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Previous research on the institutional structure of franchising networks (Bri- ley et al. 1991; Lutz 1995; Shane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also residual income rights of franchisor-owned outlets. Previous studies primarily examines the incentive, signalling and screening effects of fees, royalties and other contractual pro- sions from the point of view of organizational economics (see Dnes 1996 for a review) without taking into account the interactions between residual decision and residual income rights as interrelated parts of the governance structure. This paper fills this gap in the literature. According to the property rights view, de- sion rights should be allocated according to the distribution of intangible kno- edge assets between the franchisor and franchisee and ownership rights should be assigned according to the residual decision rights. Since ownership rights are diluted in franchising networks, the dilution of residual income rights of fr- chised outlets is compensated by residual income rights of company-owned o- lets. Under a dual ownership structure, company-owned outlets compensate the disincentive effect of low royalties for the franchisor, and low royalties strengthen the investment incentives for the franchisee.
This paper takes a systematic look at the portfolio choice problem faced by Investment Banks or Funds investing in transition economies. We relate the performance of projects in the transition economies to the broader macroeconomic and international environment, which affect the project through its input-output structure and its financial balance sheet. Among the macroeconomic determinants of enterprise behavior we consider are productivity growth, real wage growth, movements in the international terms of trade, shocks to the relative price of traded and non-traded goods, domestic and foreign interest rates, currency depreciation and the rate of inflation. We evaluate the attractiveness of alternative investment strategies and provisioning rules from the perspective of portfolio theory.
This paper demonstrates the value-relevance of foreign earnings for U.S. multinational firms by examining the associations between annual abnormal stock performance and changes in firms' domestic and foreign incomes disclosed through SEC Regulation?210.4-08(h). For 2570 firm-year observations between 1985 and 1993, both foreign and domestic earnings changes have significant positive associations with annual excess returns measures; however, the association coefficient on foreign income is significantly larger than the association coefficient on domestic income. This indicates that foreign earnings disclosures are value-relevant and suggests that firm value is more sensitive to foreign earnings than domestic earnings. We demonstrate that this larger foreign association coefficient is consistent with differences in growth opportunities between domestic and foreign operations. To further support the growth opportunity interpretation of the results, we demonstrate that larger foreign association coefficients are not due to the influence of exchange rate changes or the result of methodological problems such as differences in the timing of foreign versus domestic earnings recognition or misspecification in the earnings expectation process.
Machines are more expensive in poor countries, and the relation is pronounced. It is hard for a Solow (1956) type of model to explain the relation between machine prices and GDP given that in most countries equipment investment is under 10% of GDP. A stronger relation emerges in a Solow (1959) type of vintage model in which technology is embodied in machines.
We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N + 1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K 1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player's value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill.