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The American Civil War introduced the operational level of war and with its introduction came one of the greatest challenges ever confronted by military commanders--operational command and control. In that regard, the objective of this monograph is to determine by what means high level Civil War commanders, here defined as army or army group equivalent, dealt with that challenge. First, the characteristics of the war that led to its being considered the first conflict to experience operations is described. Second, the command structure and general staff organization of late Civil War Union field armies is addressed. A description of the different means of exercising command and control over those armies form the main body of this study and includes the roles played by staffs, aerial telegraphy and electro-magnetic telegraphic systems. Finally, an example of the ways in which the various command and control means were used is offered through an analysis of the planning and early execution of the Union Army's 1864 spring offensive--Grant's final campaign.
The American Civil War introduced the operational level of war and with its introduction came one of the greatest challenges ever confronted by military commanders--operational command and control. In that regard, the objective of this monograph is to determine by what means high level Civil War commanders, here defined as army or army group equivalent, dealt with that challenge. First, the characteristics of the war that led to its being considered the first conflict to experience "operations" is described. Second, the command structure and general staff organization of late Civil War Union field armies is addressed. A description of the different means of exercising command and control over those armies form the main body of this study and includes the roles played by staffs, aerial telegraphy and electro-magnetic telegraphic systems. Finally, an example of the ways in which the various command and control means were used is offered through an analysis of the planning and early execution of the Union Army's 1864 spring offensive--Grant's final campaign.
The American Civil War introduced the operational level of war and with its introduction came one of the greatest challenges ever confronted by military commanders--operational command and control. In that regard, the objective of this monograph is to determine by what means high level Civil War commanders, here defined as army or army group equivalent, dealt with that challenge. First, the characteristics of the war that led to its being considered the first conflict to experience "operations" is described. Second, the command structure and general staff organization of late Civil War Union field armies is addressed. A description of the different means of exercising command and control over those armies form the main body of this study and includes the roles played by staffs, aerial telegraphy and electro-magnetic telegraphic systems. Finally, an example of the ways in which the various command and control means were used is offered through an analysis of the planning and early execution of the Union Army's 1864 spring offensive--Grant's final campaign.
In this comparative history of Union & Confederate command & strategy, Jones shows us how the Civil War was actually conducted. Looking at decision-making at the highest levels, Jones argues that President Lincoln & Davis & most of their senior generals brought to the context of the Civil War a broad grasp of established mil. strategy & its historical applications, as well as the ability to make significant strategic innovations. He emphasizes the role of maneuvers as well as the significance of battles, & demonstrates that the war was a multi-faceted blend of traditional warfare with early influences of the industrial age.
Dr. Richard Sommers’ Challenges of Command in the Civil War distills six decades of studying the Civil War into two succinct, thought-provoking volumes. This first installment focuses on “Civil War Generals and Generalship.” The subsequent volume will explore “Civil War Strategy, Operations, and Organization.” Each chapter is a free-standing essay that can be appreciated in its own right without reading the entire book. Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee stand out in Volume I as Dr. Sommers analyzes their generalship throughout the Civil War. Their exercise of command in the decisive Virginia Campaign from May 1864 to April 1865 receives particular attention—especially during the great Siege of Petersburg, about which the author has long ranked as the pioneering and pre-eminent historian. Five chapters evaluating Grant and Lee are followed by five more on “Civil War Generals and Generalship.” One of those essays, “American Cincinnatus,” explores twenty citizen-soldiers who commanded mobile army corps in the Union Army and explains why such officers were selected for senior command. Antietam, Gettysburg, and Petersburg are central to three essays on Northern corps and wing commanders. Both Federals and Confederates are featured in “Founding Fathers: Renowned Revolutionary War Relatives of Significant Civil War Soldiers and Statesmen.” The ground-breaking original research underlying that chapter identifies scores of connections between the “Greatest Generations” of the 18th and 19th Centuries—far more than just the well-known link of “Light Horse Harry” Lee to his son, Robert E. Lee. From original research in Chapter 10 to new ways of looking at familiar facts in Chapters 6-9 to distilled judgments from a lifetime of study in Chapters 1-5, Challenges of Command invites readers to think—and rethink—about the generalship of Grant, Lee, and senior commanders of the Civil War. This book is an essential part of every Civil War library.
