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Beginning with a look at continuity and change in French policy since de Gaulle, this book presents the evolution of French security policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Dr. Laird pays special attention to the French nuclear modernization process and to the trend in the last two decades toward a greater emphasis on security interdependence within the Western alliance at the expense of the classic Gaullist stance of independence. He examines the major dimensions of French security policy, particularly French nuclear employment policy and doctrine, the Franco-German relationship, and France's role in Europe and in East-West relations. The book features the first-time translation of some of the most significant recent papers by leading French analysts of security affairs.
Dr. Laird provides the student of Soviet affairs, international security, and arms control with an understanding of the role of the Soviets in European security by examining the Soviet-French interaction. He first defines the general Soviet approach to European security issues and discusses it with specific reference to France. He identifies contem
Wilfred Kohl analyzes the development of France's atomic force, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in de Gaulle's policies and its impact on French relations with NATO, her key alliance partners (the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany), and the U.S.S.R. He emphasizes the discontinuity between de Gaulle's grandiose designs and the more modest programs envisaged by cither the preceding governments of the Fourth Republic or the succeeding Pompidou government. Originally published in 1972. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This book offers the first non-official history of French nuclear policies which goes beyond the divide between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. It addresses the sizing of France’s nuclear forces, technological assistance to countries with nuclear weapons programs, uranium prospection, nuclear testing, its health effects and protests against it, as well as plans to prevent and manage accidents in nuclear power plants. It is based on new questions and new sources from France and abroad. The chapters in this volume show how independent and interdisciplinary scholarship free from conflicts of interests can uniquely advance our understanding of nuclear history and politics. This is the case because it does not treat the categories and judgments of official discourse as neutral starting points of the analysis. This volume is based on untapped primary sources from France, the UK, the US, India, South Africa and Iran, on a new assessment of the health consequences of French nuclear testing in Polynesia thanks to a modern atmospheric particle transport code coupled with historical weather data, open-source information about radioactive debris (“mushroom”) clouds, as well as data on the composition and particle sizes of the fallout; and on new survey data about French knowledge of and attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. They show notably that the first generation of French nuclear forces lacked technical credibility despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew this, as did France's allies and adversaries. Moreover, French strategic collaborations associated to nuclear programs extended to India and South Africa; nuclear safety regulations changed fundamentally after the Cold War, and approximately 110,000 people, i.e. 90% of the French Polynesian population in the 1970s, could have received doses that would qualify them for compensation according to French law. The volume will be of interest to scholars and students of history, politics, international relations, military history, war studies, conflict and global governance. Most of the chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue in Cold War History. A few chapters were first published in the Nonproliferation Review, Diplomacy & Statecraft and Science & Global Security.
This book, first published in 1984, examines France’s independent nuclear weapons programme of the 1980s alongside the French peace movement, which was almost totally absent – in contrast to the peace protests of the US and the rest of Europe. This book analyses this unusual pattern of defence and dissent, and assesses its likely development. It looks at the evolvement of French post-war defence policy, and discusses the French peace movement, attempting to explain why it was so weak.
This volume reviews the nuclear weapons policies of France, Britain, and China and analyzes their roles as independent deterrents in international politics. The end of a bipolar international system and deep reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals have increased the relative importance of the nuclear forces of these three countries.
For the foreseeable future, France must maintain its independent capability and not implement the Eurobomb concept. Three invasions in less than one century, the defeat of 1940, and the Suez crisis constitute the main historical elements, explaining the fourth republic's will to develop a nuclear program. Nuclear weapons offered France freedom of action and influence and gave France the ability to play a key role in international community as a global power. France gained the image of a strong modern nation independent from the bipolarity of the cold war. With the end of the cold war, France joined the other nuclear powers to negotiate arms control and disarmament. For the foreseeable future, France must maintain its independent nuclear capability and not implement the Eurobomb concept. To maintain a credible arsenal, France will henceforth use simulation in conjunction with GB and US cooperation. Domestically, France's nuclear arsenal is supported by a large consensus. This consensus must be a permanent concern for the government in order to let France preserve its freedom of choice between a Europeanization of its capability and an independent arsenal. Indeed, an independent arsenal needs to be supported by French public opinion to strengthen the government in the face of international opposition.