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Benefit fraud is a crime and undermines public confidence in the benefits system. In 2006-07, the Department for Work and Pensions estimated that it spent some £154 million on tackling fraud, identifying £106 million of overpaid benefit, against total benefit expenditure of £120 billion. The Department estimates that fraud fell from £2 billion in 2001-02 to £800 million in 2006-07, which is 0.6% of benefit expenditure. But the Department must do more to reverse the rise in official and customer error. Estimated error rose from £1 billion in 2001-02 to £1.9 billion in 2006-07. Benefit complexity is believed to be a major cause of error. Increasing the volume of pre-payment checks and encouraging customers to receive benefit payments directly into their bank accounts has prevented some fraud. The Department now works closely with the police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency and local authorities to prevent, identify and act against fraud. But it could make more effective use of its powers and resources. While the Department successfully prosecutes 90 per cent of the cases it takes to court, the Prosecution Division has lost 17 per cent of its staff since 2003. Debt recovery is an essential part of tackling fraud, yet in 2006-07 the Department only recovered £22 million of fraud debt out of a known fraud debt stock of £339 million. The Department has been slow to improve its management information systems, hampering its ability to measure the cost-effectiveness of counter-fraud activities. It has taken from 2003 until February 2008 to roll out a new national management information system, known as FRAIMS, at a cost of £65 million.
This NAO report is a follow up to one issued in the 2002-03 session (HC 393, ISBN 9780102920635), Tackling Benefit Fraud. The report sets out some key facts, including: that the total benefit expenditure is £120 billion; the total number of recipients is 18 million; the total estimated fraud is £0.8 billion. In the 2006-07 period, £154 million was spent on six strategies to reduce fraud, with a Departmental estimate of £106 million of benefit overpayments identified as a result of fraud investigation and compliance activity. Also in the 2006-07 period, the Department recovered £22 million of the total £339 million outstanding fraud debt. Although the NAO has identified that fraud has fallen from an estimated £2 billion in 2001-02 to an estimated £0.8 billion in 2006-07, official error has risen in the same period from £1 billion to £1.9 billion. Tackling fraud is a key priority for the Department for Work and Pensions, and the report examines the main anti-fraud initiatives, recognising that: tackling benefit is inherently difficult; that the UK has levels of social security fraud and error which are similar to those of comparable countries; that the Department has made good progress in tackling fraud, but will find it increasingly difficult to secure further year on year reductions. The NAO has also set out a number of recommendations, including: that the Department's management information on fraud could be improved, with greater communication between the various departmental directorates responsible for counter-fraud work; that a review of the cost effectiveness of the Customer Compliance approach (which deals with lower risk cases of fraud) should be done; that a record of the outcomes of prosecution activities should be taken by case type to provide better Departmental information; that the Department must review recovery of overpayments in fraud cases and consider setting appropriate targets for recovery from customers who have committed fraud.
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and its agencies, are responsible for administering around 40 social security benefits to the value of around £100 billion a year. Many of these benefits are linked together; hence some customers are in receipt of more than one benefit. The need for equity and fairness in interpreting legislation, is a cause of complexity. Incentives (e.g. to work) and rewards (e.g. for an individual's savings) have been built into procedures. Problems are caused by the interface between DWP benefits and tax credits (which are administered by HM Revenue and Customs); and by the constant flow of major and minor legislative and administrative changes. Simplified procedures would enable both staff and customers to understand the system better, and to avoid duplication of effort. There would also be less scope for benefits fraud (estimated at £2.6 billion in 2004-05). This NAO report also highlights the need for improved communication with customers and better use of new technology.
The Department for Work and Pensions does not yet have enough evidence to demonstrate that its activities to reduce the cost of mistakes by customers have been value for money. Mistakes made by claimants in the information they provide to the Department, termed customer error, are difficult to detect, correct and prevent. The scale of overpayments and underpayments demonstrate a clear imperative for improvement. Mistakes made by customers are difficult for the Department to tackle because they often arise from a change in customers' circumstances, which customers may not realise they have to tell the Department about. Overpayments due to customer error, which are estimated at £1.1 billion in 2009-10, represent a substantial loss to the taxpayer. And underpayments, which were approximately £800 million in 2009-10, can cause hardship for the families affected. The establishment by the Department of the Fraud and Error Council shows a commitment to tackling fraud and error, but there is little evidence that sufficient attention has been paid to reducing losses due to customer mistakes. The Department launched a five year strategy for tackling error in January 2007 but there has been no discernible decrease between 2006-07 and 2009-10 in underpayments and overpayments due to customer error as a percentage of total benefits expenditure. The Department and its agencies do not yet have enough information to target initiatives effectively. Nor is there enough consistently measured data on the costs and benefits of interventions.
