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In 1776, Thomas Paine declared the end of royal rule in the United States. Instead, “law is king,” for the people rule themselves. Paine’s declaration is the dominant American understanding of how political power is exercised. In making law king, American lawyers became integral to the exercise of political power, so integral to law that legal ethics philosopher David Luban concluded, “lawyers are the law.” American lawyers have defended the exercise of this power from the Revolution to the present by arguing their work is channeled by the profession’s standards of ethical behavior. Those standards demand that lawyers serve the public interest and the interests of their paying clients before themselves. The duties owed both to the public and to clients meant lawyers were in the marketplace selling their services, but not of the marketplace. This is the story of power and the limits of ethical constraints to ensure such power is properly wielded. The Lawyer’s Conscience is the first book examining the history of American lawyer ethics, ranging from the mid-eighteenth century to the “professionalism” crisis facing lawyers today.
On trial practice, defense lawyers, and legal ethics, by discussing the murder of Lord William Russell in London, May 5, 1840, and a reconstruction of the trial of his valet, Benjamin François Courvoisier.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
A discussion on the tradition of American legal positivism--the theory that ""it is necessary, in working with law, to set morals aside."" Notre Dame law professor Shaffer argues that modern-day attorney-client relationships are characterized either by the ""ethics of role"" (the lawyer does what the client wants, or tells the client what to do) or by the ""ethics of isolation"" (moral statements, but no dialogue). It is a delusion, Shaffer suggests, to pretend that conscience has nothing to do with serving a client or that lawyer and client do not influence each other. In place of ""adversary ethics,"" Shaffer urges the profession to adopt an ""ethics of care"": a professional relation marked by openness in moral dialogue, in which the lawyer's calling becomes a form of ministry. Telling the client, ""it's up to you,"" after a full exchange of views, is not the same as saying ""whatever you want.""For Shaffer, the American legal system's avoidance of moral ""witnessing"" is nurtured by the legal education; the (often unstated) choice is not against morals, but ""against morals as having intellectual importance."" Law-school instruction either flatly avoids moral questions or, by failing to explore students' stated moral positions, suggests that there is no discipline in moral discourse. Law school is where things have to begin changing: there, ""we can still try to tell the truth to one another."" In elaborating his ethical view, Shaffer segues neatly from Barth to Buber to Trollope's Orley Farm to American legal history to the lives of Thomas More and Franz Jagerstatter. This is an unremittingly ""learned"" book--tough sledding for the intellectually unprepared--but intelligent, well-argued, and bound to become controversial among law-and-ethics scholars.
An analysis of America's commitment to religious liberty uses political history, philosophical ideas, and key constitutional cases to discuss its basis in six principles: equality, respect for conscience, liberty, accommodation of minorities, nonestablishment, and separation of church and state.
Our society's longstanding commitment to the liberty of conscience has become strained by our increasingly muddled understanding of what conscience is and why we value it. Too often we equate conscience with individual autonomy, and so we reflexively favor the individual in any contest against group authority, losing sight of the fact that a vibrant liberty of conscience requires a vibrant marketplace of morally distinct groups. Defending individual autonomy is not the same as defending the liberty of conscience because, although conscience is inescapably personal, it is also inescapably relational. Conscience is formed, articulated, and lived out through relationships, and its viability depends on the law's willingness to protect the associations and venues through which individual consciences can flourish: these are the myriad institutions that make up the space between the person and the state. Conscience and the Common Good reframes the debate about conscience by bringing its relational dimension into focus.
A legal-ethical dilemma occurs when two legal duties conflict or, in the alternative, when a legal duty conflicts with a moral duty. Such dilemmas are inherent in the current regime for lawyers governing legal ethics in Manitoba. The problem is how best to resolve these dilemmas. In solving this problem, the secondary literature provides the theoretical framework. Four writers exemplify four different models of the adversarial system, the lawyer-client relationship and the context of criminal defence. The framework gleaned from the secondary literature is then used to analyse the primary sources of legal ethics in the Province of Manitoba. The Manitoba Law Society Act and Code of Professional Conduct are researched to their historical origins. The current Code of Conduct is compared with not only its antecedent but also its correlatives in other Canadian jurisdictions. The conclusion reached is that legal-ethical dilemmas are best resolved by lawyers with reference to common morality. Lawyers are to be heldpublicly accountable for decisions made and results obtained in their course of representing a client. To facilitate the transition to this method in legal-ethical reasoning there will have to be legislative and regulatory changes.
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