The purpose of this monograph is to identify skills and capabilities required by commanders to excel at the operational level of war and in the practice of operational art. The author evaluated the performance of Confederate Major General Daniel Harvey Hill in his role as a department commander during the American Civil War. Department commanders were responsible for sequencing tactical operations to support the accomplishment of their government’s strategic objectives but received little guidance on how to fulfill their missions. The monograph concludes that twenty first century American military officers in similar command positions must be able to make decisions given ambiguous guidance and a fluid operational environment, be creative and active in developing innovative techniques to better understand the operational environment, and be able to craft holistic campaign plans that go beyond offensive and defensive operations. An examination of Hill’s tenure as commander of the Confederate Department of North Carolina from February to July 1863 found that he was uncomfortable translating discretionary orders into action, he was unable to adequately visualize his operational environment, and he did not construct a coherent campaign plan to accomplish disparate missions and support Confederate strategic aims. Some of Hill’s struggles were due to the inability of the Confederate high command to articulate strategic priorities, the actions of the Union forces, and lack of experience in higher level commands. Previous tactical-level experiences in the war made Hill more cautious about committing force when presented with ambiguous situations and in his capacity as department commander he did not grasp his responsibility to provide recommendations to strategic-level decision makers regarding force disposition and types of combat operations.
A key element in the practice of operational art is the command and control senior leaders employ to direct their forces in battle. This command and control encompasses not only the vision the commander has for the attainment of his campaign aims, but how he translates that vision and his intent into orders which lead to the securing of his objectives. Should the commander fail to impart his vision or intent to his subordinates the unity of effort of his forces will suffer as each subordinate will be left to determine for himself which actions on the battlefield are key to the success of the campaign. This, in large measure, was the case in the army of Northern Virginia in 1863, and the result was defeat on the battlefield.
[Includes 11 charts, 1 map, and 20 illustrations] “In combat situations prior to Vietnam, U.S. military forces had an existing command and control structure which could be tailored to accomplish the task at hand. In Europe during World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower modified the command structures developed for the North African and Mediterranean operations to form Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). After his departure from Bataan in 1942, General Douglas MacArthur had several months in which to design the command structure that ultimately contributed to the defeat of the Japanese...There, the command and control arrangements, which ultimately directed a U.S. Military force of over 500,000 men, evolved from a small military assistance mission established in 1950. The Military Assistance Advisory Group’s philosophy of assistance rather than command significantly influenced the development of the organization. “This monograph describes the development of the U. S. military command and control structure in Vietnam. The focus of the study is primarily on the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and the U.S. Army in Vietnam (USARV). The relationships with the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), and other outside agencies are discussed only as their decisions, policies, and directives affected MACV and operations within South Vietnam. The air war against North Vietnam and naval operations of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were CINCPAC’s responsibilities and are only mentioned in regard to their impact on MACV and the forces under MACV. “This study is not a conventional military or diplomatic history of the war in Vietnam. Rather, it is an analytical appraisal of the command and control structure.”
The Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union’s Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals. General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a “premature” pursuit of General Lee. Upon examination, however, their inability to conceptualize a decisive pursuit of General Lee’s army points to a direct failure at the operational level of War. Both Union generals were unable to link their tactical victories to any larger strategic objective. The reasons for this from the strategic confusion of a conflict evolving from limited War to total War, and from the void in operational training that left both McClellan and Meade ill prepared to perform successfully at this critical level of Warfare. Examining this operational void, it becomes apparent that a commander’s construct of War must be complete, that is, fully cognizant of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of War, in order to achieve success beyond the limits of the tactical battlefield. Such an examination points to the criticality of the operational level of Warfare, highlights the importance of the commander’s concept of operations and suggests that an operational commander must grow in the sense that his cognitive processes must be tuned into the dynamics of his environment, not only on a tactical level, but on the operational and strategic level.