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A comprehensive history of the development and dismantling of South Africa's weapons of mass destruction program.
In 1989, South Africa made the momentous decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, making it the first and still the only country that has produced nuclear weapons and given them up. Over thirty years, the apartheid regime had created a remarkably sophisticated capability to build nuclear weapons-both the nuclear warhead and advanced military systems to deliver them. The program was born in secret and remained so until its end. The government initially sought to dismantle it in secret. It hoped to avoid any negative international consequences of possessing nuclear weapons. The apartheid government's strategy did not work, because too many intelligence agencies knew about South Africa's nuclear weapons. Faced with intense pressure, South Africa's President F.W. de Klerk reversed course and adopted a policy of transparency in 1993. However, he decided to hide many of its aspects. Nonetheless, most of the remaining secrets emerged over the ensuing 25 years. Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program draws on previously secret information to provide the first comprehensive, technically-oriented look at South Africa's nuclear weapons program; how it grew, evolved, and ended. It also finds lessons for today's nuclear proliferation cases.
The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful developments and subsequent rollbacks of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from flu's effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own identity Crisis. Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation and receive guarantees of its security rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared total onslaught by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West.
South Africa was the first nation in the world to renounce and destroy its top-secret nuclear weapons capability. Its government also eliminated the ability to produce and deliver these warheads. Because no one archived the official documentary evidence of the program, various writers and scholars, as well as the public at large, have been left to speculate-and forget-the activities that consumed billions of rands and years of dedication. Based on facts and first-hand perspectives, Armament and Disarmament offers intimate views from three participants in the nuclear weapons program. A larger picture emerges through their recollections, fulfilling the role of essential perspectives and documentation where official records no longer exist. Out of secrecy and a need-to-know philosophy, many involved in the program, both wittingly and unwittingly, were never briefed as to how their particular endeavors fit into the bigger scheme. Armament and Disarmament sheds light on the complexity of events surrounding the South African nuclear weapons program and brings tribute to the ingenuity and dedication of all those involved.
This unique book analyzes the origins and development of the South African chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, as well as its rollback. It concludes with a profile of South Africa as a state that produced weapons of mass destruction and with a list of outstanding questions. More than 20 policy lessons, based on the South African case, are presented, which should be considered in future CBW non-proliferation studies. From the 1960s until the 1990s, apartheid South Africa was an isolated state that felt threatened by growing domestic unrest, as well as by a more powerful state actor, the Soviet Union, which was helping hostile regimes and liberation movements in southern Africa. One response of the apartheid regime to changing threat perceptions outside and inside of South Africa was to develop a new and more sophisticated CBW program, code-named "Project Coast," and to accelerate a nuclear weapons program. The CBW decision-making process was secretive and controlled by the military and enabled a very sophisticated program to be developed with little outside scrutiny. Military and police units used chemical and biological agents for counter-insurgency warfare, assassination, and execution of war prisoners. As the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition at home, top political leaders approved plans for research and development of exotic means to neutralize opponents, large-scale offensive uses of the program, and weaponization. However, the plans were not operationalized. The end of the external threat led to a decision to unilaterally dismantle the program, prior to a shift to majority rule. Lack of civilian control over military programs made the rollback difficult, rife with corruption, and left proliferation concerns in place. Ultimately, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries pressured the South African government to ensure that the CBW program was dismantled and the former project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, constrained. However, Basson secretly retained copies of Project Coast documents, which helped to perpetuate proliferation concerns. Project Coast was not the first CBW program that the South African government had developed. From 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, South African troops fought in the two World Wars and faced the threat of CBW. Although the 1925 Geneva Convention banned the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, Japan and possibly the Soviet Union employed such weapons in WWII. As early as the 1930s, widespread evidence emerged of the efficacy of biological warfare (BW) based on scientific work conducted in the US, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The South African scientific and military communities kept pace with the various developments in CBW.
Contents: Research Problem and Assumptions; South Africa's Nuclear Capability; Utility for South African Nuclear Weapons; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Economic Interests; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Interests in Access to Strategic Materials; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Political Interests; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Military Interests; South African Proliferation and Western Security Interests in General. (fr).
South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction offers an in-depth view of the secret development and voluntary disarmament of South Africa's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program, Project Coast. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess explore how systems used for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in South Africa were acquired and established beyond the gaze of international and domestic political actors. On the basis of archival evidence from Project Coast and their own extensive interviews with military and political officials, Purkitt and Burgess consider what motivates countries to acquire and build such powerful weaponry and examine when and how decisions are made to dismantle a military arsenal voluntarily. Questions such as how to destroy weapons safely and keep them from reappearing on international markets are considered along with comparative strategies for successful disarmament in other nation-states.
Project Coast was the codename for a covert programme, established by the South African apartheid government in 1981, to develop a range of chemical and biological agents intended for use against opponents of the regime within and outside the state. This book examines the history of the project, its operation outside ordinary political, military and financial controls, through to its eventual demise in 1995. It draws on information made public at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, as well as evidence presented at the criminal trial of Dr Wouter Basson, the project's director.