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This 2017 report sets out recommendations for branch mismatch rules that would bring the treatment of these structures into line with the treatment of hybrid mismatch arrangements as set out in the 2015 Report on Neutralising the Effects of Hybrids Mismatch Arrangements (Action 2 Report).
Global investment patterns mean that effective taxation of foreign investors is of increasing importance to the economies of lower income countries. It is thus of considerable concern that the historical framework for cross-border income tax arrangements is not always well suited to allow low-income countries (LICs) effectively to generate tax revenues from profits on foreign direct investment (FDI). Several aspects of this framework contribute to the problem. This paper discusses, in particular, the likely effect of a shift by major economies from the system of worldwide corporate taxation toward a territorial system on the volume, distribution, and financing of FDI, focusing on LICs. It then empirically analyzes bilateral outbound FDI data for the UK for 2002–10 to determine whether the move to territoriality made corporations more sensitive to hostcountry statutory tax rates. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is found for FDI financed from new equity.
This paper reviews the rapidly growing empirical literature on international tax avoidance by multinational corporations. It surveys evidence on main channels of corporate tax avoidance including transfer mispricing, international debt shifting, treaty shopping, tax deferral and corporate inversions. Moreover, it performs a meta analysis of the extensive literature that estimates the overall size of profit shifting. We find that the literature suggests that, on average, a 1 percentage-point lower corporate tax rate will expand before-tax income by 1 percent—an effect that is larger than reported as the consensus estimate in previous surveys and tends to be increasing over time. The literature on tax avoidance still has several unresolved puzzles and blind spots that require further research.
For MBA students and graduates embarking on careers in investment banking, corporate finance, strategy consulting, money management, or venture capital Through integration with traditional MBA topics, Taxes and Business Strategy, Fifth Edition provides a framework for understanding how taxes affect decision-making, asset prices, equilibrium returns, and the financial and operational structure of firms. Teaching and Learning Experience This program presents a better teaching and learning experience-for you and your students: *Use a text from an active author team: All 5 authors actively teach the tax and business strategy course and provide students with relevant examples from both classroom and real-world consulting experience. *Teach students the practical uses for business strategy: Students learn important concepts that can be applied to their own lives. *Reinforce learning by using in-depth analysis: Analysis and explanatory material help students understand, think about, and retain information.
In an age when cross-border business transactions are increasingly effected without the transference of physical products, revenue concerns of states have led to a multitude of tax disputes based on the concept of ‘nexus’. This important and timely book is the most authoritative to date to discuss one of the major tax topics of our time – the question of how taxing rights on income generated from cross-border activities in the digital age should be allocated among jurisdictions. Demonstrating in prodigious depth that it is the economic nexus of the tax entity or activity with the state, and not the physical nexus, which meets the jurisdictional requirement, the author – a leading authority on this area who is a Senior Commissioner of Income Tax and a Member of the Dispute Resolution Panel of the Government of India – addresses such dimensions of the subject as the following: whether a strict territorial nexus as a normative principle is ingrained in source rule jurisprudence; detailed scrutiny of such classical doctrines as benefit theory, neutrality theory, and internation equity; comparative critique of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and United Nation (UN) model tax treaties; whether international law and customary principles mandate a strict territorial link with the source state for the assumption of tax jurisdiction; whether the economic nexus-based tax jurisdiction and absence of a physical presence breach the constitutional doctrine of extraterritoriality or due process; and whether retrospective tax legislation breaches the principle of constitutional fairness. The book offers a politically informed analysis of the nexus principle and balances the dynamics of physical presence and economic nexus standards, based on an in-depth survey of the historical evolution of judicial pronouncements and international practices in this regard. Dr Singh’s book exposes an urgently needed missing link in the international source rule literature and takes a giant step towards solving the thorny question of appropriate tax apportionment. It sheds brilliant light on the policies states may adopt when signing new tax treaties, so that unintended results may be foreseen and avoided. Tax practitioners, taxation authorities, and academic researchers in the field of international tax law and policy will greatly appreciate the book’s forthright enhancement of the ability to defend challenges based on the nexus doctrine.
Global investment patterns mean that effective taxation of foreign investors is of increasing importance to the economies of lower income countries. It is thus of considerable concern that the historical framework for cross-border income tax arrangements is not always well suited to allow low-income countries (LICs) effectively to generate tax revenues from profits on foreign direct investment (FDI). Several aspects of this framework contribute to the problem. This paper discusses, in particular, the likely effect of a shift by major economies from the system of worldwide corporate taxation toward a territorial system on the volume, distribution, and financing of FDI, focusing on LICs. It then empirically analyzes bilateral outbound FDI data for the UK for 2002–10 to determine whether the move to territoriality made corporations more sensitive to hostcountry statutory tax rates. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is found for FDI financed from new equity.
Interest in corporate tax reform that lowers the rate and broadens the base has developed in the past several years. Some discussions by economists in opinion pieces have suggested there is an urgent need to lower the corporate tax rate, but not necessarily to broaden the tax base, an approach that presents some difficulties given current budget pressures. Others see the corporate tax as a potential source of revenue. Arguments for lowering the corporate tax rate include the traditional concerns about economic distortions arising from the corporate tax and newer concerns arising from the increasingly global nature of the economy. Some claims have been made that lowering the corporate tax rate would raise revenue because of the behavioral responses, an effect that is linked to an open economy. Although the corporate tax has generally been viewed as contributing to a more progressive tax system because the burden falls on capital income and thus on higher-income individuals, claims have also been made that the burden falls not on owners of capital, but on labor income. The analysis in this report suggests that many of the concerns expressed about the corporate tax are not supported by empirical evidence. Claims that behavioral responses could cause revenues to rise if rates were cut do not hold up on either a theoretical or an empirical basis. Studies that purport to show a revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate of 30% (a rate lower than the current statutory tax rate) contain econometric errors that lead to biased and inconsistent results; when those problems are corrected the results disappear. Cross-country studies to provide direct evidence showing that the burden of the corporate tax actually falls on labor yield unreasonable results and prove to suffer from econometric flaws that also lead to a disappearance of the results when corrected, in those cases where data were obtained and the results replicated. Many studies that have been cited are not relevant to the United States because they reflect wage bargaining approaches and unions have virtually disappeared from the private sector in the United States. Overall, the evidence suggests that the tax is largely borne by capital. Similarly, claims that high U.S. tax rates will create problems for the United States in a global economy suffer from a misrepresentation of the U.S. tax rate compared with other countries and are less important when capital is imperfectly mobile, as it appears to be. Although these new arguments appear to rely on questionable methods, the traditional concerns about the corporate tax appear valid. While an argument may be made that the tax is still needed as a backstop to individual tax collections, it does result in some economic distortions. These economic distortions, however, have declined substantially over time as corporate rates and shares of output have fallen. Moreover, it is difficult to lower the corporate tax without creating a way of sheltering individual income given the low tax rates on dividends and capital gains. A number of revenue-neutral changes are available that could reduce these distortions, allow for a lower corporate statutory tax rate, and lead to a more efficient corporate tax system. These changes include base broadening, reducing the benefits of debt finance through inflation indexing, taxing large pass-through firms as corporations, and reducing the tax at the firm level offset by an increase at the individual level. Nevertheless, the scope for reducing the tax rate in a revenue-neutral way may be limited.
In 2009, the United Kingdom changed from a worldwide to a territorial tax system, abolishing dividend taxes on foreign repatriation from many low-tax countries. This paper assesses the causal effect of territorial taxation on real investments, using a unique dataset for multinational affiliates in 27 European countries and employing the difference-in-difference approach. It finds that the territorial reform has increased the investment rate of UK multinationals by 15.7 percentage points in low-tax countries. In the absence of any significant investment reduction elsewhere, the findings represent a likely increase in total outbound investment by UK multinationals.
Tax competition in the form of harmful tax practices can distort trade and investment patterns, erode national tax bases and shift part of the tax burden onto less mobile tax bases. The Report emphasises that governments must intensify their cooperative actions to curb harmful tax practices.