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This paper was originally prepared in March 2004 as draft technical annexes to Chapter 3 of the strategy document "Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward." It was prepared with support from ADB, IMF, UNDP, World Bank, and others, and presented at the international conference on Afghanistan and the International Community: A Partnership for the Future in Berlin on 31 March-1 April 2004. This paper outlines the current status, accomplishments, and key issues in the transport sector, and presents the Government's sector development programs and investment budgets.
This paper outlines the current status, accomplishments, and key issues in the natural resources management sector, and presents the Government's sector development programs and investment budgets.
The U.S. strategic goal for Afghanistan is to defeat and prevent the return of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Since fiscal year 2002, U.S. costs reported for U.S. military, U.S. diplomatic, and reconstruction and relief operations in Afghanistan have been over $500 billion. Given U.S. strategic goals and the level of U.S. resources expected to support Afghanistan in the future, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified a number of key issues for the 113th Congress to consider in developing oversight agendas and determining the way forward in Afghanistan. This book suggests specific areas of oversight on the topics of: Afghanistan's security environment; transition of lead security to Afghan security forces; future cost and sustainability of Afghan security forces; and Department of Defense planning for the drawdown of equipment in Afghanistan.
This book examines the implications of international military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 for the country's future economic growth, fiscal sustainability, public sector capacity, and service delivery.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
The authors consider various approaches to networked operations that are based on the physical environment and cultural context in which armed forces operate. They conclude that a "one size fits all" approach to command and control for networked operations may not be the most effective and suggest a more human-centric approach than the primarily technology-centred model used by the U.S. military.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
Afghan women were at the forefront of global agendas in late 2001, fueled by a mix of media coverage, humanitarian intervention and military operations. Calls for "liberating" Afghan women were widespread. Women's roles in Afghanistan have long been politically divisive, marked by struggles between modernization and tradition. Women, politics, and the state have always been intertwined in Afghanistan, and conflicts have been fueled by attempts to challenge or change women's status. It may appear that we have come full circle twenty years later, in late 2021, when Afghanistan fell to the Taliban once more. Women's rights in Afghanistan have been stripped away, and any gains--however tenuous--now appear lost. Today, the country navigates both a humanitarian and a human rights crisis. This book measures the rhetoric of liberation and the physical and ideological occupations of Afghanistan over the twenty-year period from 2001 through 2021 through the voices, perspectives, and experiences of those who are implicated in this reality--Afghan women.