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Seasonal analysis of the structure, conduct, and performance (SCP) of markets for staple crops has received relatively little attention in food policy analysis yet it has important implications for food and nutrition security. This study employs a mixed methods approach to analyze the SCP of maize markets in Malawi in the 2018/19 main harvest and lean seasons. We interviewed 749 traders from 74 markets across 8 districts, held 28 focus group discussions (FGD) with a total of 480 farmers and analyzed daily and weekly price data from 13 regional markets. The structure of maize markets was explored by examining marketing channels, barriers to entry and the competitiveness of different tiers of the marketing chain. Inequality in sales revenues, switches in trader types between seasons, quality and weights standardization, and the behavior of traders were used to examine market conduct. Performance was assessed by examining traders’ costs and margins, and the spatial and temporal integration of maize markets. We find that Malawi’s maize market is pyramidal in structure and highly competitive at lower tiers of trade but ‘oligopolistic’ at higher tiers. The market channels vary across seasons with switches between trader types and instances of rural-urban trade reversals. There is considerable inequality of sales revenues among traders of similar capacities, and a widespread lack of structured trading despite existing institutions. A high ratio of marketing costs to revenue suggests marketing inefficiencies. Malawi maize prices were highly seasonal and more volatile than neighboring countries. In contrast to previous studies, our findings show weak spatial integration of markets and slow price adjustments to long-run equilibrium values even among short-distance market pairs. The study highlights five pathways to improving Malawi’s maize marketing system: (1) increased policy predictability to promote private-sector investment; (2) institutionalization of quality grades and standardization of weights and measures; (3) increased commercialization of smallholder maize production; (4) investment in enabling infrastructure; and (5) the promotion of structured trading.
This policy note summarizes Working Paper 29 (Ochieng et al., 2019), which investigates the SCP of Malawi’s maize market during the 2018/19 main marketing and lean seasons and provides policy suggestions on how to improve Malawi’s maize marketing system.
Primary agricultural cooperatives in Malawi, in contrast to other farmer-level organizations, have legal status and can own assets, borrow money for their operations, and sign contracts, making it easier for them to do business for the profit of their members. Conceptually, such cooperatives enable their member-farmers to achieve economies of scale for their commercial activities. By joining together in a cooperative, members can obtain commercial inputs at lower prices closer to wholesale prices than if they purchased the inputs as individuals. In selling their output, by aggregating their crops and other products into larger lots that the cooperative then negotiates to sell on their behalf, buyers can achieve greater efficiency in buying from them and can be expected to offer a premium over the prices that they would offer farmers selling those products individually. Cooperatives can also serve farmers in providing an important channel for obtaining information and advice to increase their productivity and the profitability of their farming. Moreover, by joining together to achieve common objectives in primary agricultural cooperatives, member-farmers can exercise greater influence on local and national policy issues of concern to them, while also building social cohesion, solidarity, and trust within their communities.
Small farmers and traders often lack the market information they need to earn the most from their crop sales. This paper analyzes the effects of an action research experiment in central Malawi, in which four groups of smallholder farmers were provided with maize and soybean price information from a local commodity exchange during the 2019 marketing season, while four other groups of smallholder farmers did not receive this information. Using data from a panel survey of 399 farmers and 78 traders conducted before and after the main marketing season and using kernel propensity score matching approach to account for possible differences between the treated and non-treated farmers, we estimate the effects of the intervention on a number of outcome indicators. A before versus after analysis was also employed to evaluate changes in traders’ marketing outcomes. We find positive but statistically insignificant effects on maize and soybean selling prices, sales through structured markets and levels of commercialization after the intervention. We also find a negative and statistically significant effect on the quantity of maize sold by farmers, suggesting paradoxically that providing farmers with price information reduced their sales volumes. The proportion of traders aware of structured markets and their share of sales through structured markets also increased significantly after the intervention. The quantity of maize sold by traders as well as the selling prices for maize and soy-bean also increased significantly, although this may be due to factors other than the intervention. The study concludes that provision of price information alone is not enough to facilitate small farmers’ and traders’ use of structured markets. Greater effort is needed to sensitize farmers and traders on the quality and quantity requirements as well as the operations of structured markets.
This report reveals that substantial knowledge is available about the aflatoxin challenge that plagues African farmers, other agri-entrepreneurs, and governments. Commissioned by the ACP-EU Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) in collaboration with the African Union Commission - Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa (PACA), this literature review reveals that a wide range of commodities that are traded nationally, regionally and internationally are contaminated by aflatoxins. African citizens and economies are negatively impacted as a result.
This report addresses the overarching question regarding the role of institutions in enhancing market development following market reforms. It uses the New Institutional Economics framework to empirically analyze the role of a specific market institution, that of brokers acting as intermediaries to match traders in the Ethiopian grain market in reducing the transaction costs of search faced by traders. Brokers play a key role in facilitating exchange in a weak marketing environment where limited public market information, the lack of grain standardization, oral contracts, and weak legal enforcement of contracts increase the risk of contract failure. Relying on primary data, it analyzes traders' microeconomic behavior, social capital, the nature and extent of their transaction costs, and the norms and rules governing the relationship between brokers and traders.The study uses an innovative approach to quantify the costs of search and demonstrates that the brokerage institution is economically efficient both for individual traders and for global economic welfare.
This report summarizes the findings from an innovative study to collect the prices that farmers received for maize and soybeans during the 2020 main marketing season in Malawi. Between April and July, whenever they sold maize or soybeans, farmers were asked to report the prices they received by calling or texting a toll-free number managed by Farm Radio Trust. Reported prices were then compared to the minimum farmgate prices set by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. Our findings show that 75 percent of maize farmers and 90 percent of soybean farmers sold their crops below the official minimum farmgate prices. On average, prices received by these farmers were approximately three-quarters of official minimum farmgate prices.