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This book critically examines the origins of American diplomacy in the greater Persian Gulf region, arguing that it was the inability of the United States to contend effectively with the disintegration of British imperial authority in the Gulf that eventually led it to assume its current role in the region.
"A remarkable feat--clear, compelling and accessible--. Critical background for any appreciation of the Jewish state."--The New York Times Book Review With his characteristic grace and lucidity, Howard M. Sachar, renowned author of thirteen earlier books on Middle Eastern and Jewish history, brings to life the complex and dramatic story of the friendships and fallings-out between Israel and the various European powers over the last half-century. Dr. Sachar chronicles the always uneasy relationship between Israel and Great Britain; its early love-affair and nasty break-up with France; the shifting Soviet policies toward Israel; and the unlikely emergence of Germany as the new nation's chief European benefactor. A master of historical narrative, Sachar once again enlightens us with fine scholarship, insightful analysis, and an unerring knowledge of human--and national--motivations.
This book aims to explore Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East between 1945 and 1955 and the attempts of these two Western powers to contain the Soviet expansion towards the region. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East. Instead, it aims to explore those policies with a particular focus on the problems of Middle East defence. It also seeks to determine the aims behind the proposals of MEC, MEDO, NTDC and BP, their failings, and the struggle that was undertaken against them by hostile countries, such as Egypt, India and the Soviet Union. It examines the events surrounding their formation, development and collapse. Furthermore, it explores the policies of the regional countries, namely Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Thus, it poses the questions of how the participating countries perceived the question of Middle East defence, what their basic aims were, and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.
Based on excerpts from original sources, this book provides an introduction to the controversies and dilemmas that have confronted those making and implementing British defence policy since the end of World War II. Ovendale explores the policy dilemmas caused by Britain's parallel commitments to continental Europe and to a global foreign policy, the legacy of her imperial past. He also examines the decision in 1957 to rely on the nuclear deterrent, abolish conscription and move away from a maritime strategy; and the role of the Treasury in dictating the limits of British defence policy.
This description of Allied contingency plans for military operations in the Middle East - in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union - argues that diplomatic events and crises in the Middle East in 1945-55 are understandable only in the context of assets sought by the Allies in that region.
This volume examines how Conservative and Labour governments in the UK related diplomatically to a plurality of Turkish governments between 1959 and 1965. With research based on newly-available Public Records Office archives, the author provides insight on British reactions to political events in Turkey and shows that in relation to the partition of Cyprus the crucial changes started as early as 1963, with Britain's indirect support.
The book explains why some Third World states have centralized, conventional military forces while others rely on militias, paramilitaries, and other non-state actors using detailed case studies of Indonesia, Iraq, and Iran and offers policy recommendations for dealing with weak states based on this analysis.
Military alliances are a constant feature in international politics, and a better understanding of them can directly impact world affairs. This book examines why alliances endure or collapse. As a distinctive feature, it analyses asymmetric alliances focusing on the junior allies’ decision to continue or terminate a military agreement. It deepens our knowledge of alliance cohesion and erosion, investigating the relevance of the weaker side’s preferences and behavior in alliance politics. The author examines the literature on alliance persistence and termination and puts forward a theoretical model that helps interpret historical and contemporary cases in a way that is useful for expert researchers and non-expert readers alike.
The Cold War did not culminate in World War III as so many in the 1950s and 1960s feared, yet it spawned a host of military engagements that affected millions of lives. This book is the first comprehensive, multinational overview of military affairs during the early Cold War, beginning with conflicts during World War II in Warsaw, Athens, and Saigon and ending with the Cuban Missile Crisis. A major theme of this account is the relationship between government policy and military preparedness and strategy. Author Jonathan M. House tells of generals engaging in policy confrontations with their governments’ political leaders—among them Anthony Eden, Nikita Khrushchev, and John F. Kennedy—many of whom made military decisions that hamstrung their own political goals. In the pressure-cooker atmosphere of atomic preparedness, politicians as well as soldiers seemed instinctively to prefer military solutions to political problems. And national security policies had military implications that took on a life of their own. The invasion of South Korea convinced European policy makers that effective deterrence and containment required building up and maintaining credible forces. Desire to strengthen the North Atlantic alliance militarily accelerated the rearmament of West Germany and the drive for its sovereignty. In addition to examining the major confrontations, nuclear and conventional, between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—including the crises over Berlin and Formosa—House traces often overlooked military operations against the insurgencies of the era, such as French efforts in Indochina and Algeria and British struggles in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden. Now, more than fifty years after the events House describes, understanding the origins and trajectory of the Cold War is as important as ever. By the late 1950s, the United States had sent forces to Vietnam and the Middle East, setting the stage for future conflicts in both regions. House’s account of the complex relationship between diplomacy and military action directly relates to the insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and confrontations that now occupy our attention across the globe.