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The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace, is the third book by Shimon Shetreet on Judicial Independence. The first was Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (edited by Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes, Nijhoff,1985). The second was The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges (Edited by Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth, Nijhoff, 2012). This volume contains essays by senior academics, judges and practitioners across jurisdictions offering an analysis of several central issues relative to the culture of Judicial Independence. These include judicial review, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and world peace, constitutional position of top courts, relations between the judiciary and the other branches of government, impartiality and fairness of the judicial process, judicial ethics, dispute resolution in arbitral awards and international investments, international courts and cross country issues, judicial selection. The volume also offers an update report on the International Project of Judicial Independence of the International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, including the relations of top courts and international courts, administrative judges, culture of judicial independence and public inquiries by judges.
This book investigates the causes and consequences of congressional attacks on the US Supreme Court, arguing that the extent of public support for judicial independence constitutes the practical limit of judicial independence. First, the book presents a historical overview of Court-curbing proposals in Congress. Then, building on interviews with Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and judicial and legislative staffers, the book theorizes that congressional attacks are driven by public discontent with the Court. From this theoretical model, predictions are derived about the decision to engage in Court-curbing and judicial responsiveness to Court-curbing activity in Congress. The Limits of Judicial Independence draws on illustrative archival evidence, systematic analysis of an original dataset of Court-curbing proposals introduced in Congress from 1877 onward and judicial decisions.
In this 2010 book, Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government and those of the executive and legislative branches in the light of two of the most significant constitutional reforms of recent years: the Human Rights Act (1998) and Constitutional Reform Act (2005). Both statutes have implications for the separation of powers within the United Kingdom constitution. The Human Rights Act brings the judges into much closer proximity with the decisions of political actors than previously permitted by the Wednesbury standard of review and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, while the Constitutional Reform Act marks the emergence of an institutionally independent judicial branch. Taken together, the two legislative schemes form the backbone of a more comprehensive system of constitutional checks and balances policed by a judicial branch underpinned by the legitimacy of institutional independence.
This volume is a collection of essays on the contentious issues of judicial independence and federal judicial selection, written by leading scholars from the disciplines of law, political science, history, economics, and sociology.
This book is about law, but it is not a law book. It is aimed at all interested contemporaries, lawyers and non-lawyers alike. Richly seasoned with personal memories and anecdotes, it offers unique insights into how European courts actually work. It is generally assumed that independence is part and parcel of the role and function of a judge. Nevertheless, European judges sometimes face difficulties in this regard. Owing to their being nominated by a government, their limited term of appointment, and the possibility of being reappointed or not, their judicial independence can be jeopardized. Certain governments have a track record of choosing candidates who they believe they can keep on a leash. When this happens, private parties are at risk of losing out. The EFTA Court is under even more pressure, since the EEA/EFTA states Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway essentially constitute a pond with one big fish (Norway) and two minnows. For quite some time now, certain Norwegian protagonists have sought to effectively transform the EEA into a bilateral agreement with the EU. This attitude has led to political implications that have affected the author himself. The independence of the EFTA Court is also endangered by the fact that it operates alongside a large sister court, the Court of Justice of the European Union. And yet the EFTA Court has established its own line of jurisprudence and its own judicial style. It has remained faithful to specific EFTA values, such as the belief in free trade and open markets, efficiency, and a modern view of mankind. During the first 24 years of its existence, it has even had an over-proportionate influence on ECJ case law. Since EEA Single Market law is economic law, the importance of economics, an often-overlooked aspect, is also addressed. In closing, the book explores Switzerland’s complicated relationship with, and Britain’s impending departure from, the EU. In this regard, it argues that the EFTA pillar should be expanded into a second European structure under British leadership and with Swiss participation.
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from political life. The central claim of this work is that far from standing apart from the political realm, judicial independence is a product of it. It is defined and protected through interactions between judges and politicians. In short, judicial independence is a political achievement. This is the main conclusion of a three-year research project on the major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the consequences for judicial independence and accountability. The authors interviewed over 150 judges, politicians, civil servants and practitioners to understand the day-to-day processes of negotiation and interaction between politicians and judges. They conclude that the greatest threat to judicial independence in future may lie not from politicians actively seeking to undermine the courts, but rather from their increasing disengagement from the justice system and the judiciary.
The creation of a culture of Judicial Independence is of a central significance both in national domestic legal systems, as well as for the international courts and tribunals. The main aim of this volume is to analyze the development of a culture of Judicial Independence in comparative perspectives, to offer an examination of the conceptual foundations of the principle of judicial independence and to discuss in detail the practical challenges facing judiciaries in different jurisdictions. The proposed volume is based on the papers presented at the five conferences held in the framework of The International Project on Judicial independence. The editors of this volume and the contributors to it are leading scholars and distinguished experts on judicial independence and judiciaries.
2011 Winner of the Selection for Professional Reading List of the U.S. Marine Corps The judiciary in the United States has been subject in recent years to increasingly vocal, aggressive criticism by media members, activists, and public officials at the federal, state, and local level. This collection probes whether these attacks as well as proposals for reform represent threats to judicial independence or the normal, even healthy, operation of our political system. In addressing this central question, the volume integrates new scholarship, current events, and the perennial concerns of political science and law. The contributors—policy experts, established and emerging scholars, and attorneys—provide varied scholarly viewpoints and assess the issue of judicial independence from the diverging perspectives of Congress, the presidency, and public opinion. Through a diverse range of methodologies, the chapters explore the interactions and tensions among these three interests and the courts and discuss how these conflicts are expressed—and competing interests accommodated. In doing so, they ponder whether the U.S. courts are indeed experiencing anything new and whether anti-judicial rhetoric affords fresh insights. Case studies from Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia provide a comparative view of judicial controversy in other democratic nations. A unique assessment of the rise of criticism aimed at the judiciary in the United States, The Politics of Judicial Independence is a well-organized and engagingly written text designed especially for students. Instructors of judicial process and judicial policymaking will find the book, along with the materials and resources on its accompanying website, readily adaptable for classroom use.
The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another. At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability? Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do citizens and judges see its independence in the same way? Do judges feel that their independence is respected by the users of the courts, by the leadership of the courts and by politicians? Does the population trust the judiciary more than other public institutions, or less? How does independence of the judiciary work at the national level and at the level of the European Union? These interrelated questions are particularly relevant in times when the independence of the judiciary is under political pressure in several countries in the European Union, giving way to illiberal democracy. Revealing surveys among judges, lay judges and lawyers - in addition to regular surveys of the European Commission - provide a wealth of information to answer these questions. While the answers will not please everyone, they are of interest to a wide audience, in particular court leaders, judges, lawyers, politicians and civil servants.