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This thesis examined the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on small-sized publicly traded businesses in America and the communities they operate in. This Act (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) was enacted by the U.S Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2002. The Act has had very devastating and detrimental impacts on small-sized publicly traded businesses and the communities they operate in; according to opponents of the Act, they pointed out the financial burden that many small-sized publicly traded companies had to face in the process of complying with the Act. For example, they pointed to the enormous cost of purchasing new equipment (i.e., computers) in order to comply with the requirements of the Act. The most devastating and toughest element of the Act, according to the opponents of the Act, was the requirement that publicly traded companies hire outside auditors to audit and attest to the stability and viability of their internal control systems. As a result of the stringent requirements of the Act and the costs that is associated with the requirements, many small-sized publicly traded companies have either closed down or de-listed themselves from the U.S securities markets (U.S stock exchanges).
The Sarbannes-Oxley Act (SOX) is a mandatory requirement for all listed corporations in the US, whether foreign or not. Compliance is not an option. Other countries are developing similar legislation so the books value is international in scope. SOX is a hot topic and the effects are just beginning to be felt world-wide. This new book goes beyond the implementation phase of SOX and looks at the reaction to the Act in terms of costs, benefits and business impacts. This book is for Senior Managers in the Business and Financial/Accounting Communities who want/need to know what the reaction of business and government is to the SOX legislation, what it is costing and how the effects are penetrating through the business environment.Mike Holt presents a comprehensive review of the impact that Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has had on business, the financial community, governments and the public since its inception in 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been somewhat successful, but not completely and the cost (well over a trillion dollars) might be considered too high a price to pay for the gains. This book takes a hard look at the costs, benefits and other impacts as well as at what influential and prominent financial, government and business leaders think about it now.* International in scope and content and including interviews with prominent business leaders, CEOs and CFOs of large and small corporations.* Compliance with The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is now mandatory for every listed US corporation and overseas corporations listed on US stock markets.* Covers the reaction of business and government to this legislation, what it is costing and how the effects are penetrating through the business environment.
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of July 2002 was created to address the financial malfeasance revealed during the investigations of several large firms by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Act required public companies traded on U.S. exchanges to provide increased transparency in financial statements. Key portions of the legislation required firms to create internal financial controls and placed personal accountability with top executives. SOX mandated and standardized a greater degree of self-regulation. In the years following SOX, firms experienced significantly higher compliance costs, but they also benefited from the reduction of statement errors and fraud, increased accuracy in reporting, and greater investor confidence. After the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, anecdotal evidence suggested that SOX impeded small, research intensive firms. We looked at research intensive firms going public before and after SOX to determine if there was a change in volume and quality of research intensive firms post-SOX. We found that firms that went public after SOX were fewer and had lower patenting activity. In the case of small and medium size firms, the cost of SOX compliance is likely to divert funds from research investments. We speculate that highly research intensive firms are more likely post-SOX to divert their IPO to non-U.S. exchanges, delay going public, or dismiss the idea of going public, as proposed in a "3Ds" model. The 2002 SOX US Congressional Act levied millions of dollars in new compliance costs on each foreign or domestic firm that went public on U.S. exchanges. Funding for regulatory expenditures must come from somewhere. We proposed that one likely candidate was research budgets, as research efforts have a more distant, less immediately visible, long term effect on firm performance. We suggested that large firms more easily absorbed the additional costs of SOX with a reduced effect on research and development budgets, while small firms were less able to maintain research budgets after SOX. In the aftermath of SOX, research spending did go down, most visibly in Biotech and Electronics. As the total number of IPO firms decreased dramatically after SOX, these two research intensive industries, plus Computer Software, were the only industries with a large enough sample size to evaluate. We saw that research intensive firms diminished dramatically, along with many non-research intensive firms, from IPO events after SOX. Where we had sufficient sample size, in computer software, biotechnology, electronics, and "other", we noted that research-intensive firms generally resisted the temptation to raid research budgets, finding funding for compliance elsewhere within the company or from the additional cash flow at time of IPO. Where firms did appear to greatly reduce research budgets was in the non-research intensive industries, where research budgets might be more of a discretionary expense. Firm size was not a factor in whether research intensive firms could better absorb the costs of SOX, although smaller firms tended to spend proportionally more on research in an effort to grow faster. After the enactment of SOX, we observed an indication that the markets valued research intensity even more than prior to SOX, perhaps understanding the vulnerability of research budgets being diverted to compliance costs. Overall, the data suggested that the effect of SOX was underestimated in this study, as the firms that were deterred from going public on U.S. exchanges were not in the sample evaluated. We only analyzed those firms prepared to accept the higher costs of SOX. The data set consisted of survivors, selected firms still willing to pay for SOX compliance as well as for research programs.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was instated in response to extensive audit failures and the resulting lack of confidence in the American public market. However, the regulations can be costly and small-capital and foreign companies are seeking to be exempt from the regulations altogether. Through extensive research, I have determined the validity of these arguments and the possible effects of these companies not complying with Sarbanes-Oxley. I have found that while there are initial costs incurred to meet the regulation requirements, the benefits to the public market, investors, and the companies themselves outweigh them considerably. I have documented this evidence and also given tips on creating the most value out of Sarbanes-Oxley in the most cost-effective manner.
In this paper, we examine the economic impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by analyzing foreign listing behavior onto U.S. and U.K. stock exchanges before and after the enactment of SOX in 2002. Using a sample of all listing events onto U.S. and U.K. exchanges from 1995-2006, we develop an exchange choice model that captures firm-level, industry-level, exchange-level, and country-level listing incentives, and test whether these listing preferences changed following the enactment of SOX. After controlling for firm characteristics and other economic determinants of these firms' exchange choice, we find that the listing preferences of large foreign firms choosing between U.S. exchanges and the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) Main Market did not change following the enactment of SOX. In contrast, we find that the likelihood of a U.S. listing among small foreign firms choosing between the NASDAQ and LSE's Alternative Investment Market decreased following the enactment of SOX. The negative effect among small firms is consistent with these marginal companies being less able to absorb the incremental costs associated with SOX compliance. The screening of smaller firms with weaker governance attributes from U.S. exchanges is consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by SOX.
The costs and benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have been oft-debated since the inception of the Act. Much of the extant literature has assessed the costs and benefits of SOX to publicly-traded companies. We focus on the costs of SOX compliance for private firms wanting to exit the private market via either an acquisition by a public firm or an IPO. Consistent with our predictions we establish three principal findings. First, SOX appears to have shifted the incentive for firms to exit the private market via IPO to exit via acquisition by a public acquirer. Second, private target deal multiples are increasing in variables that proxy for a private target's level of pre-acquisition SOX compliance. For our median-sized private target, the estimated dollar value decrease in deal proceeds when one moves from a high level to a low level of pre-acquisition SOX compliance is $1.3 million. Finally, public target deal multiples are not affected by a public target's level of pre-acquisition SOX compliance. These findings suggest that SOX-related costs have both restricted the action space of possible exit strategies for private firms and led to lower deal multiples for those private acquisition targets that are less likely to be SOX compliant prior to acquisition. We believe that the implications from our tests will be relevant to regulators in the U.S. and many countries outside the U.S. that are attempting to improve their country's governance and listing standards and potentially seeking alternatives to SOX-like standards, especially with respect to internal controls. International regulators need to assess the total costs of SOX, including costs imposed on private company shareholders, when contemplating the net benefits of SOX-like regimes.