessly with the rational foundations of liberal criminal justice? This volume brings together leading criminologists and sociologists from across the world in a much needed conversation about how to re-calibrate reason and emotion in crime and justice today. The contributions range from the micro-analysis of emotions in violent encounters to the paradoxes and tensions that arise from the emotionalisation of criminal justice in the public sphere. They explore the emotional labour of workers in police and penal institutions, the justice experiences of victims and offenders, and the role of vengeance, forgiveness and regret in the aftermath of violence and conflict resolution. The result is a set of original essays which offer a fresh and timely perspective on problems of crime and justice in contemporary liberal democracies.
By what criteria should public policy be evaluated? Fairness and justice? Or the welfare of individuals? Debate over this fundamental question has spanned the ages. Fairness versus Welfare poses a bold challenge to contemporary moral philosophy by showing that most moral principles conflict more sharply with welfare than is generally recognized. In particular, the authors demonstrate that all principles that are not based exclusively on welfare will sometimes favor policies under which literally everyone would be worse off. The book draws on the work of moral philosophers, economists, evolutionary and cognitive psychologists, and legal academics to scrutinize a number of particular subjects that have engaged legal scholars and moral philosophers. How can the deeply problematic nature of all nonwelfarist principles be reconciled with our moral instincts and intuitions that support them? The authors offer a fascinating explanation of the origins of our moral instincts and intuitions, developing ideas originally advanced by Hume and Sidgwick and more recently explored by psychologists and evolutionary theorists. Their analysis indicates that most moral principles that seem appealing, upon examination, have a functional explanation, one that does not justify their being accorded independent weight in the assessment of public policy. Fairness versus Welfare has profound implications for the theory and practice of policy analysis and has already generated considerable debate in academia.
Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002) was a leading critic of human behavioral genetics, human sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and the modern evolutionary synthesis. Why Gould Was Wrong explains why Gould's claims were horribly wrong.