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Königgrätz, a city overlooking the river Elbe, was a western strongpoint of the Austrian Empire. On the morning of July 3, 1866, Prussia attacked the city against high odds and defeated the Austrian army in a single day, despite the Austrian advantage in heavy artillery and command of the high ground. The fall of Königgrätz transferred power over the German states from Austria to Prussia, marking the beginning of the German nation, a political consequence considered to be among the most important of any conflict in modern history. The battle for the city of Königgrätz—now called Hradec Králové, located in the Czech Republic—was the largest of its time, with nearly half a million troops involved. It was also the first battle where the outcome was directly determined by the availability of new technologies, including the railroad, telegraph, cast steel rifled cannon, and breech-loading rifle. It also marked a lesson in the fallacy of dependence on technology at the expense of sound strategy. In this full account, distinguished historian Gordon A. Craig discusses the state of political affairs surrounding the battle, the personalities involved, the weaponry, and the tactics in order to recreate the battlefield in all its complexity.
Reproduction of the original: The Campaign of Königgrätz by Arthur L. Wagner
"Before the War of 1866 the name Helmuth von Moltke was scarcely known outside the Prussian army ... This book follows Moltke's part in the course of the campaign at the end of which his name had become a household word. It traces his rise to the position of Chief of the General Staff, against the background of the political situation of Prussia in the middle of the 19th Century, and the way in which he developed the functions of the General Staff."--Inside cover
This is a history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. It is based upon extensive new research in the state and military archives of Austria, Germany, and Italy. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Venetia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Although the book gives a thorough accounting of both the Prussian and Italian war efforts, it is most notable for the light it sheds on the Austrians. Through painstaking archival research, Wawro reconstructs the Austrian campaign, blow-by-blow, hour-by-hour. Blending military and social history, he describes the terror and panic that overtook Austria's regiments of the line in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the unconscionable blundering of the Austrian commandant and his chief deputies who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war - crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy - that most European pundits had predicted they would win.
Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke’s thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on “Moltke the Elder” that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke’s enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War “Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor’s careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.”—Foreign Affairs Magazine “This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history’s greatest geniuses. [Moltke’s] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended.”—Armed Forces Journal “A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History
Useful and reliable primer that was designed for use of Staff College students sitting exams in 1908, and as such gives a clear analytical account of this mid-19th century conflict. The Seven Weeks' War was the first war between two major continental powers in seven years, and used many of the same technologies as the American Civil War. The Prussian Army used von Dreyse's breech-loading needle gun, which could be rapidly loaded while the soldier was seeking cover on the ground, whereas the Austrian muzzleloading rifles could only be loaded slowly, and generally from a standing position. Superior Prussian organization and élan decided the battle against Austrian numerical superiority, the victory was near total, with Austrian battle deaths nearly seven times the Prussian figure. --
The German war of 1866, generally known as “the Seven Weeks’ War,” presents many features of interest to the student, the statesman and the soldier. It closed a strife of centuries between opposing nations and antagonistic political ideas. It resulted in the formation of the North German Confederation, and thus planted the seeds of a nation, which germinated four years later, during the bloody war with France. It banished Austria from all participation in the affairs of Germany, expelled her from Italy, and deflected her policy thenceforth towards the east and south. It demonstrated that preparation for war is a more potent factor than mere numbers in computing the strength of a nation; and it gave an illustration on a grand scale of the new conditions of war resulting from the use of the telegraph, the railroad and breech-loading firearms. It is not the intention here to consider any but the military features of the great Germanic contest. Beginning the subject at the period when the quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the provinces that they had wrested from Denmark, passed from the tortuous paths of diplomacy to the direct road of war, we will consider the relative strength of the combatant nations. As the advocate of the admission of Schleswig-Holstein as a sovereign state in the Germanic Confederation, Austria gained first the sympathy, and then the active alliance, of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. Prussia aimed at the incorporation of the duchies within her own territory; and, though loudly championing the cause of German unity, her course was so manifestly inspired by designs for her own aggrandizement, that she could count on the support of only a few petty duchies, whose aggregate military strength did not exceed 28,000 men. As an offset to Austria’s formidable German allies, Prussia had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy, whose army, though new and inferior in organization, armament and equipment, to that of her antagonist, might be relied upon to “contain” at least three Austrian army corps in Venetia. The main struggle was certain to be between the two great Germanic nations.