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Examined thoroughly and intelligently in this book is an important aspect of the Japanese–American negotiations preceding the outbreak of the war—the role played by the Tripartite Alliance between Germany, Japan, and Italy. The author shows the Tripartite Pact in a broad light, as part of the general diplomatic and political developments of the times. He considers it first as it figures in the story of Japanese–American relations; then as it fits into the history of Japanese-German relations from 1936 to 1941; and finally as it was seen by the outside world, especially by the American leaders and public. The view that American policy was Roosevelt's "back door to war" is rejected, as is the opposite view that it was the only possible answer to Japanese conspiracy and aggression. The author favors Ambassador Joseph E. Crew's opinion that American policy in the latter half of 1941 was a mistake and that a more conciliatory policy could have achieved America's essential aims without war or "appeasement." Among the author's provocative contentions is that if American policy was a mistake, it was a mistake not of the Administration or a party only, but of the whole American people. Winner of the 1956 Beveridge Award, this book provides a persuasive analysis of a complex and controversial chapter in American history.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 is remembered by Americans as something like a bolt out of the blue, a sneak attack from an irrational enemy. The truth, however, is that the Japanese attack was preceded by six months of intense diplomatic negotiations between the Japanese and the Americans. In The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, historian Paul Schroeder reviews the course of these negotiations. Of particular interest to Schroeder is the role that Japan’s Tripartite Pact with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany played in the negotiations. Schroeder shows that Japan, far from entering an alliance for world domination with Hitler, viewed the pact as an opportunity to secure its interests while avoiding a war with the U.S. and how, when the Pact became a liability in Japan’s negotiations with America, the Japanese were quick to downplay their dedication to it and its importance in their policies. Schroeder also observes the other primary issues at stake in the negotiations—Japan’s war with China and its expansionary intentions in the Pacific—and discusses how American diplomacy wasted many opportunities to not only avoid war in the Pacific, but secure concessions from Japan. This book, a scholarly reconsideration of American policy leading up to the war, is notable for its balance and accuracy and for its revisionist conclusions that are wholly supportable by the facts.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Between 1942 and 1945, the U.S. government wrongfully imprisoned thousands of Japanese American citizens and profited from their labor. Japanese American Incarceration recasts the forced removal and incarceration of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II as a history of prison labor and exploitation. Following Franklin Roosevelt's 1942 Executive Order 9066, which called for the exclusion of potentially dangerous groups from military zones along the West Coast, the federal government placed Japanese Americans in makeshift prisons throughout the country. In addition to working on day-to-day operations of the camps, Japanese Americans were coerced into harvesting crops, digging irrigation ditches, paving roads, and building barracks for little to no compensation and often at the behest of privately run businesses—all in the name of national security. How did the U.S. government use incarceration to address labor demands during World War II, and how did imprisoned Japanese Americans respond to the stripping of not only their civil rights, but their labor rights as well? Using a variety of archives and collected oral histories, Japanese American Incarceration uncovers the startling answers to these questions. Stephanie Hinnershitz's timely study connects the government's exploitation of imprisoned Japanese Americans to the history of prison labor in the United States.
Often forgotten among the many aspects of World War II is the alliance between Germany and Japan. Because of the vast geographical separation between these two Axis nations, and because of some of very real philosophical and operational differences, the alliance was fraught with difficulty. But in the vast middle-ground of the Indian Ocean, these "reluctant allies" did come together to conduct naval operations that might well have had disastrous consequences for the Allies but for the intervention of fate and the inevitable friction of war. Captain Krug served in U-boats in that theater and in the Far East and, with the assistance of scholars of both nations, he has produced a very readable and meticulously researched account of German and Japanese naval interaction. Besides thoroughly covering--for the first time--this neglected topic, the authors provide valuable insight into the faulty mechanism of an alliance between totalitarian powers, characterized by suspicion and a reluctance to freely share information and assets. They also bring to light the difficulties--and ultimate consequences--of dealing with the megalomania and criminal intellect of Adolf Hitler, which resulted in war-crime trials for some of the participants. Proving that not every aspect of the world's greatest war has been covered, this book is a valuable contribution to the ever-expanding lore of the war and will be required reading for those with an interest in naval operations, global strategy, and international diplomacy during the period.
No nation was more deeply affected by America’s rise to world power than Japan. President Franklin Roosevelt’s uncompromising policy of unconditional surrender led to the catastrophic finale of the Asia-Pacific War and the most intrusive international reconstruction of another nation in modern history. Japan in the American Century examines how Japan, with its deeply conservative heritage, responded to the imposition of a new liberal order. The price Japan paid to end the occupation was a cold war alliance with the United States that ensured America’s dominance in the region. Still traumatized by its wartime experience, Japan developed a grand strategy of dependence on U.S. security guarantees so that the nation could concentrate on economic growth. Yet from the start, despite American expectations, Japan reworked the American reforms to fit its own circumstances and cultural preferences, fashioning distinctively Japanese variations on capitalism, democracy, and social institutions. Today, with the postwar world order in retreat, Japan is undergoing a sea change in its foreign policy, returning to an activist, independent role in global politics not seen since 1945. Distilling a lifetime of work on Japan and the United States, Kenneth Pyle offers a thoughtful history of the two nations’ relationship at a time when the character of that alliance is changing. Japan has begun to pull free from the constraints established after World War II, with repercussions for its relations with the United States and its role in Asian geopolitics.
This “uncommonly astute study” examines the early development of the US-UK military alliance that would eventually lead to victory in WWII (Paul Miles, author of FDR’s Admiral). On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft sank the American gunboat Panay outside Nanjing, China. Although the Japanese apologized, President Roosevelt set Captain Royal Ingersoll to London to begin conversations with the British admiralty about Japanese aggression in the Far East. While few Americans remember the Panay Incident, it was the start of what would become the “Special Relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. In The Origins of the Grand Alliance, William T. Johnsen provides the first comprehensive analysis of Anglo-American military collaboration before the Second World War. He sets the stage by examining Anglo-French and Anglo-American coalition military planning from 1900 through World War I and the interwar years. Johnsen also considers the formulation of policy and grand strategy, operational planning, and the creation of the command structure and channels of communication. He addresses vitally important logistical and materiel issues, particularly the difficulties of war production. Drawn from extensive sources and private papers held in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, Johnsen’s exhaustively researched study casts new light on the twentieth century’s most significant alliance.