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In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, focusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. One central conviction is that changes in regimes rarely have objective significance for U.S. strategic interests properly conceived. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. He argues that America has over the years maneuvered itself into political, legal and moral dilemmas by disregarding or misunderstanding the internal dynamics of Latin American countries and their implications for U.S. interests and by seeing dangerous and irremedial hostility in all revolutionary movements. Against this tradition in U.S. policy, Farer advocates tactics and strategies he deems more consonant with the proper goals of U.S. policy and with Latin American needs and aspirations. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
The role of third world countries in the grand strategies of great countries has always been uncertain. Having a low GNP, and consequently little real or latent military power, third world nations were considered unimportant from a military point of view. Yet great powers have traditionally been deeply involved in the periphery. Political scientist Michael Desch resolves this paradox, arguing that such areas can be of key importance for a variety of reasons. His discussion of the role third world nations can play in strategic matters is of particular relevance to developments in the post-Cold War world. When the Third World Matters examines U.S. strategy relating to Latin America at four critical points in history: World War I, World War II, the Cuban missile crisis, and the later Cold War. Desch shows how areas that appeared to have no inherent strategic interests nonetheless proved significant, either as a stopping point or entry way to some other, strategically important, area or as a foil to direct a rival power's attention from the main theater of action. The lessons learned from these cases, he argues, are of particular relevance to the making of U.S. post-Cold War strategy elsewhere in the third world - in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia.
A healthy Latin America is of critical value to the United States as a global power. It is besieged by a powerful force of resentment engendered by a combination of weak states, social exclusion, criminal violence, and corruption. In the context of attack by radical populism against democratic values, the United States needs a new grand strategy that addresses the causes rather than the symptoms of the malaise. The author argues that such a strategy must strengthen the effectiveness of the democratic state in providing security, justice, and governance, as well as effectively engender a linkage of the 40 percent of the population presently excluded from the social and economic benefits of democracy to the national and international economy. Unless current trends reverse, Latin American countries will be poor security partners and a continuing menace for international security. The author recommends imaginative courses of action for the grand strategy.
The fear that extra-hemispheric powers would strategically deny Latin America as a friend of the United States has animated American statesmen since the 19th century. Such fear certainly pervaded the Cold war competition. Today, the challenge to the security and well-being of Latin America is neither ideological, military, nor external. Strategic denial is more likely to come about from a highly combustible blend of poverty, crime, despair, corruption, resentment, and antidemocratic sentiments that promise a vague 21st century socialism under new authoritarian clothing. The sentiments are sinking deep roots in the sociopolitical landscape, and they are profoundly anti-American. This witch's brew is presently best understood in the case of the Andean countries, particularly Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. They, along with Peru, are experiencing a crisis of democratic legitimacy, authority, and governance. The crisis in the Andean countries applies to much of Latin America. The problem is compounded by the prevalence of weak state systems that are incapable of providing security, justice, and the benefits of democratic governance to the maximum number of people. The roots of the weak state syndrome are to be found in the persisting dualism of the formal state populated by the "haves" and the informal state populated by the "have nots." The two states are socio-spatially separated from each other. The 40 percent of the population that inhabits the informal state must be productively integrated into the formal state and into the global economy, or Latin America will continue to face crises of authority, governance, and legitimacy. The United States is the only power that can move Latin America in the right direction. Accordingly, a new American grand strategy for Latin America is imperative. It must address simultaneously two challenges: strengthening the effectiveness of the democratic state, and enhancing the security and dignity of the socially excluded.
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on such issues as right and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this fascinating manner, focusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin America since the end of World War II. One central conviction is that changes in regimes rarely have objective significance for U.S. strategic interests properly conceived. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America (he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. He argues that America has over the years maneuvered itself into political, legal and moral dilemmas by disregarding or misunderstanding the internal dynamics of Latin American countries and their implications for U.S. interests and by seeing dangerous and irremedial hostility in all revolutionary movements. Against this tradition in U.S. policy, Farer advocates tactics and strategies he deems more consonant with the proper goals of U.S. policy and with Latin American needs and aspirations. His essays combine a sophisticated analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony," one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America’s consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of U.S. military strength. After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons," focuses on protecting U.S. global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of U.S. forces overseas.
Soon after the American Revolution, ?certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.
Looking beyond the headlines to address the enduring grand strategic questions facing the United States today. American foreign policy is in a state of upheaval. The rise of Donald Trump and his "America First" platform have created more uncertainty about America's role in the world than at any time in recent decades. From the South China Sea, to the Middle East, to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, the geopolitical challenges to U.S. power and influence seem increasingly severe—and America's responses to those challenges seem increasingly unsure. Questions that once had widely accepted answers are now up for debate. What role should the United States play in the world? Can, and should, America continue to pursue an engaged an assertive strategy in global affairs? In this book, a leading scholar of grand strategy helps to make sense of the headlines and the upheaval by providing sharp yet nuanced assessments of the most critical issues in American grand strategy today. Hal Brands asks, and answers, such questions as: Has America really blundered aimlessly in the world since the end of the Cold War, or has its grand strategy actually been mostly sensible and effective? Is America in terminal decline, or can it maintain its edge in a harsher and more competitive environment? Did the Obama administration pursue a policy of disastrous retrenchment, or did it execute a shrewd grand strategy focused on maximizing U.S. power for the long term? Does Donald Trump's presidency mean that American internationalism is dead? What type of grand strategy might America pursue in the age of Trump and after? What would happen if the United States radically pulled back from the world, as many leading academics—and, at certain moments, the current president—have advocated? How much military power does America need in the current international environment? Grappling with these kinds of issues is essential to understanding the state of America's foreign relations today and what path the country might take in the years ahead. At a time when American grand strategy often seems consumed by crisis, this collection of essays provides an invaluable guide to thinking about both the recent past and the future of America's role in the world.