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This note covers considerations that can guide the staff’s policy advice on the use of a broad range of macroprudential tools. It discusses the transmission and likely effectiveness of these tools in mitigating systemic risks and the set of indicators that can be used in surveillance to assess the need for changes in macroprudential policy settings. This note is a supplement to the Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy.
This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.
MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.
"A number of countries are reviewing their institutional frameworks for financial stability so as to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Effective arrangements enabling the authorities to take preventive action are strongly desirable for all countries, emerging or advanced. This paper therefore lays out some basic guidance for the review of institutional arrangements supporting macroprudential policies. It identifies a distinct set of stylized institutional models, sets out criteria for assessing different models, examines their strengths and weaknesses, and explores ways to improve existing institutional setups."--Executive summary.
Macroprudential policies – caps on loan to value ratios, limits on credit growth and other balance sheets restrictions, (countercyclical) capital and reserve requirements and surcharges, and Pigouvian levies – have become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced countries alike. But knowledge is still limited on these tools. Macroprudential policies ought to be motivated by market failures and externalities, but these can be hard to identify. They can also interact with various other policies, such as monetary and microprudential, raising coordination issues. Some countries, especially emerging markets, have used these tools and analyses suggest that some can reduce procyclicality and crisis risks. Yet, much remains to be studied, including tools’ costs ? by adversely affecting resource allocations; how to best adapt tools to country circumstances; and preferred institutional designs, including how to address political economy risks. As such, policy makers should move carefully in adopting tools.
The paper proposes a simple, new, analytical framework for assessing the cost and benefits of macroprudential policies. It proposes a measure of net benefits in terms of parameters that can be estimated: the probability of crisis, the loss in output given crisis, policy effectiveness in bringing down both the probability and damage during crisis, and the output-cost of a policy decision. It discusses three types of policy leakages and identifies instruments that could best minimize the leakages. Some rules of thumb for policymakers are provided.
This paper provides the most comprehensive empirical study of the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments to date. Using data from 49 countries, the paper evaluates the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in reducing systemic risk over time and across institutions and markets. The analysis suggests that many of the most frequently used instruments are effective in reducing pro-cyclicality and the effectiveness is sensitive to the type of shock facing the financial sector. Based on these findings, the paper identifies conditions under which macroprudential policy is most likely to be effective, as well as conditions under which it may have little impact.
This paper analyzes cross-border macrofinancial spillovers from a variety of macroprudential policy measures, using a range of quantitative methods. Event study and panel regression analyses find that liquidity and sectoral macroprudential policy measures often affect cross-border bank credit, whereas capital measures do not. This empirical evidence is stronger for tightening than for loosening measures, is distributed across credit leakage and reallocation effects, and is generally regionally concentrated. Consistently, structural model based simulation analysis indicates that output and bank credit spillovers from sectoral macroprudential policy shocks are generally small worldwide, but are regionally concentrated and economically significant for countries connected by strong trade or financial linkages. This simulation analysis also indicates that countercyclical capital buffer adjustments have the potential to generate sizeable regional spillovers.
Effective arrangements for micro and macroprudential policies to further overall financial stability are strongly desirable for all countries, emerging or advanced. Both policies complement each other, but there can also be potential areas of overlap and conflict, which can complicate this cooperation. Organizing their very close interactions can help contain these potential tensions. This note clarifies the essential features of macroprudential and microprudential policies and their interactions, and delineates their borderline. It proposes mechanisms for aligning both policies in the pursuit of financial stability by identifying those elements that are desirable for effective cooperation between them. The note provides general guidance. Actual arrangements will need take into account country-specific circumstances, reflecting the fact that that there is no “one size fits all.”