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The author has spent upwards of ten years in working on this book. His objective is to clarify the military aspect of the Moscow-Peking dialogue which has not yet received its deserved treatment. The apogee of that dialogue seems to have been passed toward the end of the rule of Khrushchev. Yet the Vietnam war spawns fresh contention. Our cover age will span the development from I956 to the present. The beginning of the dispute with regard to the origins of war in general is taken up in the first two chapters. The next three chapters discuss the several types of war with the frame of reference set in what now appears to be a quondam era. But the principle differences between the disputants are just as outstanding today as they were then. The penultimate chapter is somewhat wide in scope in order to deal with the larger and more intensely bitter polemics evolving after Khrushchev left office. There have been many new and startling views held by both sides since then, views splitting them poles apart. Omi nously at issue now is the question of Sino-Soviet peaceful coexistence. Our work, obviously, cannot wait until that question is answered to be finished. The final chapter concludes our study. To write of subjects as dynamic as this one is a challenge because they are current affairs. Due to the swift change of events, no sooner is our typescript put to press than it needs a revision.
The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War has long been understood in a global context, but Jeremy Friedman's Shadow Cold War delves deeper into the era to examine the competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for the leadership of the world revolution. When a world of newly independent states emerged from decolonization desperately poor and politically disorganized, Moscow and Beijing turned their focus to attracting these new entities, setting the stage for Sino-Soviet competition. Based on archival research from ten countries, including new materials from Russia and China, many no longer accessible to researchers, this book examines how China sought to mobilize Asia, Africa, and Latin America to seize the revolutionary mantle from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union adapted to win it back, transforming the nature of socialist revolution in the process. This groundbreaking book is the first to explore the significance of this second Cold War that China and the Soviet Union fought in the shadow of the capitalist-communist clash.
In 1950 the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance to foster cultural and technological cooperation between the Soviet bloc and the PRC. While this treaty was intended as a break with the colonial past, Austin Jersild argues that the alliance ultimately failed because the enduring problem of Russian imperialism led to Chinese frustration with the Soviets. Jersild zeros in on the ground-level experiences of the socialist bloc advisers in China, who were involved in everything from the development of university curricula, the exploration for oil, and railway construction to piano lessons. Their goal was to reproduce a Chinese administrative elite in their own image that could serve as a valuable ally in the Soviet bloc's struggle against the United States. Interestingly, the USSR's allies in Central Europe were as frustrated by the "great power chauvinism" of the Soviet Union as was China. By exposing this aspect of the story, Jersild shows how the alliance, and finally the split, had a true international dimension.
Although the Chinese and the Vietnamese were Cold War allies in wars against the French and the Americans, their alliance collapsed and they ultimately fought a war against each other in 1979. More than thirty years later the fundamental cause of the alliance's termination remains contested among historians, international relations theorists, and Asian studies specialists. Nicholas Khoo brings fresh perspective to this debate. Using Chinese-language materials released since the end of the Cold War, Khoo revises existing explanations for the termination of China's alliance with Vietnam, arguing that Vietnamese cooperation with China's Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was the necessary and sufficient cause for the alliance's termination. He finds alternative explanations to be less persuasive. These emphasize nonmaterial causes, such as ideology and culture, or reference issues within the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, such as land and border disputes, Vietnam's treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, and Vietnam's attempt to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia and Laos. Khoo also adds to the debate over the relevance of realist theory in interpreting China's international behavior during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. While others see China as a social state driven by nonmaterial processes, Khoo makes the case for viewing China as a quintessential neorealist state. From this perspective, the focus of neorealist theory on security threats from materially stronger powers explains China's foreign policy not only toward the Soviet Union but also in relation to its Vietnamese allies.
Mikhail Gorbachev's relations with the West have captured the imagination of contemporaries and historians alike, but his vision of Soviet leadership in Asia has received far less attention. The failure of Gorbachev's Asian initiatives has had dramatic consequences, by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was in full retreat from Asia, and since the Soviet collapse, Russia has been left on the sidelines of the "Pacific century." In this exceptionally wide-ranging and deeply researched book, Sergey Radchenko offers an illuminating account of the end of the Cold War in the East, tracing the death of Soviet ambitions in Asia. Radchenko shows that Gorbachev began with big gestures, of which the most important was his initiative in Vladivostok in July 1986, the opening salvo of the Soviet charm offensive in Asia Pacific. The problem, Radchenko points out, was that no one in Asia bought into Gorbachev's vision. If the Soviets had realized earlier that they needed Asia more than Asia needed them, they might have played a much more important role there. Instead, China was largely misunderstood, early gains in India were squandered, Japan was ignored or condescended to, and the Korean scenario played out in ways most unfavorable to Russia. Radchenko captures all of this in his compelling narrative, shedding important new light on many key players, including Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping, Margaret Thatcher, Boris Yeltsin, and George H. W. Bush, among others. Based on archival research in Russia, China, Mongolia, India, the United States, Britain, and numerous European countries and on interviews with former policy makers in a dozen countries, Unwanted Visionaries presents a deftly narrated and penetrating portrait of the Soviet failure in the East, with a wealth of valuable insight into Asia today.
Using major new sources, including cables between Mao and Stalin and interviews with key actors, this book tells the inside story of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the origins of the Korean War.
Why would one country impose economic sanctions against another in pursuit of foreign policy objectives? How effective is the use of such economic weapons? This book examines how and why the United States and its allies instituted economic sanctions against the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, and how the embargo affected Chinese domestic policy and the Sino-Soviet alliance.
The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order is the third volume in Gilbert Rozman's trilogy on national identity. The first two volumes, edited by Gilbert Rozman, concerned the identities of three East Asian countries: China, Japan, and South Korea. These books analyzed how these countries' national identities suffered through their relation to modernization, and examined how the national identity of each differed from the other two and how those differences were shaped by the relation of each country to the United States. In this third volume, Rozman examines Russia together with China. The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order argues that China and Russia's national identities are much closer to each other than usually thought, and are growing even closer. Moreover, the closeness of their identities comes neither from their prerevolutionary pasts nor from today's practical politics, but rather from habits carried over from their communist periods, even though the ideological dimensions of their identities have weakened since 1990.