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Mathematical economics uses mathematical tools and reasoning to describe and explain economic reality. At the core of mathematical economics is general equilibrium theory. Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium Theory describes and analyses various general equilibrium models, treating theory from an axiomatic point of view, which may lead to a deeper understanding of problems, may help to avoid incorrect reasoning, and may improve communication within the economic science. This volume consists of four parts, each of which is self-contained. Part I deals with the mathematical and economic preliminaries. Part II considers the static aspects of disequilibrium theory. Part III determines price rigidities endogenously. Finally, Part IV deals with dynamic aspects of disequilibrium theory.
This book contains essays in honour of Claus Weddepohl who, after 22 years, is retiring as professor of mathematical economics at the Department of Quantitative Economics of the University of Amsterdam. Claus Weddepohl may be viewed as th~ first Dutch mathematical economist in the general equi librium tradition of Arrow, Debreu and Hahn. The essays in this book are centered around the themes Equilibrium, Markets and Dynamics, that have been at the heart of Weddepohl's work on mathematical economics for more than three decades. The essays have been classified according to these three themes. Admittedly such a classification always is somewhat arbitrary, and most essays would in fact fit into two or even all three themes. The essays have been written by international as well as Dutch friends and colleagues including Weddepohl's former Ph. D. students. The book starts with a review of Claus Weddepohl's work by Roald Ramer, who has been working with him in Amsterdam for all those years. The review describes how Weddepohl became fascinated by general equilibrium theory in the early stages of his career, how he has been working on the theory of markets throughout his career, and how he turned to applications of nonlinear dynamics to price adjustment processes in a later stage of his career. The first part of the book, Equilibrium, collects essays with general equilib rium theory as the main theme.
General equilibrium In this book we try to cope with the challenging task of reviewing the so called general equilibrium model and of discussing one specific aspect of the approach underlying it, namely, market completeness. With the denomination "general equilibrium" (from now on in short GE) we shall mainly refer to two different things. On one hand, in particular when using the expression "GE approach", we shall refer to a long established methodolog ical tradition in building and developing economic models, which includes, as of today, an enormous amount of contributions, ranging in number by several 1 thousands • On the other hand, in particular when using the expression "stan dard differentiable GE model", we refer to a very specific version of economic model of exchange and production, to be presented in Chapters 8 and 9, and to be modified in Chapters 10 to 15. Such a version is certainly formulated within the GE approach, but it is generated by making several quite restrictive 2 assumptions • Even to list and review very shortly all the collective work which can be ascribed to the GE approach would be a formidable task for several coauthors in a lifetime perspective. The book instead intends to address just a single issue. Before providing an illustration of its main topic, we feel the obligation to say a word on the controversial character of GE. First of all, we should say that we identify the GE approach as being based 3 on three principles .
The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Colleagues and former students in mathematics and econometrics were asked to write on topics that intersected their own specialty and the work of Tijs, who over the past quarter century has created a distinct school of game theory at various universities in the Netherlands. Some of the 14 papers present new results, and others are surveys of the literature, but most fall somewhere between. The topics include sequencing games, the number of extreme points of the core of a transferable utility game, centrality orderings in social networks, the nucleolus as equilibrium price, and a maximum likelihood approach to population uncertainty and equilibrium selection. There is no index. Annotation (c)2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).
Game Theory: Stochastics, Information, Strategies and Cooperation provides a discussion of some relevant topics in game theory. It is composed partially from material compiled by Professor Joachim Rosenmüller when lecturing at IMW, the Institute of Mathematical Economics at the University of Bielefeld. On the other hand, it also contains research topics that are not presented in a typical game theory textbook. Thus, the volume may provide the basis for an advanced course in game theory; simultaneously it may be called a monograph, and, as a third aspect, it also supplies some rather elementary versions of advanced topics of the field. The volume has a non-cooperative and a cooperative part and in both of them the reader is assumed to have some basic knowledge in game theory, for instance, concerning the normal form (bimatrix games, Nash equilibria of the mixed extension, backwards induction in games with perfect information) on one hand and the coalitional function (simple games, convex games, superadditive games, the core, the Shapley volume) on the other hand. Some emphasis is laid on the probabilistic background; however, the author treats stochastic games using the language of probability in order to consider simple models in which measure theory can be omitted.
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.
The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades and this book explores this further by gathering specialists from different professional communities, i.e., economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. This volume considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, with each contribution evaluating the foundational issues. In particular, emphasis is placed on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem. Part I of this collection deals with iterated knowledge in the multi-agent context, and more particularly with common knowledge. The first two papers in Part II of the collection address the so-called logical omniscience problem, a problem which has attracted much attention in the recent epistemic logic literature, and is pertinent to some of the issues discussed by decision theorists under the heading 'bounded rationality'. The remaining two chapters of section II provide two quite different angles on the strength of S5 (or the partitional model of information)- and so two different reasons for eschewing the strong form of logical omniscience implicit in S5. Part III gives attention to application to game theory and decision theory.
In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.