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Abstract : In simple one-good international macro models, the presence of non-diversifiable labor income risk means that country portfoliosshould be heavily biased toward foreign assets. The fact that the opposite pattern of diversification is observed empirically constitutes the international diversification puzzle. We embed a portfolio choice decision in a frictionless two-country, two-good version of the stochastic growth model. In this environment, which is a workhorse for international business cycle research, we derive a closed-form expression for equilibrium country portfolios. These are biased towards domestic assets, as in the data. Home bias arises because endogenous international relative price fluctuations make domestic stocks a good hedge against non-diversifiable labor income risk. We then use our our theory to link openness to trade to the level of diversification, and find that it offers a quantitatively compelling account for the patterns of international diversification observed across developed economies in recent years.
This paper develops a two-country monetary DSGE model in which households choose a portfolio of home and foreign equities, and a forward position in foreign exchange. Some nominal goods prices are sticky. Trade in these assets achieves the same allocations as trade in a complete set of nominal state-contingent claims in our linearized model. When there is a high degree of price stickiness, we show that not much equity diversification is required to replicate the complete-markets equilibrium when agents are able to hedge foreign exchange risk sufficiently. Moreover, temporarily sticky nominal goods prices can have large effects on equity portfolios even when dividend processes are very persistent.
Home bias - the empirical phenomenon that investors assign anomalously high weights to their own domestic assets - has puzzled academics for decades: financial theory predicts that an internationally well diversified portfolio of stocks and short-term bonds can reduce risk significantly without affecting expected return. Although the globalization of international equity markets has increased international investments, equity portfolios remain severely home biased today, and no single explanation seems to solve the puzzle completely. In this paper, we first provide a thorough description of the equity home bias phenomenon by defining, discussing, and applying the competing measures and presenting some estimates of the costs of under-diversification. Second, we evaluate the explanations for the equity home bias proposed in the literature such as information asymmetries, behavioral aspects, barriers to foreign investment, and governance issues, and conclude that each explanation on its own falls short, suggesting that the equity home bias probably reflects a combination of factors. Lastly, we review the implications of international under-diversification for portfolio formation and the cost of capital of companies.
It is an established fact that investors favor the familiar%u2014be it domestic securities or, within a country, the securities of nearby firms%u2014and avoid investments that would provide the greatest diversification benefits. While we do not rule out familiarity as an important driver of portfolio allocations, we provide new evidence of investors%u2019 international diversification motive. In particular, our analysis of the security-level U.S. equity holdings of foreign and domestic institutional investors indicates that institutional investors reveal a preference for domestic multinationals (MNCs), even after controlling for familiarity factors. We attribute this revealed preference to the desire to obtain %u201Csafe%u201D international diversification. We then show that holdings of domestic MNCs are substantial and, after accounting for this home-grown foreign exposure, that the share of %u201Cforeign%u201D equities in investors%u2019 portfolios roughly doubles, reducing (but not eliminating) the observed home bias.
Although international financial markets are highly integrated across the more well-developed countries, investors nevertheless hold portfolios that consist nearly exclusively of domestic assets. This violation of the predictions of standard theories of portfolio choice is known as the 'international diversification puzzle.' In this paper, we show that the presence of nontraded risk associated with variations in the return to human capital has dramatic implications for the optimal fraction of domestic assets in an individual's portfolio. Our analysis suggests that the returns to human capital are highly correlated with the returns to domestic financial assets. Hedging the risk associated with nontraded human capital involves a short position in national equities in an amount approximately 1.5 times the value of the national stock market. Thus optimal and value- weighted portfolios very likely involve a short position in domestic marketable assets.
Despite the liberalization of foreign portfolio investment around the globe since the early 1980s, the home-bias phenomenon is still found to exist. Using a relatively new IMF survey dataset of cross-border equity holdings, this paper tests new structural equations from a consumption-based asset-pricing model on international portfolio holdings. Using of stock data allows us to provide new and clear-cut evidence on the determinants of international portfolio holdings. The empirical results show that an augmented gravity model performs remarkably well. The results indicate that market size, transaction cost, and information asymmetry are major determinants of cross-border portfolio choice. These findings shed light on alternative theories of international portfolio holdings, especially on the transaction and information cost-based explanations of home bias.
This paper documents the available evidence on international portfolio investment in five GECD countries. We draw three conclusions from the data. First. there is strong evidence of a home bias in national investment portfolios despite the potential gains from international diversification. Second, to the extent investors hold international securities, the composition of the portfolio of foreign securities seems to reflect factors other than diversification of risk. Third, the high volume of cross-border capital flows and the high turnover rate on foreign equity investments relative to domestic equity markets suggests that transactions costs and incomplete information are unlikely to be important deterrents to international investment. These observations suggest that a richer set of models is required to account for international investment behavior.
This paper documents the available evidence on international portfolio investment in five GECD countries. We draw three conclusions from the data. First. there is strong evidence of a home bias in national investment portfolios despite the potential gains from international diversification. Second, to the extent investors hold international securities, the composition of the portfolio of foreign securities seems to reflect factors other than diversification of risk. Third, the high volume of cross-border capital flows and the high turnover rate on foreign equity investments relative to domestic equity markets suggests that transactions costs and incomplete information are unlikely to be important deterrents to international investment. These observations suggest that a richer set of models is required to account for international investment behavior.
Domestic investors hold a substantially larger proportion of their wealth portfolios in domestic assets than standard portfolio theory would suggest. This phenomenon has been called equity home bias. In the absence of this home bias, investors would optimally diversify away domestic output risk. Therefore, in a world without investor home bias, consumption growth rates would tend to comove across countries even when output growth rates do not. Empirically, however, consumption growth rates tend to have a lower correlation across countries than do output growth rates. Moreover, consumption growth in each country appears to be highly correlated with its own output growth relative to the world. This phenomenon may be called consumption home bias. In this paper, I evaluate existing explanations for these two types of home bias.