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Following his country's victory over Nazi Germany, Joseph Stalin was widely hailed as a great wartime leader and international statesman. Unchallenged on the domestic front, he headed one of the most powerful nations in the world. Yet, in the period from the end of World War II until his death, Stalin remained a man possessed by his fears. In order to reinforce his despotic rule in the face of old age and uncertain health, he habitually humiliated and terrorized members of his inner circle. He had their telephones bugged and even forced his deputy, Viacheslav Molotov, to betray his own spouse as a token of his allegiance. Often dismissed as paranoid and irrational, Stalin's behavior followed a clear political logic, contend Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk. Stalin's consistent and overriding goal after the war was to consolidate the Soviet Union's status as a superpower and, in the face of growing decrepitude, to maintain his own hold as leader of that power. To that end, he fashioned a system of leadership that was at once patrimonial-repressive and quite modern. While maintaining informal relations based on personal loyalty at the apex of the system, in the postwar period Stalin also vested authority in committees, elevated younger specialists, and initiated key institutional innovations with lasting consequences. Close scrutiny of Stalin's relationships with his most intimate colleagues also shows how, in the teeth of periodic persecution, Stalin's deputies cultivated informal norms and mutual understandings which provided the foundations for collective rule after his death. Based on newly released archival documents, including personal correspondence, drafts of Central Committee paperwork, new memoirs, and interviews with former functionaries and the families of Politburo members, this book will appeal to all those interested in Soviet history, political history, and the lives of dictators. Cold Peace was a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2005.
Can Russia and the United States really move beyond their bitter Cold War rivalry to a genuinely cooperative relationship?Yes, argues distinguished diplomat James Goodby, but only if the United States, together with its European allies, promotes a new "logic of peace" to which NATO enlargement could contribute. During the nuclear standoff, a network of norms, rules, and structures kept the peace between the superpowers in Europe. Today, a new logic must be established, one that builds on mutual concerns to combat nuclear terrorism, reduce nuclear weaponry, and avoid the kind of bloodshed seen in the former Yugoslavia.Drawing on the lessons of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Goodby analyzes the prospects for achieving a secure and democratic Euroatlantic community. He challenges policymakers and public alike to embrace a new vision of U.S.-Russian cooperation.
"A detailed introductory essay to provide the necessary historical and political context precedes each part. The individual documents are introduced by short headnotes summarizing the contents and orienting the reader. A chronology, glossary and bibliography offer further background information."--BOOK JACKET.
James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring the permanent presence of American ground forces on the continent.The permanent presence of American forces in Europe is often seen as a lesson that policymakers drew from the disastrous experiences of two world wars, but McAllister's archival research reveals that both FDR and Eisenhower, as well as influential strategists such as George Kennan, did not draw this lesson. In the short term, American power was necessary to balance the Soviet Union and reassure Western Europe about the revival of German power, but America's long-term objective was to create the conditions under which Western Europe could take care of both of these problems on their own.In the author's view, the key element of this strategy was the creation of the European Defense Community. If Western Germany could be successfully integrated and rearmed within the context of the EDC, Western Europe would have taken the most important step to becoming a superpower on par with the United States and the Soviet Union. Understanding why this strategy was pursued and why it failed, McAllister asserts, has important implications for both international relations theory and contemporary questions of American foreign policy.
"Featuring new evidence on: the end of the Cold War, 1989; the fall of the Wall; Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-59; Soviet missile deployments, 1959; the Iran Crisis, 1944-46; Tito and Khrushchev, 1954.
Drawing on recently declassified Soviet archival sources, this book sheds new light on how the division of Europe came about in the aftermath of World War II. The book contravenes the notion that a neutral zone of states, including Germany, could have been set up between East and West. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was determined to preserve control over its own sphere of German territory. By tracing Stalin's attitude toward neutrality in international politics, the book provides important insights into the origins of the Cold War.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, deployed a tactic Chris Tudda calls “rhetorical diplomacy”— sounding a belligerent note of anti-Communism in speeches, addresses, press conferences, and private meetings with allies and with Moscow. Yet all the while, Tudda discloses, the two were confidentially committed to a contradictory course—the establishment of a strong system of collective security in Western Europe, peaceful accommodation of the Soviet Union, and the maintenance of a new, albeit divided Germany. Tudda explores the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of these two mutually exclusive diplomatic strategies and reveals how failure to reconcile them endangered the fragile peace of the 1950s. He builds his argument through three case studies: of the administration’s badgering the French and their allies to ratify the European Defense Community, of its threat to liberate Eastern Europe from Moscow’s rule, and of its forcing the issue of German reunification. By emphasizing the threat from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower and Dulles were trying to promote an activist rather than an isolationist foreign policy. But their rhetorical diplomacy intensified Cold War tensions with European allies as well as with Moscow and effectively overwhelmed the administration’s true diplomatic aims. Based on American, British, Eastern European, and Soviet primary sources—many only recently unearthed—The Truth Is Our Weapon is a major contribution to the historiography of Eisenhower’s diplomacy and an important statement about the implications of public and private policy making.