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This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
This important report analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and force structure of the U.S. Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957). It compares these impacts with those that occurred on the U.S. Air Force and Navy during that time. Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare. Their unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed warfare. For the Army, nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge. The Army faced a U.S. security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the battlefield. The nation's security policy of large scale strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree the Navy. The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will. In all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an external struggle to retain a useful position within the U.S. Defense establishment during this period.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. The Army Before Last: Military Transformation and the Impact of Nuclear Weapons on the U.S. Army in the Early Cold War * A. Introduction * B. Current Military Transformation * C. The Nuclear Revolution * D. The Military Services And Nuclear Weapons * E. Thesis and Design * II. The Nuclear Revolution and The United States Air Force and Navy * A. Introduction * B. Revolutions * C. Defining the New Threat 1947-1955 * D. Policy to War Plan * E. Decisive Air Power * F. The Strategic Air Command * G. Early Cold War Naval Power * H. Bomber and Supercarrier * I. Conclusion * III. The Army's Atomic Force Structure * A. Introduction * B. The Korean Conflict * C. Army Nuclear Forces * D. Conflicts * E. Conclusion * IV. The Army's Atomic Age Doctrine * A. Introduction * B. Soviet Early Cold War Strategy * C. Countering The Threat * D. Atomic Doctrine And Units * E. Conclusion * V. Conclusion * A. Introduction * B. The Comparisons - Then and Now * C. The Impacts * D. ConclusionThe current U.S. military is essentially the product of the combat lessons of World War II and the preparations to fight the Soviet military during the Cold War. Tactics, techniques and equipment refined during both of those wars led to the victory in Desert Storm as well as the success of the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Ongoing efforts throughout the 1990's to capitalize on emerging information technologies enhanced the forces that defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and ousted Saddam Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom two years later. The Army is always changing, by improving its weapons systems, altering its force structure, or refining its doctrine and tactics. This process always involves the interaction of recent combat experience, budget realities, and the exploitation of a new technology. Any change in an institution such as the Army is a skilled balance of risk versus reward. The early Cold War represented a comparably intense period for military change. Before the Second World War, the American army and navy had been primarily hemispheric defense forces. The challenge of defeating both Germany and Japan required a massive land force for Europe and an equally large naval force for the vast Pacific theater. Furthermore, World War II saw an exceptional growth of military technology including improved mechanization, radios, jet engines, and, most significantly, the atomic bomb.
American Military History provides the United States Army-in particular, its young officers, NCOs, and cadets-with a comprehensive but brief account of its past. The Center of Military History first published this work in 1956 as a textbook for senior ROTC courses. Since then it has gone through a number of updates and revisions, but the primary intent has remained the same. Support for military history education has always been a principal mission of the Center, and this new edition of an invaluable history furthers that purpose. The history of an active organization tends to expand rapidly as the organization grows larger and more complex. The period since the Vietnam War, at which point the most recent edition ended, has been a significant one for the Army, a busy period of expanding roles and missions and of fundamental organizational changes. In particular, the explosion of missions and deployments since 11 September 2001 has necessitated the creation of additional, open-ended chapters in the story of the U.S. Army in action. This first volume covers the Army's history from its birth in 1775 to the eve of World War I. By 1917, the United States was already a world power. The Army had sent large expeditionary forces beyond the American hemisphere, and at the beginning of the new century Secretary of War Elihu Root had proposed changes and reforms that within a generation would shape the Army of the future. But world war-global war-was still to come. The second volume of this new edition will take up that story and extend it into the twenty-first century and the early years of the war on terrorism and includes an analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq up to January 2009.
Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.
This essay is a brief history of the U.S. army during the years immediately following the Korean War. For many in our own time that period-corresonding to the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency-has acquired an aura of congenial simplicity. Americans who survived Vietnam, Watergate, and painful economical difficulties wistfully recall the 1950s as a time when the nation possessed a clearly-charted course and had the will and the power to follow it.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
This illustrated book that includes tables, charts, and maps primarily discusses the role of USAREUR (US Army Europe) in rearming and training the new German Army which was perhaps the Army's single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the US Army in Europe.
This thesis analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and force structure of the US Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957). It compares these impacts with those that occurred on the US Air Force and Navy during that time. Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare. Their unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed warfare. For the Army nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge. The Army faced a US security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the battlefield. The nation's security policy of large scale strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree the Navy. The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will. In all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an external struggle to retain a useful position within the US Defense establishment during this period.
General Adams reflects on his experiences in the cold war, during which he served in both manned bombers and missile silos. He tells stories of famous and not-so-famous cold warriors, including some from the US Navy. Some stories are humorous; some stories are tragic. Having traveled extensively in Russia and some former Soviet Union states after retirement, General Adams tells us about his former adversaries, the Soviet cold warriors. In the process, he leaves no doubt about his respect for all who served so valiantly in the "strategic triad"-- the strategic command, the ICBM force, and the submarine Navy.