This Draft Local Audit Bill, sets out the government's vision for the future of local audit. It has been designed to implement the government's commitment to disband the Audit Commission and re-focus audit on helping local people hold their councils and other local public bodies to account for local spending decisions. The aim of this new draft bill is to develop a locally focused audit regime, but one still retaining a high quality of audit of local government spending. The government views the current audit arrangements for local public bodies as inefficient and unnecessarily centralised, which has created a system of weak cost incentives and therefore become too focused on reporting to central government and not local people. The new audit framework will also allow bodies to appoint their own auditors from an open and competitive market. The Bill also gives new responsibilities to the Financial Reporting Council, which will act as the overall regulator for auditors; the National Audit Office, which will set the code of audit practice; and the professional audit bodies will also have a role in regulating and monitoring audits.
Fraud, corruption and bribery in and around public services have become an increasing concern in recent years. The reported level of fraud and corruption affecting the public sector has remained unacceptably high despite numerous national and international initiatives intended to tackle these crimes and their consequences. Fraud and Corruption in Public Services is a definitive, practical guide to the diverse risks that arise in central and local government. There is guidance on civil and criminal law around fraud, bribery and corruption as well as the national and international governmental measures and initiatives for countering this form of criminality. Most importantly of all, the book offers advice, practical examples and strategies for preventing and combating fraud, bribery and corruption. The text is readable, well-informed and intensely practical; illustrated throughout with real-life examples from the author's 40 year career.
This comprehensive edited volume contains analysis and explanation of the nature, extent, patterns and causes of over 40 different forms of crime, in each case drawing attention to key contemporary debates and social and criminal justice responses.
It remains uncertain how the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) will manage the housing costs element of Universal Credit without increased risks of fraud and error. The Government has stated that an IT system (the Integrated Risk and Intelligence Service (IRIS)) will allow it to cross-check data and provide similar safeguards against fraudulent claims under Universal Credit as are currently operated by local authorities within the Housing Benefit system. However, the National Audit Office found that IRIS was 'missing' from the UC Pathfinders, and it remains unclear how or when DWP will achieve automated access to the range of property data currently available to local authorities. The official estimated benefit fraud rate is 0.7% of total benefits expenditure. The general public's misperception is that it is some 34 times higher. To reduce the risk of confusion or conflation in media reporting, DWP should publish statistics relating to the estimated level of benefit fraud on a separate day from those related to error in the benefits system. Fraud and error rates have plateaued from 2005/06 to 2012/13 and DWP must employ innovative approaches which are aligned with the known risk factors associated with each benefit to achieve reductions. Biometric identity systems could have an important role to play in identity verification processes across government. The Single Fraud Investigation Service (SFIS), which will investigate all social security benefit fraud across DWP, HMRC and local authorities, should be implemented in line with the roll out of Universal Credit.
Drawing on 20 years of experience as Comptroller and Auditor General, and head of the United Kingdom National Audit Office, Public Sector Auditing: Is it Value for Money? is Sir John Bourn’s own account of the role and influence value for money auditing has in holding governments to account and in helping public bodies improve the ways in which they deliver services. Key features include: In-depth case studies from UK, US, Canada, China, India and Australia; Detailed analysis of complex areas of public expenditure such as health, education, privatisation, regulation, defence and IT; Examples of how auditing can promote positive outcomes rather than negative post mortems. This book is relevant for people working in both the public and private sectors, and should be essential reading for the staff of public sector audit institutions around the world, as well as commercial accountancy firms and students of accountancy, politics, economics and public management.
There are around 30 different types of benefits and pensions, and £148 billion was paid out to 20 million people in 2009-10. The Department for Work and Pensions estimates that £2.2 billion of overpayments and £1.3 billion of underpayments were made in 2009-10 as a result of administrative errors by its staff and mistakes by customers. Efforts to tackle error have had little success and levels of error have remained constant since 2007. A joint HM Revenue and Customs and Department for Work and Pensions fraud and error strategy announced in October 2010, along with additional funding of £425 million over four years, is an opportunity to inject a new impetus. Importantly, the Department has not addressed underpayments, despite the hardship that benefit underpayments can create for people in need. Interventions to reduce error must be targeted where they are most likely to get the greatest return. Progress on reducing error requires a better understanding of where and why errors arise, and a greater focus on preventing errors occurring in the first place. The Department is not making use of all available sources of information to identify the reasons why staff make mistakes, where guidance and training efforts should be directed, and to identify which customers are most likely to make mistakes on their benefit claims. Wider welfare reforms have the potential to reduce errors in the long term by simplifying benefits administration, but waiting for the implementation of the Universal Credit is not an option.