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An important tenet of game theory, core theory has nonetheless been all but ignored by the mainstream. Its basic premise is that individuals band together in order to promote their interests as much as possible. The return to an individual depends on competition among various coalitions for its membership, and a group of people can obtain a joint maximum by suitable coordinated actions. In this key title, Lester Telser investigates the following issues: Markets Multiproduct Industry Total Cost Functions with Avoidable Costs Critical Analyses of Noncooperative Equilibria. Through these distinct sections, Telser skilfully brings the ideas of core theory to bear on a range of issues within economics – with particular emphasis on supply and demand and the way markets function.
Upon hearing that Ronald Coase had been awarded the Nobel Prize, a fellow economist's first response was to ask with whom Coase had shared the Prize. Whether this response was idiosyncratic or not, I do not know; I expect not. Part of this type of reaction can no doubt be explained by the fact that Coase has often been characterized as an economist who wrote only two significant or influential papers: "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) and "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960). And by typical professional standards of "significant" and "influential" (i. e. , widely read and cited), this perception embodies a great deal of truth, even subsequent to Coase's receipt of the Prize. This is not to say that there have not been other important works - "The Marginal Cost Controversy" (1946) and "The Lighthouse in Economics" (1974) come immediately to mind here - only that in a random sample of, say, one hundred economists, one would likely find few who could list a Coase bibliography beyond the two classic pieces noted above, in spite of Coase's significant publication record. ' The purpose of this collection is to assess the development of, tensions within, and prospects for Coasean Economics - those aspects of economic analysis that have evolved out of Coase's path-breaking work. Two major strands of research can be identified here: law and economics and the New Institutional Economics.
This textbook places the relationship between law and economics in its international context, explaining the fundamentals of this increasingly important area of teaching and research in an accessible and straightforward manner. In presenting the subject, Alan Devlin draws on the neoclassical tradition of economic analysis of law while also showcasing cutting- edge developments, such as the rise of behavioural economic theories of law. Key features of this innovative book include: case law, directives, regulations, and statistics from EU, UK, and US jurisdictions are presented clearly and contextualised for law students, showing how law and economics theory can be understood in practice; succinct end- of-chapter summaries highlight the essential points in each chapter to focus student learning; further reading is provided at the end of each chapter to guide independent research. Making use of tables and diagrams throughout to facilitate understanding, this text provides a comprehensive overview of law-and-economics that is ideal for those new to the subject and for use as a course text for law-and-economics modules.
Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. The book's theory of collective rationality explains how to evaluate collective acts. The people engaged in a game of strategy collectively produce an outcome, and the theory reveals what makes some outcomes solutions. It generates new equilibrium standards for solutions to cooperative games.
Ronald Coase is one of the most important economists of the twentieth century. Amongst other great achievements, Coase taught us why firms exist and how we can better understand how to solve environmental problems. He also made a profound contribution to our understanding of the provision of so-called "public goods" and helped join the often distinct intellectual fields of law and economics. Coase coined the phrase "blackboard economics" to describe an approach to economics that involved ignoring what happens in practice and, instead, led the profession to obsess with theory. He once said: 'If economists wished to study the horse, they wouldn't go and look at horses. They'd sit in their studies and say to themselves, "what would I do if I were a horse?"'There is much that students, teachers, policymakers and regulators can learn from the economics of Ronald Coase, and he will, no doubt, provide a rich seam of material for decades to come. The authors of this short book have taken up the challenge. They apply Coase's ideas to a number of different areas of economics and, in doing so, provide a practical and very readable introduction to a number of topics that have direct relevance for regulation and for public policy.
​​​​This book examines the role of economic violence (violations of economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural resources) within the transitional justice agenda. Because economic violence often leads to conflict, is perpetrated during conflict, and continues afterwards as a legacy of conflict, a greater focus on economic and social rights issues in the transitional justice context is critical. One might add that insofar as transitional justice is increasingly seen as an instrument of peacebuilding rather than a simple political transition, focus on economic violence as the crucial “root cause” is key to preventing re-lapse into conflict. Recent increasing attention to economic issues by academics and truth commissions suggest this may be slowly changing, and that economic and social rights may represent the “next frontier” of transitional justice concerns. There remain difficult questions that have yet to be worked out at the level of theory, policy, and practice. Further scholarship in this regard is both timely, and necessary. This volume therefore presents an opportunity to fill an important gap. The project will bring together new papers by recognized and emerging scholars and policy experts in the field.​
Although the study of politics dates to ancient Greece, the basic questions that interested those earliest political scientists still linger with us today: What are the origins of government? What should government do? What conditions foster effective governance? Rational choice theory offers a new means for developing correctable answers to these questions. This volume illustrates the promise of rational choice theory and demonstrates how theory can help us develop interesting, fresh conclusions about the fundamental processes of politics. Each of the book’s three sections begins with a pedagogical overview that is accessible to those with little knowledge of rational choice theory. The first group of essays then discusses various ways in which rational choice contributes to our understanding of the foundations of government. The second set focuses on the contributions of rational choice theory to institutional analysis. The final group demonstrates ways in which rational choice theory helps to understand the character of popular government.
Is economics always self-corrective? Do erroneous theorems permanently disappear from the market of economic ideas? Intellectual Path Dependence in Economics argues that errors in economics are not always corrected. Although economists are often critical and open-minded, unfit explanations are nonetheless able to reproduce themselves. The problem is that theorems sometimes survive the intellectual challenges in the market of economic ideas even when they are falsified or invalidated by criticism and an abundance of counter-evidence. A key question which often gets little or no attention is: why do economists not reject theories when they have been refuted by evidence and falsified by philosophical reasoning? This book explores the answer to this question by examining the phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in the history of economic thought. It argues that the key reason why economists do not reject refuted theories is the epistemic costs of starting to use new theories. Epistemic costs are primarily the costs of scarcity of the most valued element in academic production: time. Epistemic scarcity overwhelmingly dominates the evolution of scientific research in such a way that when researchers start off a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and un-replicable research. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the methodology, philosophy and history of economics.
The objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesia