Download Free Taking Property And Just Compensation Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Taking Property And Just Compensation and write the review.

While much has been gained from the traditional legal scholars' doctrinal mode of analysis of the takings issue, this volume is presented in the belief that contributions from scholars from the various schools of thought that comprise Law and Economics can complement the traditional doctrinal approach to law. As the discipline of Law and Economics continues to advance, it remains heterodox; there are several vantage points from which to describe and analyze the interrealtionships between law and economics. It is hoped that the analyses from the several vantage points provided here will complement the prodigous body of existing doctrinal, legal analysis of the takings issue and deepen the understanding of the jurisprudential questions and economic issues surrounding the takings issue. To this end, each contributor to this volume was selected as `representative' of one of the schools of thought comprising Law and Economics. In addition, each contributor was provided with a collection of recent United States Supreme Court cases (those summarized in Chapter 1 of this book) along with President Regan's Executive Order: The sole charge to each contributor was to conduct a legal-economic analysis of the cases and the President's Executive Order from the vantage point of their respective school of thought.
If legal scholar Richard Epstein is right, then the New Deal is wrong, if not unconstitutional. Epstein reaches this sweeping conclusion after making a detailed analysis of the eminent domain, or takings, clause of the Constitution, which states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In contrast to the other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the eminent domain clause has been interpreted narrowly. It has been invoked to force the government to compensate a citizen when his land is taken to build a post office, but not when its value is diminished by a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Epstein argues that this narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the takings clause and the political theory that animates it. He develops a coherent normative theory that permits us to distinguish between permissible takings for public use and impermissible ones. He then examines a wide range of government regulations and taxes under a single comprehensive theory. He asks four questions: What constitutes a taking of private property? When is that taking justified without compensation under the police power? When is a taking for public use? And when is a taking compensated, in cash or in kind? Zoning, rent control, progressive and special taxes, workers’ compensation, and bankruptcy are only a few of the programs analyzed within this framework. Epstein’s theory casts doubt upon the established view today that the redistribution of wealth is a proper function of government. Throughout the book he uses recent developments in law and economics and the theory of collective choice to find in the eminent domain clause a theory of political obligation that he claims is superior to any of its modern rivals.
Examination of the concept of "takings" in the context of international law and international investment agreements. It is an analysis of the law relating to the takings of foreign property by host countries and of the clauses International Investment Agreements' seeking to provide protection against such takings. It deals with the development of the law and considers both what possible protection against governmental interference can be given by international instruments and under what conditions and in which manner a State retains, under international law, the freedom to take action that may affect foreign property in the interests of its economic development.
This law school study aid contains the history and cases related to the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. The authors bring their long-time teaching experience to this important area.
Property Rights: From Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment breaks new ground in our understanding of the genesis of property rights in the United States. According to the standard interpretation, echoed by as lofty an authority as Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, the courts did little in the way of protecting property rights in the early years of our nation. Not only does Siegan find this accepted teaching erroneous, but he finds post-Colonial jurisprudence to be firmly rooted in English common law and the writings of its most revered interpreters. Siegan conducts an exhaustive examination of property rights cases decided by state courts between the time of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788 and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. This inventory, which in its sweep captures scores of cases overlooked by previous commentators on the history of property rights, reveals that the protection of these rights is neither a relatively new phenomenon nor a heritage with precarious pedigree. These court cases, as well as early state constitutions, consistently and repeatedly embraced key elements of a property rights jurisprudence, such as protection of the privileges and immunities of citizens, due process of law, equal protection under the law, and prohibitions on the taking of property without just compensation. Case law provides overwhelming evidence that the American legal system, from its inception, has held property rights and their protection in the highest regard.The American Revolution, Siegan reminds us, was fought largely to affirm and protect private property rights-that is, to uphold the "rights of Englishmen"-even if it meant that the colonists would cease being Englishmen. John Locke and other great theoreticians of property rights understood their importance, not only to individuals who happened to possess property, but to the preservation of a free society and to the prosperity of its inhabitants. Siegan's contribution to this venerable tradition lies in his faithful reconstruction of our legal history, which allows us to see just how central property rights have been to the American experiment in liberty-from the very beginning.
Offers policy recommendations from Cato Institute experts on every major policy issue. Providing both in-depth analysis and concrete recommendations, the Handbook is an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone else interested in securing liberty through limited government.
The US Constitution requires the government to pay just compensation for taking private property. Justice, in this context, will be achieved only if compensation meets two tests, a reality test and a perception test. The reality test asks whether is it more likely than not that the owner deprived of her property would be made whole by the amount of compensation provided. In determining this likelihood, economics, biology, and psychology ought all to be considered. These disciplines indicate that possession, duration of possession, and multiple occupancy call for compensation bonuses. The perception test asks whether it is more likely than not that the average person would think that the owner would be made whole by the amount of compensation provided. In determining this likelihood, surveys of lay persons should play a key role. Participants surveyed provide more compensation when owners are in possession, when possession lengthens, when there are multiple occupants, and when the land is taken for a project involving substantial private ownership. Participants surveyed did not, however, consider justice to require that owners be awarded full compensation for subjective losses or that compensation be increased proportionately when property appreciates in value.