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Fiscal rule frameworks have evolved significantly in response to the global financial crisis. Many countries have reformed their fiscal rules or introduced new ones with a view to enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and providing a medium-term anchor. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have also been upgraded. However, these innovations have made the systems of rules more complicated to operate, while compliance has not improved. The SDN takes stock of past experiences, reviews recent reforms, and presents new research on the effectiveness of rules. It also proposes guiding principles for future reforms to strike a better balance between simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Read the blog
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) encompasses the legislative text and political resolutions regulating fiscal policy and public finances in EMU. The contributions in this volume analyse the institutional, legal, theoretical and empirical aspects of the SGP, examine its development and evaluate its main implications. The authors include academic economists, who provide insightful analysis, and policy makers who have contributed to the shaping of the pact and have a direct responsibility for its implementation. This book is the definitive source of reference on the SGP for academics, policy makes and economists.
There is evidence that fiscal rules, in particular well-designed rules, are associated with lower sovereign spreads. However, the impact of noncompliance with fiscal rules on spreads has not been examined in the literature. This paper estimates the effect of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) on sovereign spreads of European Union member states. Based on a sample including the 28 European Union countries over the period 1999 to 2016, sovereign spreads of countries placed under an EDP are found to be on average higher compared to countries that are not under an EDP. The interpretation of this result is not straight-forward as different channels may be at play, in particular those related with the credibility and the design of the EU fiscal framework. The specification accounts for typical macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial determinants of sovereign spreads, the System Generalized Method of Moments estimator is used to control for endogeneity, and results are robust to a range of checks on variables and estimators.
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last 20 years rather than before? We begin by discussing the “tax smoothing” model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: (i) models based upon opportunistic policymakers and naive voters with “fiscal illusion;” (ii) models of intergenerational redistributions; (iii) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (iv) models of coalition governments; (v) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (vi) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications.
This book offers an essential guide to Public Finance and National Accounts in the context of the European Union. Since the creation of the Eurozone, fiscal policy has been at the heart of economic (but also political/media) discussions in the EU. From the Stability and Growth Pact (1997) to the more recent Fiscal Treaty, EU and Eurozone, countries have been subject to various fiscal rules. The importance of these rules, and of the subsequent procedures that every Eurozone country has to adhere to, is unquestionable. The book provides the reader with an in-depth understanding of the complex EU rules concerning fiscal policy, breaking down the corresponding legal texts into simple and accessible language. It has a broad interdisciplinary appeal, and scholars and practitioners whose work involves these areas will find it of particular interest.
A rules-based fiscal framework, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), can be an important bulwark against short-sighted policies. Although policies have improved following the SGP’s adoption, shortcomings remain. These, however, are rooted in the policies rather than the rules, where few changes seem necessary. Specifically, the Excessive Deficit Procedure needs a stronger focus on policies rather than outcomes, while staying operationally simple and transparent. Furthermore, reforms are needed to foster time-consistent national policies, budgetary transparency, and ownership of the Pact. Accordingly, parliaments should debate national Stability Programs and national fiscal councils should review these programs for parliaments.
The paper uses survey data to analyze whether financial market expectations on government budget deficits changed in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom during the period of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Our findings indicate that accuracy of financial expert deficit forecasts increased in France. Convergence between the European Commission's and market experts’ deficit forecasts also increased in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, particularly during the period after SGP’s reform in 2005. Yet, convergence between markets’ forecasts and those of the French, German, and Italian national fiscal authorities seems not to have increased significantly during the SGP.
This volume argues that the crisis of the European Union is not merely a fiscal crisis but reveals and amplifies deeper flaws in the structure of the EU itself. It is a multidimensional crisis of the economic, legal and political cornerstones of European integration and marks the end of the technocratic mode of integration which has been dominant since the 1950s. The EU has a weak political and administrative centre, relies excessively on governance by law, is challenged by increasing heterogeneity and displays increasingly interlocked levels of government. During the crisis, it has become more and more asymmetrical and has intervened massively in domestic economic and legal systems. A team of economists, lawyers, philosophers and political scientists analyse these deeper dimensions of the European crisis from a broader theoretical perspective with a view towards contributing to a better understanding and shaping the trajectory of the EU.
Successive reforms have brought many positive elements to the European Union’s fiscal framework. But they have also increased its complexity. The current system involves an intricate set of fiscal constraints, which hampers effective monitoring and public communication. Compliance has also been weak. This note discusses medium-term reform options to simplify the framework and improve compliance. Based on model simulations and practical considerations, it argues for moving to a two-pillar approach, with a single fiscal anchor (public debt-to-GDP) and a single operational target (an expenditure growth rule, possibly with an explicit debt correction mechanism) linked to the anchor.
This paper explores how the Stability and Growth Pact may cope with the future costs of population ageing in the European Union. Clearly, population ageing has forced countries to reform their pension systems, and will continue to do so, both by reducing the generosity of pension arrangements and by switching to funding rather than relying on pure pay-as-you go pension provision. We study how such reforms affect the room for adhering to the Pact, but also how the Pact may induce or hamper the incentives for reform. In our analysis we will draw on recent literature on the Pact and on the pensions and the ageing problem. We will also calibrate a simple model for addressing intergenerational equity.