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Boolos, a pre-eminent philosopher of mathematics, investigates the relationship between provability and modal logic.
This volume contains articles covering a broad spectrum of proof theory, with an emphasis on its mathematical aspects. The articles should not only be interesting to specialists of proof theory, but should also be accessible to a diverse audience, including logicians, mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Many of the central topics of proof theory have been included in a self-contained expository of articles, covered in great detail and depth.The chapters are arranged so that the two introductory articles come first; these are then followed by articles from core classical areas of proof theory; the handbook concludes with articles that deal with topics closely related to computer science.
The Unprovability of Consistency is concerned with connections between two branches of logic: proof theory and modal logic. Modal logic is the study of the principles that govern the concepts of necessity and possibility; proof theory is, in part, the study of those that govern provability and consistency. In this book, George Boolos looks at the principles of provability from the standpoint of modal logic. In doing so, he provides two perspectives on a debate in modal logic that has persisted for at least thirty years between the followers of C. I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine. The author employs semantic methods developed by Saul Kripke in his analysis of modal logical systems. The book will be of interest to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in logic, mathematics and philosophy, as well as to specialists in those fields.
This volume is a collection of essays in honour of Professor Mohammad Ardeshir. It examines topics which, in one way or another, are connected to the various aspects of his multidisciplinary research interests. Based on this criterion, the book is divided into three general categories. The first category includes papers on non-classical logics, including intuitionistic logic, constructive logic, basic logic, and substructural logic. The second category is made up of papers discussing issues in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics and logic. The third category contains papers on Avicenna’s logic and philosophy. Mohammad Ardeshir is a full professor of mathematical logic at the Department of Mathematical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, where he has taught generations of students for around a quarter century. Mohammad Ardeshir is known in the first place for his prominent works in basic logic and constructive mathematics. His areas of interest are however much broader and include topics in intuitionistic philosophy of mathematics and Arabic philosophy of logic and mathematics. In addition to numerous research articles in leading international journals, Ardeshir is the author of a highly praised Persian textbook in mathematical logic. Partly through his writings and translations, the school of mathematical intuitionism was introduced to the Iranian academic community.
It is Sunday, the 7th of September 1930. The place is Konigsberg and the occasion is a small conference on the foundations of mathematics. Arend Heyting, the foremost disciple of L. E. J. Brouwer, has spoken on intuitionism; Rudolf Carnap of the Vienna Circle has expounded on logicism; Johann (formerly Janos and in a few years to be Johnny) von Neumann has explained Hilbert's proof theory-- the so-called formalism; and Hans Hahn has just propounded his own empiricist views of mathematics. The floor is open for general discussion, in the midst of which Heyting announces his satisfaction with the meeting. For him, the relationship between formalism and intuitionism has been clarified: There need be no war between the intuitionist and the formalist. Once the formalist has successfully completed Hilbert's programme and shown "finitely" that the "idealised" mathematics objected to by Brouwer proves no new "meaningful" statements, even the intuitionist will fondly embrace the infinite. To this euphoric revelation, a shy young man cautions~ "According to the formalist conception one adjoins to the meaningful statements of mathematics transfinite (pseudo-')statements which in themselves have no meaning but only serve to make the system a well-rounded one just as in geometry one achieves a well rounded system by the introduction of points at infinity.
A serious introductory treatment geared toward non-logicians, this survey traces the development of mathematical logic from ancient to modern times and discusses the work of Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Pauli, Heisenberg, Dirac, and others. 1972 edition.
Forever Undecided is the most challenging yet of Raymond Smullyan’s puzzle collections. It is, at the same time, an introduction—ingenious, instructive, entertaining—to Gödel’s famous theorems. With all the wit and charm that have delighted readers of his previous books, Smullyan transports us once again to that magical island where knights always tell the truth and knaves always lie. Here we meet a new and amazing array of characters, visitors to the island, seeking to determine the natives’ identities. Among them: the census-taker McGregor; a philosophical-logician in search of his flighty bird-wife, Oona; and a regiment of Reasoners (timid ones, normal ones, conceited, modest, and peculiar ones) armed with the rules of propositional logic (if X is true, then so is Y). By following the Reasoners through brain-tingling exercises and adventures—including journeys into the “other possible worlds” of Kripke semantics—even the most illogical of us come to understand Gödel’s two great theorems on incompleteness and undecidability, some of their philosophical and mathematical implications, and why we, like Gödel himself, must remain Forever Undecided!
Develops a new logic paradigm which emphasizes evidence tracking, including theory, connections to other fields, and sample applications.
This introduction to first-order logic clearly works out the role of first-order logic in the foundations of mathematics, particularly the two basic questions of the range of the axiomatic method and of theorem-proving by machines. It covers several advanced topics not commonly treated in introductory texts, such as Fraïssé's characterization of elementary equivalence, Lindström's theorem on the maximality of first-order logic, and the fundamentals of logic programming.